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ABSTRACT 
The issue of legitimacy raises the problem of the 
validation of political authority by those subject to its 
command. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate critically 
Antonio Gramscils concept of hegemony as a framework for 
analysing legitimacy. I identify Gramscils analysis as a 
response to Italy's social and political crisis after the 
First World War, and argue that this sets limits to the 
applicability of his analysis today. 
I show that Gramscits response to the crisis had two 
central characteristics: the search for a new form of moral 
unity in the proletariat, and a concern to ground that unity 
in the objective decline of the Italian liberal state. The 
concept hegemony was crucially bound up with that response. 
As an analysis of the relationship between state, society and 
consent, hegemony provided a 'strategic' account of class 
politics, as opposed to a formal analysis of capitalist 
society, as some critics have suggested. Furthermore, Gramsci 
believed that in the period of crisis, authority had passed 
over to the intellectuals in civil society. The increased 
social division of labour in contemporary society placed 
intellectuals in a position to provide leadership for the 
subjects they represented. I point out that Gramscils 
construal of the relationship between class and ideology is 
novel precisely because of the transitional period he sought 
to interpret. This permitted him to emphasise classes as the 
central political forces, yet retain a non-economistic account 
of ideology. 
As a framework for the analysis of legitimacy, Gramscils 
concept of hegemony is limited. This is because he 
presupposed the absence of a strongly articulated public 
sphere. As a consequence, his stress on ideological struggle 
in civil society is suggestive, but remains inadequate as a 
general theory. 
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Note on Abbreviations and References 
References to works by Gramsci will be provided in brackets in 
the text using the abreviations outlined below. Other works 
cited will be given in the text using the author, date, page 
system (see Bibliography for full citation). Longer 
references will be given in the footnotes. 
The majority of references to Gramsci will be to Italian 
editions. However, where possible I have consulted English 
translations. Abbreviations for works by Gramsci will be as 
follows: 
CT Cronache torinesi (1913-1917) (1980). 
CF La Citt& futura (1917-1918) (1982). 
NM Il Nostro Marx ( 1918-1919) (1984). 
ON L'Ordine nuovo ( 1919-20) (1987). 
CPC La costruzione del Partito comunista (1971). 
scw Selections from Cultural Writings (1985). 
SPWI Selections-from Political Writinqs, 1911-1921 
(1977). 
SPWII Selections from Political Writings, 1921-1926 
(1978). 
SPN- Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971). 
Q Quaderni-del carcere (1975). 
LC Lettere del carcere (1975). 
L -Lettere 1908-26 (1992). - 
INTRODUCTION 
The capacity of political systems to maintain the continued 
support of their subject populations is increasingly in doubt 
in contemporary societies. Less clear, however, is the mode 
of analysis that can illuminate the means by which social 
relations come to sustain-or undermine political legitimacy. 
one such approach, centred on the concept of hegemony,, as 
conceived by the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1891- 
1937), places emphasis on the ideological and political bases 
to consent in class divided societies. In this thesis I 
address the issue of the contemporary relevance of Gramscils 
writings to the analysis of legitimacy. 
I argue that Gramscils concept of hegemony, as developed 
in his Ouaderni del carcere, must, be seen as part of an on- 
going response to the crisis in Italian political and social 
life since the. First World War. This response was 
characterised by a concern to find new bases of moral unity 
centred on the proletariat. In addition, Gramsci was 
compelled to reveal how a new social order was intrinsically 
bound up with the decline of the bourgeois state. 
The theme of crisis fundamentally influenced Graltscils 
prison writings. This is especially so in two areas closely 
related to the analysis of consent: the relation between 
state, society and politics, andthe role of the 
intellectuals. Against recent, marxist critics, I argue that 
Gramscils location of hegemony in civil society implied a 
'strategic' rather than structural account of politics. This 
presupposed that a transition away from bourgeois political 
dominance was already underway and hence hegemony cannot be 
equated with a formal account of capitalist society. 
The organising capacities of individuals with specialist 
functions are of paramount importance in Gramscils 
conceptualisation of consent as a moral relationship. His' 
account of intellectuals highlighted what he saw as the 
increased prominence of functional divisions of labour -in 
securing the unification of class interests. The struggle 
over civil society, therefore, was critically linked to the 
unification of class intellectuals whose role it was to 
interpret the particular experiences of the masses in terms of 
the hegemonic worldview of the dominant class. '" As such, 
consent was presented in a decidedly non-liberal guise, as a 
form of leadership over consciousness. 
As an account of the relation between class and ideology, 
I argue that Gramscils concept of hegemony'is novel. This is 
because he sought to grasp both the ultimate closure on 
beliefs and values by class structure, and the irreducibility 
of consciousness to a simple economic determination. Yet 
despite recent attempts to incorporate hegemony into more 
systematic accounts of ideology, I suggest that Gramscils 
thought is coherent in terms of his aim: to grasp the 
indeterminate character of class struggle in a period of 
crisis. 
The process of legitimating the authority of the state, 
in light of the above arguments, is not fully exhausted in 
Gramscils account of hegemony. Despite attempts by Marxists 
to draw his work into their analyses, hegemony is clearly 
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circumscribed by the presuppositions that characterised his 
response to the Italian crisis. In stressing the ideological 
and political unification of civil society, Gramsci remained 
focused on the collapse of bourgeois political influence and 
the possible emergence of forms of moral symmetry--shared 
conceptions of the good--to take its, place. While hegemony, 
therefore, is limited as a framework for analysing legitimacy 
in the modern state, it is suggestive with regard to the 
notion of civil society. For just as hegemony indicated that 
the collective organisation of cultural identities could not 
be reduced to the simple imposition of a class ideology, so 
contemporary theorists are seeking to reconstruct the relation 
between the 'private' and the 'public' as an ethical ideal 
irreducible to bourgeois individualism. 
In this introductory chapter I shall reveal how the 
problematic of hegemony is rooted in debates concerning the 
proper analysis of the relationship between subjects and 
political authority. One of the cornerstones of this debate 
is the distinction between private and public--a division that 
is both normative and sociological in its implications. 
Analysing hegemony as a framework for legitimacy means first 
of all showing how the, issue of consciousness, central to 
Gramscils concerns, is related to arguments over the role of 
belief in validating authority relations. -Part One of this 
Introduction reveals the problematic nature of legitimacy when 
conceived as an enquiry into the role of belief in sustaining 
political authority. Part Two goes on to highlight the 
different normative and analytical approaches to the analysis 
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of legitimacy. And Part Three discusses the scope and method 
of argument employed in the following study. 
Part one: Legitimacyl Authority and Belief , 
An enquiry into legitimacy is an enquiry into the means by 
which subjects are reconciled to the political order. Broadly 
speaking, legitimacy refers to the. validation of political 
relationships and institutions. However, the issue arises in 
different contexts for various reasons and inevitably there - 
are diverse ways of conceiving it. Indeed the definition and 
relevance of legitimacy itself has become a political issue 
(see Barker, 1990: ch. 1; Vincent: 1987: 37-9). 
The search for legitimacy, Connolly (1984b) argues, is a 
characteristic feature of modernity. In an age distinguished 
from its predecessors by the Isecularisation of nature, the 
concentration of, will and agency in human beings, [and] the 
accentuation of the conventional' (Connolly, 1984b: 4), the 
problem of finding a common ground to validate political 
institutions is exposed in a way never before imagined. The 
turn away frqm the Divine to human will as the source of all' 
authority, however, has generated as many problems as it has 
benefits. For theorists such as Charles Taylor (1985) and 
John H. Schaar (1984) modern political crises are 
fundamentally linked to the crisis of human identity 
instigated by modernity. 
While these philosophical approaches to the issue offer 
some clue to the broader dimensions of the problem, the 
practical analysis of legitimacy implies a different kind of 
enquiry. Normative political theory, for instance, seeks to 
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outline prescriptive criteria by which subjects' compliance 
with political institutions can be conceived as a rational 
obligation. This stress on how political relations ought to 
be arranged has been elaborated most commonly in theories of 
justice. In modern liberal democratic theory this approach 
has emerged in terms of theories of rights, in which justice 
has a strong juridical connotation. The emphasis here is 
clearly on the prescriptive. Whereas legitimacy is 
undoubtedly implicit in this approach, the onus is 
fundamentally on achieving a coherent resolution to the 
problems of the day, rather than raising the issue of 
legitimacy as a problem to be explained. This latter task is 
more descriptive in orientation than abstract and, as such, 
endeavours to enquire into the means by which legitimacy is 
actually generated or lost. However, it would be false to 
assume that analysing legitimacy is simply a matter of 
empirical observation. Legitimacy raises the problem of why 
and on what basis people obey, not merely whether they do so. 
An enquiry into legitimacy is necessarily interpretive, 
therefore, seeking to establish within specific c9ntexts the 
correspondence between people's behaviour and the forms of 
justification from whichýthey may or may not depart. Such an 
analysis must define criteria by which patterns of compliant 
behaviour may be predicted. In this way 'the degree of 
support given to a specific governmental order' (Cohen, 1988: 
3) may be discerned. While these criteria may well include 
normative accounts such as those proffered in political 
theory, it is their normative force rather than logical 
coherence that is seen to be significant in generating 
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legitimacy. Analysing legitimacy, therefore, requires an 
understanding of the normative force of legitimating criteria 
in order to assess the degree of support subjects may confer 
upon political relations. Importantly, these criteria include 
not only the justifications for compliance by subjects but 
also the constraints on rulers in their specific capacities. 
That legitimacy is raised as an issue in itself suggests 
the possibility of disjuncture between political arrangements 
and the support they require to continue. The analysis of 
legitimacy, therefore, provides the terms'by which the 
achievement or loss of support may be measured. Such terms 
may not necessarily explain the motivations for behaviour, but 
they do contribute to the explanation of the effects of 
certain kinds of behaviour on the validation of political 
relations. 
But what are the criteria for measuring legitimacy? What 
determines the legitimacy of the'political order? ý Ronald 
Cohen (1988: 16-20) has argued that a number of causal factors 
may be seen to determine legitimacy, and consequently he 
recommends a 'synthetic' approach. For Cohen, legitimacy'is 
determined by an amalgam of the coercive capacities of the 
state, the continued accrual-of benefits to those who must 
comply, the maintenance of a specifically moral sanction to 
political relations, and the generation of a rational dialogue 
between subjects and state. Each factor in isolation-cannot 
account for legitimacy, but taken as a'whole each, has an 
important contribution to make. 
Cohen"s account, however, provides a clue to the'Most 
influential factors on legitimacy more than an explanation of 
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legitimacy itself. David Beetham (1991), in contrast, has 
provided what he sees as a general definition of legitimacy 
for, comparative use in the social sciences. In his view, 
legitimacy is, a multidimensional concept with three distinct 
levels. These consist of: 1) rules, which regulate the 
exercise of power; 2) beliefs, which couch rules in 
conceptions of the moral source of authority, the qualities of 
the powerful, and the sense of a common interest; -and 3) 
consenting behaviour, which provides a symbolic confirmation 
of the validity of power relations through observable action 
(Beetham, 1991: 15-20). Each dimension provides a 
qualitatively distinct justification of power relations and 
consequently a distinct mode of non-legitimacy if absent. For 
power to be legitimate, Beetham argues, each condition is 
required, for all systems of power are regulated by rules, 
beliefs and actions that embody normative-justifications; 
although in any specific circumstance their realisation will 
be a matter of degree (1991: 19-20,37-40). The three 
dimensions of legitimacy are intrinsic to relations of power 
which typically. embody asymmetrical access to resources and 
capacities to command (1991: 46-51). The division of labour 
between dominant and subordinate is specified by the above, 
legitimating criteria which, far from being arbitrary, confer 
an appearance of 'naturalness' upon those relations. Thus 
Beetham argues power relations are self-legitimating since 
legitimacy operates internally, not externally, to the social 
organisation of power (1991: 61-3). Furthermore, Beetham 
warns against conceiving legitimacy as simply the belief in 
legitimacy. Because the criteria of legitimacy are intrinsic 
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to power relations, they have a status independent of, the 
subject's preferences and hence legitimacy is not contingent 
upon the arbitrary will of the dominant or subordinate. ' 
The concept of legitimacy is often associated with the 
correlate term 'authority', and it is to this term that I turn 
next. For debates concerning legitimacy frequently arise-in 
the context of disputes about authority. This involves 
especially the relationship between belief and authority. 
The claim to ultimate authority within a given 
territorial boundary has been the distinctive feature of the 
modern nation state. As such, the power it wields is claimed 
to override all others within that boundary. Such a power is 
said to be invested with an authority that no other 
association may rightly demand. As a distinct mode of power 
it requires a distinct mode of legitimacy. But what is so 
distinct about political authority that it may rightfully 
demand compliance from its subjects? 
Friedman (1990) has attempted to clarify some of the 
issues in modern disagreements over the nature of the concept 
authority. The ambiguity of the term is illustrated by its 
use in defining both the legitimate deployment of force 
(Weber, 1948) and in suggesting a relationship in which force 
is by definition unnecessary to elicit obedience (Arendt, 
1961; see Friedman, 1990: 59-63). What unites these 
approaches is the recognition that authority denotes a 
relationship of influence characterised by the 'surrender of 
private judgment' (see Green, 1988: 36-42). This relationship 
1. Beetham (1991: 62). See also his critique of Weber, 
(1991: 23-5). 
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is thus characterised by an asymmetry whereby one party 
exercises influence (power, control, force, advice) over 
another. Yet this influence is neither simply, advice nor 
force, for what distinguishes authority from mere counsel or 
naked coercion is the condition whereby those subject to it 
are obliged to obey regardless of their own opinion. 'What is 
therefore essential to the concept of an authoritative command 
is the opening up of a distinction between the person who I 
prescribes and what he prescribes, so that the content of the 
prescription becomesIrrelevant, and the, person becomes the 
factor that endows the prescription with, its distinctive 
appeal' (1990: 66). Consequently: 'To cite authority as a 
reason for doing an act (or believing an opinion) is to put a 
stop to the demand for reasons at the level of the act-itself, 
and to transfer one's reason to another-person's "will" or 
judgment' (1990: 67). Inevitably, therefore, an authority 
relation will include some mode of identification of a 
person's entitlement to command (1990: 68-71). 
Yet if these dimensions are intrinsic features of 
authority, they are clearly interpreted in different ways and 
Friedman suggests that-there must be some 'prior social 
agreement' that differentiates distinct forms of authority. 
The concept authority therefore 
implies that there exists, some mutually recognised 
normative relationship giving the one the right to 
command or speak and the other the duty to obey. 
Authority thus involves a form of influence that can 
only be exercised from within a certain kind of 
normative arrangement accepted by both parties. 
Therefore to explain how one man can exercise 
authoritative influence over another always calls 
for an explanation of the existence (acceptance) of 
the arrangement within which the parties conceive 
themselves to be embraced (1990: 71). 
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Friedman identifies two conceptions of authority distinguished 
by the location of belief in the authority relation. The 
distinction between 'in' andýlanl authority has come to 
signify different traditions in political philosophy,, and it 
is around these two notions that, -authority has become 
ambiguous. ý Whereas authority suggests the surrender of 
judgment to another, the reasons for the relinquishing of 
private judgment differ markedly with respect to the qualities 
ascribed to the person or party in command. When a person, is 
described as being 'in authority", this suggests that the 
obligation to obey stems from the fact that commands issue 
from a particular office. The qualities of the person who_ 
issues them and the nature of the commands themselves are 
considered'irrelevant. This procedural form of authority 
relation arises when there is an absence of consensus over 
substantive issues and hence where it is thought that 
abandonment of private belief is outweighed by the value of 
coordination (1990: 78). The merits of the-person in 
authority and the decisions made are ruled out as intrinsic 
features of the relation. of authority. Consequently, 'the 
authority relationship will then appear as an elaborate 
contrivance designed to achieve agreement at the procedural 
level--by defining whose judgment is to count as "public" and 
whose judgment is deemed "private'" (1990: 78). This approach 
involves the acceptance of a division between theory and 
practice, i. e the inevitability of a disjuncture between 
public obligations and private desires. 
An alternative and opposed approach is suggested by the 
notion of 1-an authority'. It is the quality of the position 
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holder rather than the'-office itself that affirms the duty to 
obey: 'Here the justification for deferring to'some-person is 
thal: 'he is thought to have special knowledge, wisdom, or- 
insight or to be the recipient-of a revelation or unique 
experience not availableýto other men' (1990: 80). As such, 
this notion suggests an inequality in judgment-that the 
previous'notion did not (for anyone could hold office) and 
therefore posits the'existence of substantive reality-over- 
which an authoritative judgment can be made. The issuer of 
commands is in this case an-authority over belief, an 
interpreter whose right to command derives from the prior 
assumption that there is a substantial' common interest to 
which he or she has special access. 
The relation-between belief and authority is crucial in 
distinguishing these two approaches. As Friedman remarks: 
'belief can enter into the authority relation at two distinct 
points and can be directed on two distinct objects, the'source 
of the authoritative utterance and the content' (1990: 68-9). 
In the procedural conception ('in' authority)'deference is to 
an office regardless of any shared belief between the subject 
and office-holder. In the second conception ('an' authority) 
deference is predicated on precisely a common belief in the 
existence of substantial good of which the office-holder has 
superior knowledge. While both require that the subject'obey 
regardless of their own judgment (for authority by definition 
is established in order to by-pass the constant evaluation of 
commands), the relation itself is constituted on a prior 
understanding in which belief plays a fundamental role in 
determining the nature of the office-holder's relationship 
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with the subject. Both require some kind of 'social 
agreement' by which to establish authority, but in the 
procedural account that is the entirety of the role of belief. 
There, belief over most substantive issues remains 'private'. 
In the second account, belief is carried over into the content 
and not just the form of the authority relation and 
consequently the office-holder is ascribed a status as the 
interpreter of a common good rather than that of a 'neutral' 
official. 
Authority specifies the arrangement which establishes the 
bond between rulers and ruled. Beetham argues that such an 
arrangement is articulated at the level of belief which unites 
the powerful and subordinate in a common interest, and then 
differentiates them according to their capacities to realise 
it (1991: 69-90). The idea of a community of interests aims 
to show that the distribution of power serves both the 
powerful and subordinate, and not the powerful alone (1991: 
82). This sets up a degree of 'symmetry' between members of a 
community. 2 This symmetry is often symbolised by the 
identification of a common source of authority. For example, 
God,, 'Tradition', or the 'People'. As Friedmanýsuggests, 
however, belief may specify both the source and content of 
authority. The distinction between 'in' and 'an' authority 
represents, therefore, alternative accounts of how common 
2.1 have taken the term 'symmetry' from Tester (1992: ch. 
2). Whereas he employs it to discuss the relation 
between individuals in civil society, I use it to suggest 
the commonality of subjects in relation to authority. 
This commonality need not imply equality. 
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interests may not only establish but also regulate the 
practice of legitimate authority. 
Part Two: Analyzing the Public and the Private 
At stake in these approaches are contrasting accounts of the 
boundary that separates the subject and the political order. 
Modern political theory has presented this-problematic 
relation in terms of the divide between 'public' and 
'private'. Although these-terms are liberal in origin, they 
constitute a crucial point of departure for-the analysis of 
legitimacy, because competing accounts of the support for 
political authority presuppose some conception of how 
individual subjects relate to common obligations. Liberal 
political thought, -for example, has sought to, construct a 
notion of authority balancing individual with collective 
goods. With a strong emphasis on the private interests of the 
individual, legitimacy is argued to derive from the continued 
separation of private and public realms. However, a more 
radical tradition within liberal and Marxist thought has 
exposed what is believed to be the poverty of such a 
separation between private and public. The reunification of 
the subject with the political order demands a form of 
authority grounded in the 'collective will' of the 'people'. 
These two traditions have set the general tone of debate for 
normative arguments concerning legitimacy in-Western political 
theory. They are, however, intimately connected with the 
kinds of concepts and categories deployed generally in the 
analysis of political systems. 
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Liberalism, as Benn and Gaus (1983) have argued, has 
oscillated between an 'individualist' and an 'organic' model. 
This has resulted in differentiated accounts of the 
relationship between private and public, and state and 
society. The individualist model stresses the ontological and 
consequently political primacy, of individuals (1983: 33-5). 
This has led to an attempt to draw a strict division between 
private and public, where 'publicness' refers only to the 
aggregation of individual claims. Individualists are 
suspicious of ascriptions of collective identity and are keen 
to draw a boundary between public and private activities. The 
relation between the two is often treated as a 'contract' or 
embellished with an appeal to 'rights' in order to emphasise 
the priority of the individual over the collective. In this 
way political authority is characteristically-treated as an 
impersonal form of public power, above all coordinating rather 
than unifying diverse claims. 3 This strand of thought has 
postulated a 'procedural' notion of authority. Often in this 
account it is civil society, as the realm of diverse interests 
and individual activities, that is considered the primary 
realm of freedom. While the state ensures the conditions of 
this freedom, it is recommended that its role is minimal, 
'interfering' only to restore the continued pursuit of private 
goods. Consequently, individuals, participation in political 
activity is thought to be a restriction on the division 
3. Hobbes (1991: 121), for instance, argued that, the 
commonwealth was authorised by the consent of the 
multitude and not by a single collective entity. 
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between private and public and hence is regarded with 
suspicion. 
organic liberal-models and, Marxist'accounts have arisen 
in opposition to liberal individualism, although only the 
latter has inspired a sophisticated form of political 
analysis. Both approaches reject the division between 
individual and society intrinsic to the individualist model 
and seek to address the division by asserting the fundamental 
unity of subjects in society. 
organic liberal theory has aimed at undermining the 
strict, division'between private and public by presenting the 
state as representative of the common life of its citizens. 
Primacy is given to the social group-rather than the 
individual, and the public realm is ascribed an-identity 
beyond a mere aggregation (Benn and Gaus, 1983: 50). The 
closer proximity of private and public is illustrated in 
organic liberalism's use of the division between 
'particularity' and 'universality., to characterise the two 
realms. This suggests not so much an opposition divided by a 
clear boundary than a mutuality whereby the one reinforces the 
other. Importantly, organic liberal theory-has stressed that 
although the two realms are not opposed, they still remain as 
separate realms. Private and public are mutually 
,, /Pýaccommd, ating; 
they do not cancel each other out. Hegel, 's, 
attempt to reconcile state and civil society as distinct 
realms of 'ethical life, is a good example here. 4 
4. See Walton (1983) and Vincent (1987: 'ch. 4). Rousseau 
(1979) also provided an 'organic' account of the relation 
between individual and state. For contemporary criticism 
of liberalism's failure to provide a substantive 
normative foundation, see Sandel (1992) and Taylor 
is 
The Marxist tradition, however, despite drawing on 
similar 'organic' arguments,, has presented, the division 
between private and public as inherently contradictory and 
irreconcilable. Marxist political theory, therefore, -, 
postulates the dissolution of the state as a necessary step 
towards human emancipation. Traditionally, Marxists have - 
considered social collectivities, - classes, as the basic units 
of human agency in society. However, unlike organic liberals, 
they do not believe that the conflict of interests between 
such collectivities can be fully transcended through a higher 
common identity in the liberal state. Marx-argued 
vociferously against the universalising pretensions of, the, 
modern state as it was presented by Hegel-(see Marx, 1975: 58- 
64). Only by, exposing class conflict and urging the 
revolutionary overthrow of-bourgeois rule could the unity of 
thought and action be, properly realised. -As such, the Marxist 
critique of bourgeois society has taken the potential unity of 
human praxis as critical for the exposd of its non-achievement 
in capitalism. However, the formulation of a Marxist theory 
of politics, revealing the connection between economic 
exploitation and political domination, has been a bone of 
considerable contention since Marx's death. The absence, 
beyond scattered and inchoate remarks, of a theory of,, politics 
has long been mourned by those who take his texts as the basis 
for an elaborate critical theory of society (see Miliband, 
1977: 1-15). Dominated throughout the period of the Second 
(1985b). See Kymlicka (1989: chs 1-6) and Green (1990: 
esp. ch. 7) for a rebuttal. Berki (1979) provides a good 
account of the differences between state and society- 
centred accounts of political thought in the West. 
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International and during Stalin's reign by a positivist 
inclination, Marxist theory has only occasionally and briefly 
emerged as an incisive analysis of politics. Although- 
Marxists could postulate the illegitimacy of the bourgeois 
state in terms of its ultimate failure to overcome the - 
economic domination of society, it was apparent to some that 
the 'bourgeois' distinction between a public and private realm 
was still to be challenged as a political ideal and replaced 
by a distinctly proletarian vision of society. 
If liberal political theory presented the problem of 
belief with regard to authority relations as one of 
reconciling private and public realms, Marxist have tended to 
approach the latter issue via a theory of consciousness. 
However, difficulty arises when consciousness is seen to be 
restricted by a class theory of society. At a reductionist 
extreme, class may be considered an exhaustive determinant of 
human consciousness with, the consequence that the 
private/public distinction is either simply disregarded, or 
rejected as an ideological illusion. In these views, the 
individual's consciousness is assumed to'coincide with (olý 
will inevitably coincide with) the collective practice of its 
class location. The history of Marxist theory up to the 
present has been characterised by the progressive unravelling 
of this reductionism and an attempt to address the 
consequences in both theory and practice. The admission of a 
separation of class consciousness and class position has meant 
taking more seriously the division of private and public, yet 
without accepting these terms uncritically. This suggests the 
need to examine what Friedman described as the 'prior social 
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agreement' that determined the form of authority relations, 
and so specify the role of belief. The aim of this thesis is 
to clarify and assess Gramscils concept of hegemony as a 
framework for analyzing the 'prior social agreement' intrinsic 
to the generation of authority, and the role of belief in 
establishing its legitimacy. 
Part Three: Outline of Thesis 
Gramscils remarks on the interaction of state, class and 
ideology have been seen by many as a framework for critically 
analysing bourgeois political domination in Western societies. 
The concept of hegemony is thought to have provided an 
illuminating account of the distinctly political means by 
which the ruling class reproduces exploitative relations of 
production. 5 His insistence that consent was an essential 
feature of class domination appeared to reintegrate the 
conscious subject back into Marxist analysis and open the way 
for a non-reductionist theory of politics. 
6 
My argument in this thesis is that Gramscils concept of 
hegemony is misinterpreted if read as a theory of legitimacy 
in specifically capitalist society. Formulated as a response 
to the crisis of bourgeois rule in Italy, the concept of 
5. In a recent introduction to politics, Birch (1993: 40) 
asserts of Gramscils thought: this theory about the 
ideological hegemony of bourgeois values in capitalist 
society is undoubtedly correct'. 
6. See, for example, Simon (1991) and Fatton (1986) for two 
different contexts in the application of Gramscits 
analysis. For various accounts of the successive 
interpretations of Gramsci, see Davidson (1972), Mouffe 
and Sassoon (1977), Eley (1984), Forgacs (1989) and the 
articles in Muscatello (1990: 205-98). 
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hegemony was based on the presupposition of a period of 
transition characterised by the dislocation of state and 
society. As a consequence, Gramsci-Is formulation of the 
relation between class and ideology was a highly political 
one, giving the analysis of consent a strategic rather than 
formal connotation. The notion of hegemony, however, remains 
highly suggestive for the conceptualisation of legitimacy, but 
it does not provide an account of the 'internal' justification 
of political relations in contemporary Western societies. 
Some remarks on the methodology, and the relation between 
issues and chapters in this study, will be useful. 
The central text, or texts, in this thesis are Gramscils 
Ouaderni del carcere, or prison notebooks, written between 
1929 and 1935. The unsystematic and fragmented nature of 
these texts makes any interpretation a highly selective 
process. 7 since my'aim is to evaluate Gramscils work as a 
framework for the analysis of legitimacy, I do not pretend to 
provide an exhaustive account of his political theory. I do 
not, therefore, focus specifically on the role of the Party or 
his 'remarks on Italian culture, for example. Rather-, I have 
chosen to select a number of themes and essays in his Quaderni 
to outline what I believe to be representative of the core 
features of his analysis. These include the relationship 
between state and society, and the role of the intellectuals. 
These areas provide fundamental clues to his approach to 
class, ideology and politics, themes which have an important 
7. See Valentino Gerratana's introduction to Gramscits 
Quaderni (1975) for a discussion of the retrieval and 
publication of the prison writings. 
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bearing on the contemporary analysis of legitimacy. My 
argument is that-the specificity of Gramscil's thought _ 
distinguishes his analysis from those who, would wish to 
incorporate him into their own analyses., Consequently, I aim 
to show how the general thrust of his analysis, and not just a 
8 number of concepts, is directed around-the issue of crisis. 
Recent scholarship-in the history of political thought 
has recommended a 'contextual' reading of past thinkers, 
evaluating their ideas and-innovations in relation to the 
ideological context in which their own views are inevitably 
couched (see Tully, 1988). While I agree strongly with this 
approach, I have deliberately chosen to make this study a 
dialogue between Gramscils work and the present. This is not, 
I hope, at the cost of anachronistically converting Gramsci 
into a contemporary. on the contrary, it is precisely because 
the current relevance of Gramscils work is now in question 
that the assumed contemporaneity of his thought must be 
evaluated. While one approach-to this task is to reconstruct 
an individual's thought in close relation to his intellectual 
context, there is a danger that the agenda of the present is 
obscured or neutralised by the claim to scholarship (see, 
Alexander, 1987). Ideally, neither the present nor the past 
should be neglected as determining contexts in the recovery of 
a past thinker, and I hope to have paid due attention to both 
in this study. 9 
8. Femia (1981: ch. 2) and Hunt (1985,1986,1987) provide 
conceptual analyses of Gramscils thought. 
9. Here I disagree with Femials (1981: 14-20) remarks on 
interpretation. 
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Chapter One provides a thematic overview of Gramscils 
political thought up until his arrest in 1926. While this 
approach arguably commits the offence of presenting his early 
career as a mere prelude to his prison writings, I do attempt 
to show that the breaks and continuities in his pre-prison 
career are of fundamental importance in understanding his 
concept of hegemony. The period covered in this chapter runs 
from his engagement with the factory council struggles in 
Turin through to his attempt to steer a middle course between 
the left and right factions in the Italian Communist Party. 
While Gramscils strategic considerations change considerably 
in this period, his thought remains fundamentally rooted in 
the attempt to respond to the crisis of bourgeois rule in 
Italy. Two aspects of this response are highlighted: the 
attempt to reconstruct a new ethical community based on the 
proletariat, and the grounding-of this community in a critical 
assessment of the decline of the old. 
Chapter Two opens the analysis of hegemony by examining 
the relation between state, society and politics as a 
framework for considering. the practice of consent. Against 
Marxist critics I argue that because Gramscils account of 
hegemony is centred on what he believed was a period of 
transition in class relations, the relation between state and 
society cannot be conceived in formal terms. Consequently, 
politics was presented as a strategic activity, not one 
subordinated to a preconstituted structure of political 
relations. 
Chapter Three focuses on Gramscils consideration of the 
role of the intellectuals in securing consent. Their 
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increased importance in organising the conscious praxis, of the 
masses in contemporary capitalist society, in his view, served 
to emphasise the necessity for political agents to harness 
their support. As authorities over belief, intellectuals were 
at the forefront of revolutionary transition when that was 
conceived as the creation of a new moral community. 
Consequently, Gramsci presented consent as a form of 
leadership generated across intellectual divisions of labour. 
The relationship between class and ideology in Gramscils 
writings is examined in Chapter Four. Gramscils anti- 
reductionism has been interpreted in several ways by recent 
commentators, and here I argue that his ambiguity is closely 
tied to his interpretation of crisis. The novelty of 
Gramscils thought lies in the simultaneous presence and 
absence of class in deterimining ideology. Recent research 
suggesting he adopted a philosophical realism is helpful in 
this approach. 
Chapter Five concludes the thesis by turning directly to 
the question of hegemony as an account of the legitimation of 
the state in capitalist society. In the light of the. chapters 
above, and in contrast to some recent interpretations of 
hegemony, I argue that the term, as conceived by Gramsci, is 
of limited value as an account of the legitimation of the 
state. Gramscils focus-on the development of a widespread 
'intellectual and moral leadership' was premised on the 
disjuncture between state and society that hegemonic 
strategies sought to heal. Thus the role of intellectuals and 
the 'strategic' account of classes as political agents was 
relevant then in a way that is not necessarily so today. In 
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contemporary societies, the articulation of legitimating 
beliefs is not exhaustive of the processes that serve to 
justify political relations. While the notion of hegemony 
illuminates the contested nature of the private/public 
relation, it is unable to comprehend fully the authority of 
the modern state. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CRISIS AND RESPONSE: GRAMSCI, S POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1916-26 
The notes. and essays that formed Gramscils Quaderni del 
carcere were inextricably bound up with his response to the 
profound social and political, crisis that engulfed Italy after 
the First World War. Far from reflecting scholarly 
contemplation, the prison writings represented the 
continuation, albeit under restricted and isolated. 
circumstances, of an on-going analysis of the conditions for 
socialist revolution. The aim of this chapter is to highlight 
some of the themes of Gramscils analysis prior to his-. 
incarceration in 1926. Only in terms of the trajectory of his 
thought, and its engagement with the practical and 
intellectual upheavals of the political context, is it 
possible to appreciate the advances of his later writings. 
Any summary of Gramscils intellectual biography in one chapter 
will be inevitably selective, and I have opted for-a thematic 
rather than strictly chronological narrative. Such an account 
cannot be exhaustive, and I have chosen to focus on the 
normative and empirical dimensions of his analysis. 
1 Whereas 
the first centres on Gramscils aim to unite theory and 
practice in a participatory revolutionary strategy, the second 
deals with the political conditions that made such a strategy 
possible. 
See Davidson (1977) and Spriano (1967) for detailed 
accounts of Gramscils political career. 
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Two distinct phases of revolutionary strategy are 
identifiable in the years before Gramsci wrote his OuaderniJ 
and it is the theoretical revisions that accompanyýthis 
development that I wish to register here. The first phase, in 
the aftermath of the War, -is when Gramsci formulated his - 
factory council theory in which a proletarian state would 
unite the realms of polity and economy on the basis of moral 
symmetry in the workplace. - The second occurred in the face of 
the collapse of the Italian liberal-state, the rise of 
Fascism, and the defeat, throughout Europe, of proletarian 
uprisings. At that point he was compelled to concede the 
absence of immediately revolutionary conditions and set about 
considering the full implications of a united front strategy. 
It was in the light of these circumstances that he began to 
reflect on the particular allegiances and alliances that 
constituted the makeup of, class forces in Italy and, hence the 
conditions that would influence the organisation of a broad- 
based, proletarian-led coalition. That second phase 'of 
strategic thinking received a richer formulation in his prison 
writings, in which he formulated his notion of hegemony and 
the theory of the-Party as the lmodernýPrince, ". It also 
entailed-a reconsideration of the nature of the-state, in 
Marxist analysis and, concomitantly, of the social and 
ideological basis of collective political action. Those 
issues will be discussed in later chapters. 
Gramscils political theory was formulated in response to 
the breakdown of liberal Italy, and consequently many of the 
presuppositions and expectations he held as a revolutionary 
were carried over into his prison writings. This chapter 
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traces the origins in that response of some aspects-of the 
notion of hegemony. In Part One, I examine Gramscils 
understanding of proletarian revolution as a process of 
cultural unification and worker participation. In Part Two, I 
turn to the social analysis that underpinned his normative 
theory. Both those dimensions of his thought underwent 
significant revision as his response to Italy's crisis shifted 
from an account of an alternative state form to an 
understanding of the social basis of support intrinsic to 
political domination. 
Part One: Praxis and Symmetry 
Central to the notion of authority is the problem of political 
obligation, the search for common rational grounds for 
obedience to political institutions (see Raphael, 1990: ch. 
7). This has been a theme fundamental to the concerns of 
Italian social and political theorists since the Risorgimento. 
Gramscils political thought, too, was crucially bound up with 
that problem. In the Quaderni Gramsci explicitly identified 
Marxism as a 'philosophy of praxis' (see Q: 1860-4). A' 
unification of consciousness and action formed the basic 
principle of a social theory that aimed to reconcile human 
subjectivity with political authority. 'The roots of this 
normative dimension to Gramscils-thought are visible 
throughout the journalistic and political interventions of his 
pre-prison career. Gramsci was peculiarly sensitive to, the 
possible forms of moral symmetry--shared conceptions of the 
good--arising from proletarian praxis, and throughout this 
period he eagerly promoted the generation of a distinct class 
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consciousness anticipating a new, unified social order. The 
basic contours of this approach will be outlined below. 
Proletarian Order 
The problem of political authority posed itself starkly in 
post-unification Italy. While political institutions had been 
formally unified within the nation under the leadership of the 
state of Piedmont, full social and cultural integration was 
far from present. This was clear in the widespread mass 
disaffection from political institutions, the frequent 
violence of discontent and the equally brutal repression by 
the state of 'subversive activity'. The complete lack of any 
widespread popular participation in the founding of the united 
Italy had made its political system the hive of self- 
interested elites, compromises and corruption. The gulf 
between the ideal of a united, civic-conscious community and 
the reality of a fractious, alienated and antagonistic 
population created difficulties for a social and political 
theory dedicated to 'making the ideal realf. 2 
The rapid industrialization of northern Italy and the 
consequent onset of mass politics exposed the inadequacies of 
the liberal regime. In the years leading up to the War and in 
the crisis that followed it, popular disaffection with 
Giolitti's governments increased. 3 As Emilio Gentile points 
2. For commentary on the dilemmas of post-unification 
society and politics, see Clark (1984: 1-3,12-90), 
Tarrow (1967: 71-95), Pombeni (1993: 23-6), Gentile 
(1982: 3-29), Schecter (1991: ch. 2), Corner (1986) and 
Bobbio (1986). 
3. Corner argues that 'the real failure of liberal Italy was 
its failure to institutionalize political conflict' 
(1986: 19). It was this failure in particular, he 
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out, the profound alienation felt among intellectuals found 
its way into a revived Mazzinian radicalism whose ideological 
core he describes as 'the myth of the new state' (Gentile, 
1982: 3-29). The central theme of this ideology--common to 
Hegelians, irrationalists, neo-liberals, nationalists and 
ultimately Fascists--was a desire to reunite masses and the 
state via an 'organic' unity which appealed more to sentiment 
4 than reason. The intelligentsia saw the key to Italy's 
revival in the generation of a mass political culture whose 
impetus derived from outside the discredited parliamentary 
regime (Gentile, 1982: 13-14). In the conflict that 
characterised the post-War period, the hopes of the 
intellectuals found an increasingly active mass base to 
support their critique. 
Gramscils conception of the philosophy of praxis was 
rooted in the neo-Hegelian revival in Italian philosophy at 
the turn of the century. Hegelian thought had been adopted by 
Italian philosophers to rationalize the foundation of the new 
state as the realization of a 'national spirit'. Once it was 
clear that this was not a logical consequence of political 
unity, the idealist school, led by Bertrando Spaventa and 
Francesco De Sanctis, initiated a realist perspective designed 
to encourage the emergence of a national cultural tradition. 
suggests, that precipitated the rise of Fascism. See 
also Gentile (1982: 31-80). 
4. Gentile summarises: 'Italianism, the sense of community 
and social solidarity, mass politics, the culture of 
organisation, the idea of the nation as an organic unity, 
were the principal ingredients offered by national 
radicalism to the myth of the new state before the Great 
War' (1982: 19). 
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This aimed to incorporate the masses into a unified civic 
consciousness: the Mazzinian ideal of transforming the people 
into the 'nation' by means of a shared sense of 'mission'. 5 
The quest for full political integration became a task of 
educating the masses into a common culture that transcended 
the particularity of class and region. As Bobbio remarks, the 
dominant mode of thought at the beginning of the century was 
focused on the issue of human 'spirit' and the duty incumbent 
upon intellectuals to propagate a renewed civility (Bobbio, 
1986: 4). The neo-Hegelians, like other intellectuals, were 
influenced by this notion of political legitimacy stemming 
from a common cultural disposition. Although they differed in 
their philosophical rationalisation of this legitimacy and the 
particular form of its realisation, they all sought to ground 
the authority of the political order in philosophies of the 
unity of human consciousness and practical activity. 
The neo-Hegelian revival at the turn of the century in 
Italy represents a reaction to the positivism in social 
thought that had become widespread in both Marxist and non- 
Marxist forms-(Bobbio, 1986: 7-18; Hughes, 1979: chs 2,3 and 
6). Italian idealists hoped to reintegrate the agency of the 
conscious subject into practical activity in history. Only by 
investing human activity with a sense of moral agency could a 
full, integrated political community be generated. The 
philosophical idealism of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile 
aimed to provide an intellectual framework through which to 
conceive this possibility. Both denied any A priori 






teleological goal to history, be it metaphysical or 
materialist, as in their view this would undermine the 
creative potential of the human subject by constricting it to 
a preconceived historical design. This formed the basis of 
their critique of Hegel, for whom the rationality of the real 
was justified by an ontology based on a transcendent 
6 "Spirit'. Instead, they conceived the development of human 
consciousness as antimmanent process in history, bound up 
with, though not reducible to, human practical activity. They 
differed, however, on the extent to which thought-and being 
could be harmonised, and consequently on what, institutional 
arrangements should be recommended. Those differences became 
clearer when the First World War hastened the decline of the 
Giolittian liberal state. 
Until. his displacement as a popular figure by Gentile, in 
the second decade of the century, Croce exercised immense 
influence over the Italian intellectual scene. He voiced the 
rejection of positivism as a creed incapable of providing a 
7 shared sense of purpose and value to Italian culture. As 
Bellamy has noted: 'Croce therefore sought to reintegrate 
man's practical activity into his search for a framework of 
meaning, value and certainty' (1985: 69). The image of a 
community united in a sense of value and purpose was central 
to his philosophy, which he hoped would itself act as a total 
vision of life. Despite the implicit ambiguity in his 
6. Hegel (1991). Croce and Gentile both rejected as 
restrictive the metaphysical closure implied in his 
'Preface'. 
7. For Croce's intellectual influence see Jacobitti (1981); 
Bobbio (1986: 74-85). 
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doctrine, which at times stressed the creative autonomy of the 
human subject and at others the resignation to the ultimate 
benevolence of history, 8 Croce's emphasis on the political 
value of a shared 'faith' and the ethical*character of human 
activity restored in many of his followers the belief in the 
Risorgimento ideal of national unification. 9 That Croce's 
liberal historicism refused to admit of any final empirical 
embodiment to this ethical community through political 
institutions ultimately undermined his own popularity amongst 
radical intellectuals. They were later inspired by the more 
activist philosophy of Gentile for whom the realisation of an 
ethical community, the unification of human consciousness with 
political institutions, was attainable. 10 
In the-years between 1916 and 1921 Gramsci formulated a 
response to both the imperialist war and the restructuring of 
capitalism. For him, the profound economic and political 
changes that the war and its aftermath signalled the 
opportunity for a new form of political intervention by the 
workers' movement in Italy (De Felice, 1972: 237-55). The 
supposedly revolutionary situation, an assumption he shared 
8. See Bellamy (1985: 72), where he remarks on 'a 
vacillating in his notion of faith between the passive 
and the active component of his absolute historicism'; 
also Bellamy (1987: 77-87)'. 
9. However, thoseInfluenced by Croce were by no means 
united in terms of political practice, with both elitism 
and, later, Fascism among the tendencies. See Bellamy 
(1985: 80), Gentile (1982) and Jacobitti (1981). 
10. See Bellamy (1987: ch. 6). For the debate between Croce 
and Gentile on the state, see Bellamy (1983: 61-73). For 
Gentile's influence on Gramsci, see Schecter (1990). 
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with most of the Imaximalist' left in the_PSI (see Spriano, 
1967: 18), encouraged Gramsci to rethink the aims and nature 
of socialist political practice. Indeed, as we will see, 
politics for Gramsci became identifiable with a much broader 
set of issues than either the traditional reformist wing of 
the PSI or the maximalists, headed by Giaccinto Serrati and 
the intransigent Amadeo Bordiga, would allow. Socialism, 
Gramsci argued, implied a whole new relationship between the 
self and the political order, and as such, the task of 
political organisation was not merely to discipline the 
workforce to labour within the parameters of the bourgeois 
state, but to prepare new forms of participation and 
authority. 
Up to 1919 Gramsci defined the task of the Socialist 
Party (Par ito socialista Italiano, or PSI) as that of 
fulfilling the cultural mission promoted by Croce (see Paggi, 
1970: ch. 1). It was not surprising, then, that he would 
later refer to his early intellectual formation in Turin as 
being Itendentially Crocean'. Like Croce, Gramsci castigated 
positivism for its abandonment of the human subject in favour 
of a morally barren and instrumental approach to knowledge. 
And, like him again, Gramsci proclaimed the duty of the 
subject to realise his moral integrity rather than remain a 
pawn in a scheme not of his own making. Yet the doctrine to 
which Gramsci attached this initial theorising of moral 
obligation was a revolutionary socialism and not Croce's 
liberalism. The socialist project was conceived as the 
creation of an entire ethical and political community based on 
the emancipation of the proletariat. In his early years 
kh. - 
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Gramsci elaborated this Crocean perspective in opposition to 
other currents of the socialist tradition that in his view 
underestimated the importance of the subjective discipline of 
the workers (positivist and 'vulgar' Marxism) or overestimated 
it to the point of failing to tackle the preparation of 
workers through education and organisation (revolutionary 
syndicalism). The young Gramscils early 'idealism', then, is 
crucial to an understanding of his later work on the factory 
councils and on hegemony. For it was there that he posed the 
problem of rooting authority in the unification of proletarian 
consciousness. 
Gramscils definition of culture was a broad one, 
encapsulating a general sense of moral attunement with the 
world rather than a specific set of aesthetic tastes. 
11 This 
advanced a Kantian notion of moral obligation based on the 
superior dictates of, reason: 
We need to free ourselves from the habit of seeing 
culture as encyclopaedic knowledge, and men as mere 
receptacles to be stuffed full of empirical data and 
a mass of unconnected raw facts, which have to be 
filled in his brain as in the columns of a 
dictionary, enabling their owner to respond to the 
various stimuli from the outside world. This form 
of culture is really harmful, particularly for the 
proletariat.... Culture is something quite 
different. It is organisation, discipline of one's 
inner self, a coming to terms with one's own 
personality; it is the attainment of a higher 
awareness,. with the aid of which one succeeds in 
understanding one's own historical value, one's own 
function in life, one's own rights and obligations 
(CT: 100). 
In typically Crocean terms, Gramsci remarked in 1916: 'In 
truth, every man has his religion, a faith of his own to 
fill his life and render it worthy of living' (CT: 71). 
See also CT: 16-18; 23-6; 47-8. 
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By encompassing the whole range of subjective experience, 
Gramscils heralding of cultural criticism as an essential 
weapon of the working class-politicised all forms of 
proletarian life. Political activity, in his view, 'sh'ould be 
directed towards incorporating proletarian experience into a 
coherent political project, that is, -mobilising socialism as a 
distinctive culture in itself. This was the purpose of his 
proposed 'cultural association"in, 1917 (Davidson, 1977: 72- 
81; Adamson, 1980: 31-2). Designedto promote a particularly 
class-based culture, Gramscils recommended association aimed 
at both uniting and disciplining the proletariat (SCW: 20- 
3). 12 As'we shall see, a socialist culture was directed not 
only at the emancipation of the working class, but also the 
generation of a specific form of moral symmetry that would 
challenge bourgeois political institutions. 
'Socialism is an integral vision of life', declared 
Gramsci, in 1917, - 'it has a philosophy,, 'a mystique, a morality, 
(CF: 499). As such, the culture implicit in the doctrine of 
12. - Ina letter to Giuseppe Lombardo Radice of March'1918, 
Gramsci described the Club as an attempt 'to give new 
examples (for Italy) of association'. Its practical aim 
was to 'get the young people who adhere to the socialist 
political and economic movement accustomed to the 
disinterested discussion of ethical and social problems. 
We want to get them accustomed to research, to reading 
with discipline and method, to the simple and calm 
exposition of their convictions'. This was to be 
achieved by reading and discussing philosophical, 
political and historical texts. Yet the Club had, 
according to Gramsci, a broader task of moral 
unification: 'Beyond this the Club has amongst its goals 
the acceptance by everyone of the reciprocal control of 
daily activity in the family, workshop and society. We 
want everyone to have sufficient courage and moral energy 
to acknowledge publicly and accept that their friends 




socialism suggested a specific kind of freedom and relation 
between the individual and the society: 'For me, everybody is 
already cultured because everybody thinks, everybody connects 
causes and effects. But they are empirically, primordially 
cultured, not organically' (CF: 519). An 'organic' culture 
should synthesize the: proletariat's numerous pedagogical 
activities by deliberately organising consciousness around a 
solidaristic unity. Socialist freedom was a particularly 
collective, experience. Freedom was thus defined 'positively'- 
-the recovery of a moral self and its identification with a 
collective subject: the proletariat. 13, 
The distinct moral community to which socialists aspired 
would liberate the proletariat from its particularistic 
pursuits. This would be achieved via the inculcation of a 
'critical consciousness'. only an informed proletariat, 
enlightened to the revolutionary ruptures of the past and 
hence aware of its own collective potential, could generate 
'an intense labour of criticism, -"(CT:, 101) necessary to the 
formation of a new culture. In one article, Gramsci declared 
the pedagogical activities of the proletariat a historical, 
counterpart to the Enlightenment, the intellectual revolution 
that prepared the ground for the events-of, 1789 in France (CT: 
101-2) . 
As a distinct and complete culture in itself, Gramscils 
Crocean reading of socialism aimed to resolve the problem of 
authority that hadýlong troubled Italian politics. This is' 
13. For a discussion of the distinction between 'negative" 
and 'positive' concept of freedom, see Berlin (1969). 
For a critical account, of Gramscils early 
'egalitarianism', see Revelli (1988). 
hhh, 35 
clear in a number of articles, in which Gramsci contrasted his 
understanding of socialist collectivism with the prevailing 
fragmentation and alienation of contemporary life. For 
instance, a socialist critical consciousness was equally a 
disciplinary consciousness: I- I 
To know oneself means to be oneself, 'to be master of 
oneself, to distinguish oneself, to free oneself 
from a state of chaos, to exist as an element of 
order, but of one's own order and one's own 
discipline in striving for an ideal (CT: 102). ý 
Gramsci argued that as the bearer of a whole new society, 
the Socialist Party should elicit a particular form of 
obligation, namely that incurred through citizenship: 
The discipline imposed upon citizens by the 
bourgeois state makes them into subjects who delude 
themselves that-they exert an'influence on the 
course of events. The discipline of the socialist 
party makes the subject into a citizen: a citizen- 
who is now rebellious, precisely because he has 
become conscious of his personality and feels it is 
shackled and cannot freely express itself in the 
world (CF: 19-20; see also 17). 
The Socialist"Party, therefore, stood to the proletariat 
as an authentic bearer of its moral interests and as such 
should derive-its authority from the free articulation of 
those interests and not through-imposition. Hence, 'whereas 
bourgeois discipline is mechanical and authoritarian, , 
socialist discipline is autonomous and spontaneous' (CF: 19). 
The stress Gramsci placed on the 'autonomous and spontaneous' 
nature of workers' discipline testified to'his belief in the 
self-emancipation of the proletariat. If socialism, was an 
all-embracing culture, it was nevertheless one that originated 
in the subjective commitments of the workers themselves. It 
could not be brought jo them, only out from them. Disciplines 
of an autonomous nature, he argued, arise from 'the very life, 
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the very thought of the person who observes them' (CF:, 19). 
Gramscils recommendation'for a self-originating-socialist 
culture was very much a criticism of Italian political 
traditions'of both a socialist and more general variety. The 
originality of'a proletarian revolution, he claimed, lay'in 
its empowerment of the masses; their substantive inclusion in 
the political community. As such, their identity as 
participants in"this new order was not, to be imposed, but-' 
nurtured. -14 
The language Gramsci adopted in his early-writings was 
strongly idealistý and he was later accused of having 
advocated voluntarism. In opposition to the vulgar Marxism 
that'remained popular throughout the reformist and 
revolutionary'left in Italy, this criticism'was'not without 
some foundation. Nevertheless, Gramscils praise of idealist- 
philosophy, his commitment to organising and educating the 
subjective experiences of the proletariat, did not add up to a 
full endorsement of idealist philosophy (CT: 69-72). As 
Silvio Suppa maintains, Crocean idealism served as an 
effective critique of positivism and an assertion of the 
subjective premises'of political action (Suppa 1976: 22-3,36, 
38; -see also Paggi 1970: ch. 1). 
Croce's historicism provided a foundation for a non- 
reductionist interpretation of history. This denied'a 
simplistic economic materialism and instead stressed the 
14. For an illustration of this stress on the self- 
originating character of socialist culture, see Gramscits 
arguments against Esperanto, CF: 668-73 and L: 90. Lo 
Piparo (1979: 13-118) examines the relation between 
Gramscils interest in linguistics and his political 
thought. 
mhhý 37 
complexity of human activity and the moral projects bound up 
with it. But Gramscils Crocean influence was applied to his 
socialist commitments and, unlike Croce, Gramsci grounded his 
goal of moral unity in the historically concrete activities of 
the workers' movement (Paggi, 1970: 5). This combination of 
revolutionary socialism and Croceanism was illustrated well in 
his remark, in a letter of 1918, that: 'I am a revolutionary, 
a historicist, and I affirm that they are useful and rational 
only those forms of social activity (linguistic, economic, 
political) that arise and realise themselves spontaneously by 
the activity of free social energies' (L: 90). 
It was in the proletariat's-oppositional relation to 
capitalism that a collective ethical project was to be 
discovered, and it was only through the formulation and 
organisation of this opposition as an ethical-project that the 
proletariat would fully overcome this antagonism (CF: 19; 
Suppa, 1976: 30). Rooted in the proletariat's own 
historically specific struggles, the culture of socialism was 
neither predetermined independently, of a proletarian critical 
consciousness, nor an inevitable consequence of economic 
struggle. Similarly, revolution could not be reduced to a 
mere unfolding human consciousness. Consciousness, to 
Gramsci, was intimately bound up with the economic 
organisation of society and, the struggles involved in this. 
But it was not reducible to a mere 'reflection", of the 
economy. Economic relations were ultimately the object of 
human consciousness, a historical and human relation through 
which consciousness progressed pragmatically. As he remarked 
on the Russian revolution in 1918: 'it is not the economic 
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structure which directly determines political activity, but 
rather the way in which that structure and the so-called laws 
which govern its development are interpreted' (NM: 205). 
For Gramsci, then, in this early, period of his 
journalistic career, the identification of socialism and the 
workers' movement with the formation of an entire, new moral 
order implied a number of things. Firstly, it enabled a 
critique of. existing socialist traditions concerning the, 
divisions between leaders and led. By positioning the workers 
themselves as bearers of a new moral order, Gramscils 
socialism aimed to reverse the alienation of-politics from 
society that traditional representative institutions 
inevitably upheld. Secondly, Gramsci denied the validity of 
any fatalistic forms of Marxism that attributed the 
revolutionary process to forces beyond the interpretations of 
the workers themselves. Influenced by Antonio Labriola's 
reading of Marxism as a 'philosophy of praxis', denoting the 
general and non-causal relation of forms of consciousness to 
economic practices,, Gramsci regarded knowledge pragmatically 
and politically (see Labriola, 1908-and 1912). 15 But, more 
importantly-for our, purposes here, Gramscils early writings 
laid the basis for reconstructing the relation between the 
self and the political order. This redefined the nature of 
political obligation and authority in terms of a collective, 
participatory culture unified by common moral commitments. 
His stress on education and culture presented moral, unity as a 
15. See Paggi (1979) and Luke (1990: 70-4). 
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function of intellectual relationships. This remained a 
fundamental theme of Gramscils analysis. 
However, in that early period the institutions of 
education and of political organisation were envisaged by 
Gramsci as separate practices: for 'political and economic 
action presupposes moral, religious and philosophical problems 
which the economic and political bodies cannot discuss in 
their own organisations' (CF: 499). It was not until the 
celebrated biennio rosso of 1919-20 that Gramsci, in his 
factory council theory, outlined a radical model of 
participatory democracy which would unite, in a single 
institution, a socialist moral community with the workers' own 
organisation. Before we examine this period, we need first 
note Gramscils reaction to the Russian revolution. For it was 
in response to this event that Gramsci began to focus more 
closely on the idea of the state as an organ of political 
power and less on the pedagogical activities of the Socialist 
Party. 
Gramsci defended the Russian revolution in terms 
characteristic of his Crocean reading of socialism. The 
Bolsheviks had instigated a new moral order, they had refuted 
the mechanistic determinism of positivist Marxism and they had 
mobilised a collective will based on new forms of social 
relations. In short, the Russian revolution had synthesized 
in one collective act the ethical project based on the 
distinctive claims of the proletariat that Gramsci had till 
then been theorising as the appropriate goal of Italian 
socialism. Though news of the revolution in Italy was both 
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slow and confused, Gramscils response to it had a major effect 
on his political philosophy. 
The revolution, in the first instance, was a profound act 
of moral liberation, a qualitative leap that transcended the 
mere transference of power: 
What the revolution has created in Russia is a new, 
way of life. It has not only replaced one power by 
another, it has replaced one way of life by another. 
It has created a new moral order, and in addition to 
the physical liberty of the individual, has 
established liberty of the spirit (CF: 140). 
Although Gramsci realised that the revolution had not 
immediately constructed socialism, it had, in his view, 
prepared the way for its self-realisation by the masses. He 
emphasised the profoundly democratic nature of the revolution 
with the term 'anti-Jacobin' (CF: 138-9,265 7). This 
signified that the Bolsheviks had organised an authentic 
community of interests that spoke across all social division. 
As such, their authority lay in their 'spiritual' 
representation of that community (NM: 210). At the symbolic 
and political head of the revolution stood Lenin, whose 
leadership was 'based on prestige and trust, which formed 
spontaneously and is maintained through free choice' (NM: 
210). Here, as in his earlier writings, Gramsci sought to 
combine both a sense of liberty and discipline in mass, 
political action. The revolution was sustained by the 
discipline entailed in the representation of a freely realised 
collective consciousness. Moral obligations to the self had 
coincided with collective political obligations to the 
revolution (NM: 210-11).. 
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In his now famous 'Il rivoluzione contro il, Capitalel 
Gramsci had distinguished the Russian revolutionaries from 
those Marxists with only an empirical reading of Marx. The 
Bolsheviks, in his view, had rejected the economic schematism. 
supposedly contained in Capital for a deeper understanding - 
that reached back to Marx's Hegelian origins (CF: 513-14j. 
Human development wasýnot reducible to 'raw economic facts" 
but was a process in which consciousness comes to master the 
objective facts that at one time, dominated it. The Bolsheviks 
represented the historical force of this 'collective, social 
will', unconstrained by, any rigid, predetermined scheme. This 
stress on a Hegelianised Marx was re peated later, in 1918, in 
an article entitled 'Il nostro Marx'. once again, the 
characteristic features of Second International Marxism were 
rejeýcted (naturalism, positivism, etc. ) for an appraisal of 
Marx as an 'integral' historian. Marx had pointed to the full 
economic and cultural context, of conscious, practical activity 
in history, lapsing neither into pure idealism nor 
materialism. Gramsci read MarX as a theorist of--praxis, of 
the continual engagement between-man and the world, a process 
centred on production: 
History as that which happens is pure practical 
(economic and moral) activity. An idea becomes real 
not because it is logically in conformity with pure 
truth, pure humanity (which exists only as a plan, 
as a general ethical goal of mankind), but because 
it finds in economic reality its justification, the 
instrument with which it can be carried out (NM: 4- 
once more, Gramsci identified revolution as a process 
centred on consciousness. Economic activity was considered a 
particularly 'confused and fragmentary' form of consciousness 
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for the proletariat. In Gramscilý 
the necessity of moral discipline 
distinct class 'goals'. Economic 
overcome, not waited upon. Hence 
scholar offering predictions,, but 
moral life' (NM: 6). 
s view, Marx had suggested 
based on the attainment of 
rationality was to be 
Marx was not an abstract 
'a master of spiritual and 
Gramscils response to the Russian revolution focused him 
on concrete political issues. Having somewhat idealised the 
revolution as the founding of a collective moral order, he was 
sensitive to the distinctively proletarian participatory 
politics that it generated. The revolution-had instigated a 
regime in which the moral community of the proletariat would 
be given institutional form--the soviet: 
The direction being taken by Russian political life 
at the moment is tending to coincide with that taken 
by the country's moral life, by the Universal Spirit 
of the Russian people. There is continual movement 
between the hierarchical levels: an uncultivated 
individual gets a chance to improve himself in the 
discussion over the election of his representative. 
He controls these organs because he has them 
constantly under review and near to hand in the 
community. He acquires a sense of social 
responsibility, and becomes a citizen who is active 
in deciding the destiny of his country .... the 
society is such as has never before appeared in 
history (NM: 211). 
The coincidence of 'moral life' and 'political life' in 
the soviet, the synthesis of a unified moral community with 
the organisation of the polity, inspired Gramsci to rethink 
the role of traditional proletarian institutions in the 
revolutionary process. He had been strongly critical of these 
bodies before, but had aimed his criticism at educational 
issues within the socialist programme. The Russian 
revolution, while confirming his own rejection of economic 
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determinism, also brought into focus, the possibility of 
combining proletarian culture with proletarian institutions. 
It was in his factory council'theory of 1919-20 that Gramsci 
set out to unite state and society, -- moral and political. 
obligations, liberty and authority. 16 
The revolution had inspired revolutionaries of all 
persuasions in Italy to reassess the organisational form and 
political aims of the workers' movement. However, amongst 
those eager to-learn'from the Russian experience, which 
included the maximalist and intransigent left, there was no 
clear agreement as to what this lesson was when translated 
into-the Italian context (see De Felice, ---1972: 9-32; Spriano, 
1967: ch. 1). It was this failure to agree on the'nature of 
the proletarian revolution in Italy that, ultimately led to the 
formation of theýPCVI in 1921. De Felice identifies three 
distinct and opposed, positions, represented*by the'leaders of 
the different'revolutionary currents. -- Giacinto Serrati, ýwho 
became leader of the PSI, represented an ambiguous position, 
proclaiming the, revolutionary aims of-the-Party whilst ,I 
simultaneously attempting to reconcile the disparate wings of 
the movement into a common unity. SerratVs continued stress 
on maintaining unity with the traditional, reformist 
institutions, inevitably compromised his revolutionary' 
rhetoric, and he later-rejected the idea of transforming the 
PSI. into a communist party (De Felice,,, 1972: ý35-125). Amadeo 
Bordiga, by contrast, was, bitterly opposed to any-compromise 
with the reformist wing, of the, socialist tradition. -He 
16. See Schecter (1991) for a discussion of these themes; 
also Revelli (1988). 
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rigorously defended a class-based, rigidly organised party 
with the sole aim of revolutionary overthrow of the state. 
The War and the Russian revolution, in his view, had , 
instigated a revolutionary situation in Italy that demanded a 
complete break with the past (De Felice, 1972: 131). on this 
basis, he championed a radical intransigence and opposition to 
the bourgeois regime, calling for a determined political 
leadership with a hierarchically organised party at the 
centre. Though he shared the radical intransigence of 
Bordiga, Gramsci saw the-value of the Russian experience in 
different terms. Bordiga understood class political activity 
in terms of the primacy of political leadership over and above 
forms of economic struggle, thus distinguishing the political 
from the-economic (De Felice, 1972: 146). In the years 
immediately after the War, in which an unprecedented degree of 
industrial conflict took place, Gramsci attempted to identify 
revolution with the incorporation of the political interests 
of the'proletariat into the economy as producers. For Gramsci 
the'Russian revolution represented not the mechanical-taking 
of power, as it did for Bordiga, but the achievement of a- 
genuine-proletarian state (see De Felice, 1978). 
Gramscils factory council theory, formulated throughout 
1919-20, aimed to outline an institutional form for the 
communitarian philosophy that had underpinned his journalism. 
A proletarian state, he argued, was the ultimate aim of, 
revolutionary activity, and the factory would serve'as its- 
organisational basis. A system of factory councils could 
unite and discipline the industrial proletariat by redefining 
the worker's economic function as a political relation within 
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a community of 'producers'. Workers' self-management would 
instil a moral bond that could establish the sovereignty of 
the factory and make it the source of political authority. A 
proletarian state would therefore be identified with a united 
society of producers, and so the 'bourgeois' division between 
state and society, polity and economy, could eventually be 
overcome. 
Gramscils construal of the war-time 'internal 
commissions, 17 as the potential basis for a factory council 
state-distinguished him and the Ordine Nuovo group from many 
of their revolutionary colleagues. The unity and discipline 
displayed amongst workers through the commissions, they 
argued, would serve as the'moral and organisational foundation 
for a new political order. Against the Anarchists, Gramsci 
maintained the necessity of a state in any society, especially 
under socialism. The state was crucial in generating a 
s'Ocialist liberty (ON: 114-20). The anarchists, he argued, 
had only a fixed view of liberty, failing to see it as part of 
a dialectical process, the outcome of collective struggle to 
control the means'of production. only the embodiment of the 
proletariat's collective interest in its own state would 
preserve its specific form of freedom (ON: 215-9; see also 
487-92). 
17. The internal commissions (commisýioni interne) were shop 
floor consultation committees originating from, the 
beginning of the century. They were originally designed 
for airing grievances and for ensuring the application of 
wage agreements, but during the War they became the site 
of political and industrial unrest amongst factory 




Yet a workers' state would be organised around a 
qualitatively new principle of symmetry. Unlike the bourgeois 
state, which separated off the realms of the economic and 
political, private and public, a proletarian state would 
reunite these spheres. Freed from the constrictions of 
private property, factory production would become a public 
realm where workers' roles as producers represented their 
common political identity. 18 Because a proletarian state 
would unite economy and politics, existing workers' 
institutions would have a limited role in the revolutionary 
process, for they remained wedded to that bourgeois division 
(ON: 129-31). Gramsci insisted that the current stage of 
class struggle was no longer 'defensive' in character--i. e. 
seeking to achieve political reforms within the bourgeois 
regime--rather it now revolved around the fundamental issue of 
the control of production itself. only action designed to 
attend to this issue was appropriate; the preparation of a 
proletarian state was, for Gramsci, overdue (ON: 176-9). 19 
on what substantial basis could the factory council serve 
as a new state form? As Gramsci argued in his polemic against 
the anarchists, socialists saw the state as providing two 
things: political power and control over production (ON: 215- 
9). The councils would provide both political unity and 
economic control, each reinforcing the other (De Felice, 1978: 
vii-xix). In Gramscils view, control over factory production 
18. ON: 131. For a discussion of Gramsci's proposed 
unification of state and society, see Schecter (1991: chs 
1-4). 





would stimulate a new sense of solidarity amongst workers. 
Their increased autonomy within the factory would set in 
motion a process of education promoting the individual 
worker's identification with a community broader than the one 
defined by his immediate technical function (ON: 414-15,432- 
5). Intellectual and functional divisions of labour'were 
being gradually transcended with a sense of solidarity alien 
to previous workers' institutions (ON: 176-9; 205,239-40). 
Moreover, this was a sense of commonality that emerged from 
the objective organisation of production and from workers' own 
authentic experiences within the factory. ýAs such it 
represented for Gramsci a rational grounding of equality based 
on the 'objective necessity' of economic production (ON: 176- 
9; SPWI: 114). The moral symmetry experienced by workers in 
their capacity as producers, 'Gramsci suggested, would emerge 
as a new 'psychology' amongst individual workers. This was a 
'communist psychology' through which workers could 'express 
their will to power in terms of principles which are strictly 
organic to the relations of production and exchange' (ON: 
206). Indeed the new forms of pol. itical solidarity generated 
within the factory councils would be inseparable from the 
councils' role as the site of economic decision making. The 
moral unity of the proletariat would underlie the council's 
primary-function, the planned control of production. 
Gramsci and the Ordine Nuovo group recommended that 
production be organised through a network of factory, councils. 
These would consist of democratically elected delegates from 
individual workshops within the fa6tory. Delegates would then 
elect an executive committee and also meet in local assemblies 
k1k., An 
of delegates and of executive members (SPWI: 114-24; ON: 238- 
9)). All workers would be permitted to vote and would enjoy a 
continual dialogue with their delegates whose job in turn was 
to ensure that agreed production plans were adhered to, 
discipline maintained and that the workers' feelings were 
adequately conveyed (SPWI: 120-22). The authority of the 
workers in the factories simultaneously entailed their duty to 
submit to the discipline of planned economic production, a 
process which would become the central mediator of their 
political identities. 
Gramscils factory council theory was an ambitious 
project, and its ultimate failure testified to the tremendous 
effort of will amongst the entire socialist movement that 
would have been necessary to take it beyond its isolated 
practice in Turin. 20 A, number of additional difficulties may 
also be mentioned. The councils were seen by Gramsci as 
providing the united moral community that had been absent in 
Italy since the Risorgimento. The sense of solidarity and 
shared purpose shown by Militant workers in the post-War 
struggles was the basis for Gramscits claim that a new state 
was in preparation. However, that such solidarity could be 
channelled into a sustainable moral unity is doubtful, 
especially given the absence of support from other 
institutions. Nor is it obvious that a worker/producer 
identity within the factory could overcome either the 
different status claims of various divisions of labour or the 
workers' broader economic and cultural allegiances outside the 
20. For historical accounts, see, Clark (1979) and Spriano 
(1967). 
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workplace. As Revelli (1988: 114-22) argues, the new order 
Gramsci envisaged did not aim to'abolish technical divisions 
of labour but rather to transcend them by presenting them as 
functional to an ascribed objective. As such, Gramscils 
thought entailed an emphasis on 'order' and solidarity as 
opposed to equality. 21 Also, the project of reuniting state 
and society by making workers' daily productive lives 
coterminous with their political duties suggested a severe 
restriction in the scope for political disagreement and 
individual initiative. Thus Gramscils theory demanded a 
strong degree of substantive agreement over moral ends (see 
Schecter, 1991). 'His assumption of moral symmetry was 
grounded in an imputed desire of the proletariat to increase 
productivity. Yet this cannot be simply presupposed. Only 
with the creation of the PCdII in 1921 and the subsequent 
decline of clear revolutionary conditions did Gramsci again 
tackle the question of the ethical basis to political action. ' 
At that point he put a 'strong emphasis on the role of the - 
party, an institution he believed had been fatally absent from 
the factory council struggles. 
The Mass Partv 
From 1921 until his arrest, Gramscifs politi'cal theory centred 
on the role and form of the Communist Party (Partito comunista 
d**Italia, or PCd'I) in leading the proletariat under Fascism. 
21. Revelli suggests that Gramscils emphasis on organic unity 
implied a notion of ontological fixity reminiscent of 
classical theories of justice, rather than liberal 
concepts of equality (see 1988: 116). For a defence of 
Gramscils conciliar theory against the charge of 
productivism, see Luke (1990: 74-80). 
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While his writings in this period can be viewed as a critique 
of aspects of his conciliar theory, it would be wrong to 
assert that he had entirely abandoned the principles 
underlying that project. It is clear that within this period 
his position underwent a considerable shift. This shift 
occurred between his endorsement of Bordigals 'Rome Theses' of 
1922 and his own 'Lyons Theses' of 1926. Many commentators 
argue that this strategic development progressed throughout 
the years 1923-5.22 Gramscils party-centred theory developed 
at a time, not only of the factory council defeat, but of the 
crushing of similar revolutionary, activity throughout Europe, 
the onset and consolidation of Fascist reaction and the 
difficulties incurred in the construction of the post- 
revolutionary state in Russia. In short, the revolutionary 
possibilities that guided his earlier work had been replaced 
by a more defensive outlook geared towards assessing the 
reasons for failure and the conditions for advance in the face 
of reaction. In his later writing, however, Gramsci aimed to 
steer a course between building a cohesive and ideologically 
disciplined vanguard party, and a maintaining a mass party 
with a broad and cross-class basis of support. It was this 
attempt to reconcile ideological autonomy and organisational 
discipline with popular allegiance that set the tone for his 
theory of the Party as the 'modern Prince' in his ouaderni. 
Once again, Gramsci assumed that political support would arise 
from the praxis of the proletariat. 
22. See, for example, Sassoon (1987: 63), Buci-Glucksmann 
(1980: chs 8 and 9) and Togliatti (1967b). 
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As Sassoon (1987: 63) notes, Gramscils alignment with 
Bordiga in founding the PCd1I under the latter's tight, 
centralised conception of the vanguard did not entail a strong 
input from his own thinking. Although his commitment to the 
centrality of the Party remained constant from 1921 onwards, 
it was only from 1923, and consequently the period of his 
leadership, that he began to reorient the Party away from 
Bordigals centralism. His initial alliance with-Bordiga can 
be explained in part by his disaffection with the leadership 
of the PSI, which had failed to support the'council movement. 
This, in his view, had contributed to the movement's failure 
and had intensified bourgeois reaction. 
Gramsci remained utterly hostile towards the PSI, 
resisting calls from the Comintern for fusion between the two 
parties. 23 Between 1921 and 1923 this hostility, in addition 
to the new Party's insistence on internal discipline, made 
Gramscits position virtually indistinguishable from Bordiga's 
(Togliatti, 1967b: 187-8). No longer was the factory council 
presented as the site of the institutional and moral authority 
of the proletariat. The authority of a disciplined Party was 
apparently substituted for his earlier stress on the 
sovereignty of the workplace. This conception was formally 
accepted in the 'Rome Theses' formulated by Bordiga and 
Terracini (see SPWII: 93-117). 24 
23. See Spriano (1967) and Davidson (1977). 
24. The "Rome Theses' formally acknowledged the danger of 
factions and consequently stressed the party's 
disciplined organisation (SPWII: 94). Although the need 
for participation was mentioned, it was accepted that ý 
'one cannot insist that by a given time, or on the eve of 
undertaking general actions, the party must have realised 
the condition of incorporating under its leadership--or 
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While he continued to reject in principle the Comintern's 
insistence on a united front policy with'the PSI, which 
Tasca's grouping on the right of the Party had accepted, 
Gramsci also began to resist Bordiga's intransigent 
sectarianism. By 1923, Gramsci had begun to see Fascism as a 
more stable political force than he had previously thought and 
his commitment to unity with the Comintern compelled him to 
extenuate the PCd'I's antagonistic relationship to the Soviet 
leadership. Gramsci began to construct his own centre 
grouping to offset the damage caused by the hostility between 
the far left and right in the Party (see L: 118 -23). His 
group, like the far left, opposed any united action with the 
PSI but, unlike them, was determined to break from Bordiga's 
policy of distancing the Party from the masses (see Davidson, 
1977: ch. 4). In Gramscils view, Bordiga's leadership had 
25 resulted in the Party losing touch with its mass base, 
rendering it politically ineffectual (L: 160). Lack of 
contact with the masses had obviated a critical unde rstanding 
of the current situation in Italy and consequently denied the 
proletariat an alternative rallying point against Fascism. 
Bordiga's vanguardism was the product of a theoretical 
misconception that could have significant consequences: 
The situation of the Party, which is reflected in 
its organisation, is the consequence of a general 
political conception. The problem is thus a 
political one, and involves not just the present 
activity but that in the future; today, it is a 
actually in its own ranks--the majority of the 
proletariat' (SPWII: 98). 
25. Gramscils opposition to Bordigals conception of the party 
was made clear when he refused to sign the latter's 
leftist manifesto. See L: 159-63. 
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problem on the one hand between the Party leaders 
and the mass of members, on'the other between the 
Party and the proletariat; tomorrow it will be a 
vaster problem, which will influence the 
organisation and solidarity of the workers' state. 
Not to pose the question to its full extent today' 
would mean going back to the socialist tradition, 
and waiting to differentiate itself until the 
revolution is at the door, or even until it is 
already in course (L: 217)'. 
In a vein similar to his conciliar'theory, Gramsci' argued for 
the preparation of the revolution by attending to the 'ý, 
separation of the'Party and proletariat. Once again, this 
preparation was viewed in 'subjective' terms: 
This is our'weakness, 'this is the main reason, for' 
the defeat of the Italian revolutionary parties; not 
to have had an ideology; not to have disseminated it 
amongst the masses; not to have strengthened the 
consciousness of their militants with certitudes of 
a moral and psychological character (SPWII: 171). 
Hence Gramsci called for an educational programme based on 
Marxist ideas (CPC: 24-5,50-7), for the Party to work amongst 
workers and peasants, to deal with the Southern question, to 
avoid bureaucratic isolation (CPC: 180-1), and to lay the 
foundations for a mass party (L: 316). He also included the 
formation of factory councils as part of this general 
programme of organising the workers (SPWII: 283; CPC: 504), 
although he explicitly acknowledged the importance of the 
trade unions in contacting the proletariat (CPC: 38-91 508-9). 
Gramscils renewed stress on the inclusion of the rank and 
file in the activities of the Party found expression, in his 
'Lyons Theses', in which he outlined his own view of the 
'Bolshevisation' of the PCd1I. In his view, Bolshevisation 
ineant that the Party operated with a disciplined, - centralised 
organisation and ideology. Yet this discipline presupposed 
"its capacity to operate in contact with the masses' (CPC: 
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500). Gramsci argued that the Party must find the basis of 
its organisation in non-Party institutions: centrally, the 
realm of production (CPC: 504). Only this would distinguish 
it as a class party. While this did not mean that the 
workers' productive life would represent the sovereign 
decision-making sphere--for he was firmly convinced that only 
a central party leadership could exercise this role--Gramsci 
stressed that discipline did not mean autocracy. 
26 Internal 
democratic methods would seek to ensure, as far as possible 
given the restrictive conditions of Fascism, a Party vanguard 
linked to the masses whilst avoiding factions and internal 
conflicts (CPC: 505-6). For Gramsci, the Party's leadership' 
amongst workers could not be mechanically presupposed; it had 
to be based on a"Ireall subjective assent by the working class 
itself (CPC: 508). That required widespread infiltration 
amongst workers' institutions (trade unions and other 
production-related organisations) and engagement in minor 
economic struggles (CPC: 509). In his view, a full- 
understanding of the contemporary situation in Italy was only 
possible if the Party'engaged in the particular struggles of 
the working'class, so avoiding the aloofness of Bordigals 
sectarianism (CPC: 512). Yet while it was a duty of the Party 
to extract a 'concrete knowledge' of the changing situation 
and to formulate directions for the mobilisation of the 
proletariat, it is clear that the Communist Party was not 
26. In a letter of January 1924 to Alfonso Leonetti, Gramsci 
explicitly rejected a return to the Ordine Nuovo strategy 
as 'anachronistic'. Here he admitted the 'very serious 
errors' made in 1919-20 by the Ordine Nuovo group. See 
L: 221. 
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considered a substitute for the workers' own organisations 
themselves, however limited their aims. Revolutionary 
consciousness resided in the working class's own praxis, not 
in the Party. Thus Gramsci still maintained that a 
fundamental task of the Party was to organise the proletariat 
for the ultimate victory of its own state form (SPWII: 357). 
While it is clear that Gramscils revised Party strategy 
from 1923 to his arrest aimed to fuse the authority'of the 
Party leadership with the authentic praxis of rank and file 
workers, it is also obvious that the 'spontaneity' and 
autonomy of, mass political action about which he had enthused 
during the council struggles was absent from his thought. The 
subjective assent of the working classýwas to be mediated by 
Party cadres, and thus a subjectivity channelled into 
reinforcing the authority of, the Party. In a letter of late 
1923, Gramsci had bemoaned the Party's lack of 'intermediary 
elements' to link leaders andýmasses (L: 141). 
The issue of subjective mediation between Party and 
proletariat was also seen by Gramsci as extendible to the 
. relation 
between Party and other classes. As his remarks 
against Bordiga suggested (see p. 53 above), Gramsci saw the 
relationship between Party and proletariat as fundamentally 
linked to the future relation between state and citizens. 
This was the subject of his unfinished essay of 1926, 'Some 
Aspects of the Southern Question'. In his later thinking, - 
Gramsci emphasised the necessity not only of grounding the 
Party in the life of the proletariat but also in forging an 
alliance of workers, peasants and'other strata. Again-1 he saw 
the success of a proletarian revolution in terms, of its ý 
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capacity to unite and to lead nationally (CPc: 139-40, -144-5). 
But Gramscils focus was no longer, exclusively on the moral 
resources of working class discipline in the factory; his 
attention turned to the ideological basis of southern peasant 
allegiances to the 'agrarian bloc'. I shall examine his 
initial study of the intellectuals in the-next section-, 
Gramscils post-factory council writings did, not add up to 
a sophisticated, theory of Political participation. Unlike, his 
earlier work of 1919-20 they were articulated in a context of 
proletarian defeat,, strong party discipline and internal party 
struggle. As such these writings do not express the richness 
and boldness of his Ordine Nuovo period. Many of the themes 
from his later thought, however, are continued and deepened in 
his QUadgrni. In light of this, his writings and, strategic 
turn of 1923-4 are of considerable significance. This is 
because they represent the initial attempt to recapture some 
of the principal imperatives of his earlier work--a politics 
rooted in the authentic praxis of-the proletariat and the 
nurturing of moral symmetry--but. in conditions of, reaction-and 
with the institutional structure of the Party as its central 
agent. The success of this attempt in, his theory of the Party 
as the 'modern Prince'-has been hotly debated since Gramsci"s 
death (see Shore, 1990), but here I am concerned more with its 
role in his analysis. 
In the period prior to, his arrest, Gramsci was concerned 
to balance two imperatives: a disciplined and autonomous party 
organisation with a strong and involved popul'ar support. In 
. __(derni, 
he went on to present the Party as the inheritor his QUa 
of the role of Machiavelli's Prince: combining organisational 
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strength and loyal support in a 'collective will, (see Q: 
1553-1652). The-relationship between leaders and led was 
still on the agenda, as it was in his earlier writings, yet 
their unity was theorised at a different level. The symmetry 
that was previously conceivedlas arising from the functional 
division of labour in the factory was now mediated by the 
Party. The imperative for unity derived from the Party, 
therefore, and no longer from an alternative state form. The 
symmetry between leaders and led, which was illustrated in the 
factory council by a dual identity in the 'producer', was 
later to be mediated by 'intermediaries' in the Party and 
'intellectuals' in society in general. As a consequence 
Gramsci was able to theorise the Party's role in relation to a 
plurality of class relationships in society, notably the 
peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie, which had to be integrated 
under the leadershýp of the PCd1I. It followed that, in order 
to sustain a harmony between central direction and popular 
support, ýthe intermediaries and their relationship to the 
proletariat and other classes would be of vital significance. 
Whereas a new state form had presupposed the achievement of 
moral symmetry, Gramscils later stress on intellectuals 
suggested that the continued reintegration of Party and 
classes, leaders and led, was a central part of political 
practice that had to be constantly nurtured. In his, Ouaderni, 
this issue arose in an analysis of civil, society as a realm of 
continued political contest. This analytical shift from state 
to society will be the subject of the next section. 
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Part Two: The Structure of Italian Politics 
The normative dimension of Gramscits Political theory was 
formulated alongside an analysis of the Italian social and 
political structure. This analysis investigated the kind of 
revolutionary political intervention permitted by contemporary 
social conditions. Fundamental to this was the relationship, 
between class forces and the Italian political structure. 
In the post-War period Gramsci was keenly aware of the 
potential for proletarian intervention in the context of the 
crisis of the Italian state. Unlike many other socialists in 
Italy, and the tradition of the Second International 
generally, he was sensitive to the peculiar impact of the 
Italian social and political structure on class conflict. 
However, only with the failure of the factory council 
struggles and the onset of Fascism did his analysis come to 
focus more closely on that issue. This shift in thinking, 
which directly preceded and anticipated his prison writings, 
accompanied a vigorous emphasis on the central role of the 
Communist Party in directing proletarian political activity. 
Indeed it was only when he abandoned a state-centred strategy 
that he could evaluate more critically the reasons for the 
failure of the council struggles and the conditions for 
proletarian advance. In this section I outline Gramscils 
substantive analysis of the Italian social and political 
structure and the various shifts in focus entailed in the 
development of his thought. 
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The Decline of the Bourgeois State 
Gramscits critical attitude towards the Italian state made him 
sensitive to the cultural and political critiques he 
encountered as a youth in Sardinia and Turin. As Davidson 
points out', Gramscils own personal sense of marginality 
anticipated, to a great extent, his antagonism to the Italian 
political and social structure. 
27 Set apart from his peers by 
his ill health and-a period of familial poverty which 
interrupted his education, Gramsci was critically aware of the 
inequalities and injustices of Southern culture. It was 
through Sard nationalism that he first expressed his political 
sentiments, typically against the exploitation and brutal 
treatment of-Sardinia by the mainland and, once; in Turin, 
against the North's prejudicial sentiments towards the 
Southern peasants. Inspired by the socialist historian, 
Gaetano Salvemini, Gramscils initial political feelings were 
directed against the Italian state in the form of a defensive 
nationalism. Though he later supplanted this with a Marxist- 
based socialism, he retained-a strong identification with 
Southern cultural and political issues which distinguished him 
from many of his socialist colleagues. 
Although his pre-1918 journalism dealt predominantly with 
cultural and educational matters, Gramsci anticipated to some 
degree a number ofýissues that reappeared later in both his 
factory council theory and his writings on PCd'I strategy. 
many of these concerns were articulated within a general 
27. Davidson (1977: chs 1 and 2); see also Fiori (1971: 9- 
68). For Gramscils own view of his childhood, see L: 108 
and LC: 164-5. 
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critical position towards the PSI. Gramsci initially promoted 
a policy of free trade, arguing that revolution could only 
come about through the full development of class forces and 
antagonisms. It was only in the aftermath of the Russian 
Revolution that, inspired by Leninist theory and practice, he 
began to view the backwardness of the Italian state and the 
weakness of the bourgeoisie as the very conditions in which a 
future proletarian state could take form. 
Although he articulated no coherent strategy before 1919, 
Gramscils stance within the PSI was a critical one, and his 
articles during and in the aftermath of the War were 
formulated in terms of a policy of radical intransigence. He 
urged the Party to take a more militant position vis-&-vis the 
Italian state, the War and reformists within the pSI. 28 
Consistent with his view, examined earlier, that socialism 
aims to construct a whole new social order, his notion of 
intransigence informed a series of reýlections on party 
strategy designed to orient it unambiguously towards 
revolutionary goals. This required a fundamental shift in the 
Party's relationship to the structure of Italian politics, one 
which would situate it in a qualitatively new relationship 
with the Italian people. 
Gramscifs critical perspective was primarily historical. 
At one point he praised the ideals of earlier Italian 
intellectuals on the-communitarian principle of a united 
Italy, at another he bemoaned the failure of the country's 
28. See Gramscils first, controversial article of 1914, 
'Neutralit& attiva ed operante, (CT: 10-15)- 
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leading politicians to achieve this ideal. 29'Indeed, it was 
this latter theme--the failure of the bourgeoisie to generate 
a successful liberal state--that underlined his political 
intransigence. It was precisely the inability of the Italian 
state to set'itself off-from the particularistic interests of 
a minority political elite that signalled the historical 
failure of the bourgeoisie to develop a, proper liberal state. 
Giolittils personal dominance, the absence of strong, coherent 
bourgeois-parties, the practice of-trasformismo and the 
consequent neutralisation of political conflict within the 
state structure, all indicated the sacrifice of 'normal' 
bourgeois development to the persistence of an almost feudal 
political, -structure. It was because of this absent'liberal 
model'that Gramsci argued for a policy of non-cooperation with 
other parties. This was necessary if class antagonisms were 
to be permitted to develop to the point at which coherent 
proletarian class-consciousness would be formed (CT: 381-3; 
NM: 15-19)- 
The peculiar development of the Italian social and 
political structure was at the forefront of--Gramscits 
analysis. As a Southerner himself he was keen to point out 
the effects of the uneven development of the Italian economy, 
aided by economic protectionism in the North and the 
subjugation of the Southern peasantry to the political and 
economic might of Northern industry (see CT: 228). 
Unification had effected only a worsening of disparities 
between North and South by encouraging wealth to travel 
29. See CT: 475-6,544-5; CF: 69-72,75-6; ON: 230-33,275- 
94. 
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northwards to the protected industries thus producing 
emigration from the South and a higher cost of living for 
those who remained. The First World War and the conflicts 
that preceded it benefited only the industrial North. Gramsci 
called for a further consideration of the plight of the 
South. 30 
on the basis of this analysis he urged the abandonment-of 
border-tariffs and other measures which he perceived as 
maintaining the South's subordination. He posed the problem 
in terms of a, 'nationall solution to what had up until then 
been viewed as an isolated problem. In an article of 1917, '1 
socialisti per la libertd dogonalel, he made an explicit link 
between the aims of socialism and current economic problems 
(CF: 402). If the PSI were to usher in a new social order, a 
confrontation with the Italian economic and political 
structure as a whole would be necessary. Gramsci saw the full 
economic development of Italy as a precondition for the 
crystallization of socialism as a political force. 
'Intransigents', he argued, 'are free traders': 
They do not want barons--whether sugar and steel 
barons or barons in government. The law of freedom 
must be allowed unrestricted operation;, it is 
intrinsic to bourgeois activity, the chemical 
reagent that is continually dissolving its cadres 
and forcing them to improve and protect themselves 
(NM: 36-7). 
30. CT: 230; see also the series of articles entitled 'Contro 
il feudalismo economico, (CT: 480-2,497-8; 544-5 and 
also CF: 82-3,402-5). Gentile (1982: 37-9) indicates 
that free trade was advocated by many Southern 
intellectuals and politicians, called i liberisti, who 
argued that social and economic reform required the 
abandonment of protectionism in the North. 
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Gramscils analysis was clearly premised upon a model of 
'normal' bourgeois'development. In this view the political 
structure of the democratic state was conceived as conforming 
to a characteristic minimising of the state's functions, 
opening the way for free competition in political . 
representation in the form of parties. In the Italian case, 
Gramsci argued that this required the de-feudalisation of, the 
state's structures, that is, the decentering of power, from- 
Giolittian control, and the formation of interests--both 
bourgeois and proletarian--in terms of distinct economic aims 
in the process of class struggle. This latter development 
required the abandonment of economic privileges (i. e. , 
protectionism) in order to encourage free market competition 
(in opposition to the 'artificial life' of high wages 
sustained by imperialist gains). ' Revolutionary goals were 
therefore posited as the outcome of a"naturall struggle 
achieved via the full development of class-forces. The 
Italian political structure presented a barrier to what 
Gramsci called the 'inner necessity of the social order' (NM: 
37) that normal capitalist development entailed . 
31 In this 
plainly teleological scheme,, the importance of political 
structures was recognised but only as a contingent phenomenon 
to be overcome through the normal course of development. 
Equally, the formation of a proletarian state arising from a 
coherent class consciousness was viewed economistically,, as a 
natural consequence of class struggle. 
31. Gramsci gave England as an example of this normal 
development (NM: 36-7. See also CF: 5-12). 
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Gramscils analysis shifted significantly during 1918 and 
the biennio rosso of 1919-20. The aftermath of the War, with 
its consequent social and political unrest and the advent of 
the Russian revolution, inspired Gramsci to focus on the 
foundation of a proletarian state. We have already seen'how 
his factory council theory outlined this new state by 
grounding political authority in a united moral community. 
Here we examine the analysis underlying Gramscils normative 
theory. Whereas earlier he had conceived of revolutionýas the 
outcome of the struggle to overcome Italy's economic 
backwardness, his later analysis'conceived'revolution as 
, immanent' in contemporary conditions. Gramsci aimed to 
reveal the transformative potential of existing institutions- 
the internal commissions-by'referring to'the bourgeoisie's 
apparent loss of economic and political leadership in monopoly 
capitalism. While his thinking of'1919-20 retained the 'ý 
'idealistic' image of the Russian revolution as a construction 
of a united moral community, he became more interested in 
extracting practical lessons from Russia with regard to 
anticipating the future form of a proletarian state. Central 
to this agenda was the soviet. 
Gramsci accepted'the soviet as both an authentic model 
for proletarian self-management and political participation - 
and, somewhat uncritically, a true illustration of the Russian 
revolution's emancipatory project. 32 Here he was strongly ý 
influenced by Lenin's The State-and Revolution (1992) which 
outlined, perhaps exceptionally in Leninfs thought, the 
32. CF: 602-3; ON: 250-3,267-71,381-5,482-4. 
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emancipatory aim of revolutionary Political action. Gramsci 
discovered a similar institutional arrangement in the life of 
the Italian proletariat. The internal commissions were 
identified as the basis of the Italian soviet whereby the 
state could be united with society. 
The internal commissions were of decisive importance to 
the extent that they represented the foundation for 
proletarian control of factory management. - Workers were in a 
unique position to take organisational decisions that had been 
denied them by the trade unions and earlier forms of 
capitalist enterprise. It was this new capacity for control, 
in Gramscils view, that United the realms of economics and 
politics, so presenting the conditions for revolution in the 
very decline of bourgeois institutions (including reformist 
bodies such as the unions and the Party). Far from conceiving 
revolution as tied to the prior liberalisation of capitalism, 
Gramsci now fashioned his theory around an analysis of the 
arrested develonnent of capitalism in Italy. 
Here again he was aided by Lenin. The latter's 
Imperialism had pointed to the inevitable decline of 
capitalism in the fusion of finance and monopoly capital. - For 
Gramsci, this analysis underlay the revolutionary potential of 
the factories. Although the Italian state had never developed 
into a typically liberal state, Italy's economy, in the 
context of international capitalism which had drawn it into 
the War had exhausted its potential. The result was a crisis 
that was simultaneously economic and political. The dominance 
of monopoly and industrial capital had ultimately destroyed 
competition and so rendered the-state and bourgeois class 
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unable to lead society on the basis of its productive power 
(ON: 66-71,105-8). As the guarantor of the legitimate use of 
private property, the state had long since been the 
functionary of industrial capital and had lost its 'universal' 
political role alongside the arrested development-of 
capitalism. 
33 Revolution was no longer the outcome of, the 
normal development of capitalism, a view which Gramsci now 
associated with the Mensheviks, but was a possibility 
generated by the dissolution of political and economic 
institutions under monopoly capitalism (ON: 335-7). 
Furthermore, the War had radicalised the Northern workers and 
peasants to a point where they, especially the industrial- 
proletariat, were capable of uniting and replacing the- 
bourgeoisie as a national, economically progressive class (ON: 
83-7). The emancipation of the proletariat was a possibility 
rooted in the very decline and backwardness of the Italian 
bourgeoisie. 
At the level of class struggle, Gramsci argued that both 
economic and political initiatives had passed to the urban, 
proletariat. The War had accelerated the formation of 
solidarities of, workers and peasants to the point where they 
represented-the economic, political and moral basis for an 
alternative Organisation Of society. Absolutely crucial to 
this analysis was Gramscils insistence that-conditions of 
production within the factory provided the foundation for new 
political relations. Monopoly capital had resulted in the 
increased absence of the individual capitalist entrepreneur 
33. ON: 150-3,230-33,250-3,320-2,335-7. 
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from the productive apparatus. As ownership and control of 
private property passed into the hands of corporate 
enterprises or banks, so the factories themselves came 
increasingly under the control of workers organised within 
34 
productive units. The type of discipline and representation 
exercised by workers within the internal commissions indicated 
the growing irrelevance of markets based on private property 
for organising production. 35 The very conditions of monopoly 
capitalism had given the proletariat the means by which it 
could assert an alternative type of society and, more 
significantly, an alternative kind of state. 
Gramscils enthusiasm for a new state entailed a decisive 
rejection of older political and economic institutions: 
namely, the Italian parliamentary state, the trade unions and 
ultimately the PSI. In his view, the Italian state 
represented an increasingly irrelevant apparatus whose 
political function was inextricably tied to the maintenance of 
economic competition. 
36 With the increasing redundancy of 
private property relations in administering the development of 
production, the state's role in mediating political 
competition between parties was dissolved. Equally, the 
dominance of Giolitti since the turn of the century had 
inhibited the state's liberalisation and ability to adapt to 
new post-War conditions. This had led to petty bourgeois 
reaction as the bourgeoisie, dominated by industrial capital, 
34. ON: 66-71,127-33,325-7,338-43,413-6. 
35. ON: 80-2,331-4,335-7,432-5. 
36. ON: 114-20,230-33,335-7,413-6. 
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failed politically to neutralise the demands of the 
proletariat, peasants, returning servicemen and the new 
Popular Party of the South. 37 
But Gramsci was equally critical of the traditional 
organisations of the working class: the chambers of labour 
and, more significantly, the trade unions. The unions were an 
integral part of the capitalist system of private property and 
its separation of Political and economic interests. They 
represented the worker on the basis of his identity as an 
38 individual economic agent and not as a 'producer'. 
Inevitably, they could not conceive of workers' interests in 
terms of the integration of political and economic realms. 
Whilst Gramsci accepted that they had enabled the progressive 
clarification and protection of the workers' aims in class 
struggle, they had become a hindrance to the further 
transformation of the proletariat's Political position. 39 
Being so much a part of the bourgeois state's claims to 
authority, they could not act as central agents in 
establishing the sovereignty of the factory, and so hindered 
the transition to a new state form. Gramsci came into 
conflict with other revolutionaries, notably Angelo Tasca, who 
believed a more conciliatory approach to the unions was 
necessary (see SPWI: 239-98). 
While Gramsci argued that neither the unions nor the 
Party could be considered the primary locus of revolutionary 
37. ON: 230-31 250-3,409-12,776-9. 
38. ON: 127-33, 236-41,256-62,590-4. 
39. ON: 127-33, 236-41,297-301,590-4. 
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activity--for this concerned a new state, which only the 
factory councils were capable of initiating--he did recommend 
that both organisations were important agents in the process 
of educating workers and disciplining the movement generally. 
As it became clear throughout late 1919 and 1920 that much 
work would be required to generate the factory councils as 
effective institutions, Gramsci began to focus much more an 
the role of the Party in uniting the workers' movement to pave 
the way for new state structures. 40 Gramsci identified 
himself with the communist fraction in the PSI and argued for 
the disempowerment of reformists and parliamentarians whom he 
considered out of touch and an obstacle to revolutionary aims. 
He also demanded that the PSI leadership commit itself in 
practice to the line of the Third International, calling for 
41 
Party discipline and arejection of reformist practices. 
The failure of the metal workers' strike in April 1920 
and the September factory occupations signalled an end to the 
militancy of the Turin working class and so to Gramscils 
insistence that proletarian revolution would begin in state 
institutions based in the factories. His critical position 
towards the PSI leadership--whom he considered part 
responsible for the factory struggles' failure--intensified. 
As I have noted, his view that the PSI'had provided no 
leadership or even understanding of the historical importance 
of the struggles brought him, throughout 1920, to insist on 
40. Compare ON: 367-72 with 394-8,510-7,776-9. See also 
ON: 782-4. 
41. ON: 394-8,510-7,776-9. 
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the necessity for a centralised, disciplined party structure 
(ON: 651-61; see Davidson, 1977: 149-55). 
Gramscils factory council theory was premised upon an 
analysis that sought revolutionary political innovation within 
the combined economic and political crises of the post-War 
period. However, in retrospect this view was marred, by an 
economism that associated the apparent loss of economic 
control by the industrialists with a simultaneous 
relinquishing of political dominance by the bourgeoisie. 42 
Thus De Felice argues that for Gramsci, 'politics was 
functional to economics' (De Felice, 1971: 340). The short- 
lived proletarianradicalism within the Turin factories was 
for Gramsci translated into a theory of the breakdown of 
bourgeois institutions. Gramsci tended to view the Italian 
state reductively, as a mere instrument of the bourgeoisie, 
entirely functional in economic terms despite its non-liberal 
character. ' on this basis he drew a similarity between the 
Russian revolution and the Italian--both had states which, 
rather than hindering revolution, served as its political 
precondition. For both were forms of. dictatorship unable to 
neutralise mass disaffection politically. 43 The defeat of the 
factory struggles and the subsequent onset of reaction crushed 
Gramscils initial enthusiasm. As we have seen, throughout the 
1921-6 period Gramsci aimed to salvage a theory of political 
participation, yet this time with a focus on the central role 
of the'Party. Inevitably this led to a recasting of his 
42. For a critique of Gramscils view of the industrialists' 
loss of power in the factories, see Adler (1977). 
43. ON: 156-61,331-4,403-7. 
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analysis of the Italian state and the significance of the 
forces that constituted it. 
Fascism and Class Analvsis 
Between 1921 and 1926, Gramscils preoccupation with the 
organisation of the Party, the debates in the Comintern and 
the growing repression of the Fascist regime kept him at a 
greater distance from concrete political struggles than 
before. This distance was illustrated in the more general 
terms of analysis that his work displayed. Gramscils central 
concern was the nature of party organisation in the face of 
Fascist reaction and internal party conflict. His shift to 
Bordiga's centralised concept of the Party meant that his own 
analysis had only begun to be developed when it was clear that 
Fascism was stronger than previously thought and that a new 
understanding of the Italian situation was necessary. The 
result was an assertion of the particularity of revolutionary 
conditions in Western capitalist societies compared to Russia 
and the beginning of an analysis of the political and . 
ideological bases of bourgeois rule. This development, as we 
have seen, marked the beginning of Gramscits critical view of 
the factory council movement whose political isolation, he 
stated in a letter of 1924, had proved to be a serious error 
of judgment (L: 221). This critical revision was clear in his 
acknowledgement of the disjuncture between economic crises and 
revolutionary political action. These conclusions, which were 
central to his analysis in prison, emerged following an on- 
going examination of Fascism and a renewed focus on the 
political development of the Italian bourgeoisie. 
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In the six year period up until his arrest, Gramscils 
analysis of Fascism moved from a peripheral to a central 
position in his strategic concerns. After his initial 
dismissal of Fascism as mere bourgeois reaction, it came to 
occupy an important place in his conception of the nature and 
function of the Party. Here I give an outline of this 
analysis. 44 
Immediately before and after the formation of the PCd'I 
Gramsci had dismissed Fascism as a petty bourgeois reaction to 
working class militancy following the War. Reaction was 
therefore a consequence of the post-War political and economic 
crisis and had its roots in the Giolittian regime (ON: 765-7, 
720-3). The urban petty-bourgeoisie, who had favoured the 
Giolittian policy of intervention in the class struggle and 
the practice of parliamentary absorption (trasformismo), had 
lost their political initiative under monopoly capital and 
sought to regain it through violent and non-democratic means 
(SPWI: 372-4. See also SPWII: 23-4,29-31). This view was 
affirmed in Bordigals 'Rome Theses' which described Fascism as 
'an inevitable consequence of the regime's development, 
(sPWII: 117). 
However, Gramsci came to acknowledge that Fascism was 
only partially a class-phenomenon. He was aware that it 
represented in many respects the subversive, irrational 
character specific to Italian culture (SPWII: 38-40). Yet he 
did not analyse in depth the cultural and psychological 
aspects of the movement, remaining committed to the view that 
44. For a closer examination, see Adamson (1980); Sassoon 
(1987: pt. II). 
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it was firmly tied to the Giolittian regime (SPWII: 52-3) and 
was indeed a transitory (SPWII: 46-7,56-8), if unstable 
45 
phenomenon. He saw no need to risk compromising with other 
parties, and continued to see a disciplined PCd'I as the most 
effective weapon against reactioný(SPWII: 56-8). 
By August 1921, as Fascist violence escalated, he began 
to examine the bases of its support. In Gramscils view the 
movement was composed of two distinct wings: a conservative 
urban petty-bourgeoisie wing and a more radical wing dominated 
by the Southern landowners. While the Fascist platform united 
the petty-bourgeoisie, the northern industrialists, war - 
veterans and landowners against proletarian, and peasant-- 
militancy, the urban Fascists did not accept the legitimacy of 
the more violent tactics of the Southern Fascists. This, 
Gramsci argued, was the basis of a possible split within the 
movement, with Mussolini forming a more conciliatory Party , 
(sPWII: 63-5; see also 61-2). Thus Gramsci saw Fascism as a 
complex phenomenon, not directly linked, to the bourgeoisie''and 
by no means a unified bloc. 46 , 
In January 1922, Gramsci began to locate Fascism in the 
context of Italian history since the Risorgimento and the 
successive attempts since the turn of the century to 
neutralise the potential political threat of the working 
class. Fascism was a further example of thatýstrategy: 
seeking to attain by violence the political advantage of the 
45. Gramsci warned of the possibility of a coup attempt in 
1921 (SPWII: 44-5,59-60). 
46. See Losito and Segre (1992) for a comparative account of 
Gramscils interpretation of Fascism. 
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bourgeoisie. It was, in Gramscils view, to the PCd'I's 
advantage to be aware of this. For the PSI, in their 
ignorance, had remained integral to this strategy of 
compromise (SPWII: 79-82). 
This analysis became central to Gramscils thinking- 
following Mussolini's March on Rome, despite Gramscits 
insistence on Fascism's internal weaknesses. Following that 
event, Gramsci began to assert his differences with Bordiga on 
party strategy and analysis, drawing a crucial difference 
between the nature of bourgeois rule in Russia and in the 
West. As his characterisation of Fascism's transitoriness 
proved false, Gramsci jumped on the weaknesses of Fascism to 
guide Party strategy. He restated the existence of internal, 
divisions, the alienation of the petty-bourgeoisie and the 
strength of external resistance (L: 223-38), especially in the 
South where, the PCdII would have to work harder (CPC: 113-24; 
SPWII: 250-4). Those tasks were clearly linked to the 
argument outlined in the previous section on the need for the 
Party to expand its bases of support. Gramsci was aware of 
the oscillation of Fascist support, especially amongst the 
petty-bourgeoisie, between reaction and democratic opposition. 
In-a letter to Togliatti in 1923, he pointed out that the 
PCdII ought to combat Fascism's aim of uniting the crumbling 
agrarian bloc of class forces, i. e. its aim to become an 
'integral movement' (L: 127-3; see also 118-23). 
But Gramsci was insistent that, while the democratic 
opposition would probably reap the benefits of the growing 
anti-Fascist movement, the PCdII had to remain outside that 
grouping, for it was too reformist (CPC: 28-39) and ought to 
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be exposed as such (L: 119). Only, a united front from below 
was possible (CPC: 113-24). In prison Gramsci realised that 
this isolationism had ultimately defeated the PCd1I and 
permitted the continuation of Fascism. ý Indeed as early as 
August 1923 he had claimed that the split of the Left in 1921 
had been the 'greatest triumph of reaction' (L: 127). - 
It is difficult to tell what precise effect Gramscils 
analysis of Fascism had on his own strategic thinking., 
Arguably his interpretation of the movement as not being a 
simple class phenomenon, having-an unstable basis of support 
47 and an irrational 'logic' of its own, differentiated his 
analysis from those rather more economistic views within-his 
own Party (see Forgacs: 1986b). More obviously it brought to 
his understanding of bourgeois power a sense of the complexity 
of the forces behind the Italian state and the need for a 
concrete analysis of its particular character. His analysis, 
however, was conventionally Marxist in the sense that support 
for Fascism was viewed in fundamentally class terms, even if 
he proposed to undermine a reductionist reading (see Losito 
and Segre, 1992: 66-8). 
Gramscils strategic disagreements with Bordiga and the 
Comintern were rooted in the difference he began to draw 
between the nature of bourgeois rule in Russia and in the 
West, a superstructural difference that prevented economic 
crises from having direct revolutionary consequences. This 
marked the beginning of Gramscils reconceptualisation of the 
47. CPC: 208-10. For a view on the link between Gramscils 
interpretation of Fascism and his work in the Quaderni, 
see Adamson (1980: 626-33). 
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complex relation between the economic and the political. 
Furthermore, Italy's peculiar place amongst the capitalist 
states of the West was more closely analysed. That brought 
Gramsci to focus on the ideological and cultural issues behind 
political forces. It was this 'superstructural turn' that 
paved-the way for the emergence of the concept of hegemony as 
a key term in political strategy. 
In a letter of February 1924, Gramsci announced his own 
analysis of the Italian situation and the West in his - 
criticism of Bordigals concept of the party and revolution. 
Bordigals concept of the'revolutionary Party was based on an 
analysis of the exceptional nature of the Russian revolution. 
For him, the lack of determining economic conditions made the 
revolution a product of the voluntaristic assertion of will. 
This was not appropriate in Italy where revolution would be 
economically determined. Therefore, the Party's role was 
minimal, characterised by its separation from the masses (L: 
232-3). However, in Gramscils'view, this was mistaken. He 
suggested that capitalist developmentýin the West had 
generated more complex superstructures, rendering the economic 
determination of revolution much less direct: 
The determination, which in Russia was direct and 
drove the masses onto the streets for a 
revolutionary uprising, in central and Western 
Europe is complicated by all these political 
superstructures, created by the greater development 
of capitalism. This makes the action of the masses 
slower and more prudent, and therefore requires of 
the revolutionary party a strategy and tactics 
altogether more complicated and long-term than those 
which were necessary for the Bolsheviks in the 
period between March and November 1917 (L: 233). 
The development of a flabour aristocracy' (trade unions and 
Social Democratic parties) had ensured that political , 
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leadership was a crucial factor in revolutionary action. 'As 
we have seen, Gramsci attempted to forge closer links between 
the masses and the Party in order to tackle this problem. The 
following year he reiterated this point, indicating-that the 
division of labour between the unions and political parties of 
the, working class in the West represented an increasing 
influence of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat (CPC: 64). 
This was visible in the reformism of the unions and 
parliamentarianism of the parties. In 1926, Gramsci developed 
the point in a more general direction. He suggested 'that in 
the advanced capitalist countries, the ruling class possesses 
political and organisational reserves which it did not 
possess.... in Russia' (CPC:, 121). Consequently 'even the most 
serious economic crises do not have immediate repercussions in 
the political sphere' (CPC: 121). The political structures of 
Western economies, therefore, permitted a 'lag' between , 
economic conditions and political action; a condition that the 
leftist economic determinism of Bordiga was unable to grasp. 
Furthermore, Gramsci argued that those conditions produced a 
situation of increased 'resistance'-by state structures. - This 
was visible in the sustained organisation of support for 
regimes despite on-going economic crises (CPC: 121-2). 
This view clearly broke with that of 1919-20 in which 
Gramsci himself had considered the post-War economic crisis to 
be directly related to the exhausted political capacity of the 
bourgeois state. The survival and, consolidation of Fascism, 
despite political instability, had revealed the bourgeoisie's 
ability, -to adapt to economic crises that had not been 
adequately theorised by the PCdII. For Gramsci, this, required 
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a crucial differentiation between the analysis of Russia and 
western societies. 
In the face of the Fascist seizure of power and the 
misguided analyses of Bordiga and the Comintern, Gramsci 
returned to the specificity of the Italian social and 
political structure to guide political strategy. It was 
necessary, given the difference between Russia and the West, - 
to highlight the nature of the forganisational reserves' , 
particular to Italy. This problem was tackled most fully in 
the 'Lyons Theses' and his later essay on the Southern 
question., 
In his 'Lyons Theses', Gramsci outlined the particular 
weakness of industrial capitalism in Italy. He pinpointed the 
importance of the compromise between industrial and agrarian 
interests and the consequent absence of a unitary ruling class 
(CPC: 492). This placed the industrial working class in a 
unique position, providing it with a 'unitary function' that 
the Italian bourgeoisie was unable to fulfil. Again Gramsci 
offered the Leninist 'weakest link' theory that proletarian 
revolution need not occur in the most dqveloped capitalist 
states. For the heterogeneity of the Italian ruling class 
generated a persistent instability of the regime., , 
The weakness of the Italian'state was checked, by the 
bourgeoisie's practice of trasformismo. only by incorporating 
representatives of the working class could they prevent the 
formation of an alternative, revolutionary force amongst the 
industrial and rural proletariat (CPC: 492-5). This 
historical policy of fixing compromises at an elite level 
resulted in Italy's poor economic development (CPC: 492-3). 
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The rapid economic growth in the first decade of the century 
produced an increasingly radicalised proletariat and 
peasantry. However, the defeat of the workers' struggles in 
1920 indicated the crucial absence of strong leadership in the 
workers' movement, a situation entailed by reformist collusion 
with trasformismo. Fascism was a response, not to the 
revolutionary activity of the proletariat, but to its-failure 
(CPC: 495). In Gramscils view, Fascism 'merely modifies the 
programme of conservation and reaction which has always 
dominated Italian politics,, through a different way of 
conceiving the process of unification of the reactionary 
forces' (CPC: 495). A such, it was a continuity and not a 
break with the traditional bourgeois policy of excluding the 
popular masses from real political integration. The novelty 
of Fascism had been its petty-bourgeois support, although even 
they were discontented with the favouring of oligarchical 
industrial and agrarian capitalism (CPC: 496). 
, But what were the lorganisational reserves' specific to 
Italy, given its peculiar political structure? In a report to 
the PCd'I in August 1926, Gramsci argued that Italy, like 
Poland, Spain and Portugal was on the periphery of the 
capitalist world. -Those countries did not have the strongly 
resistant states of, the more developed capitalist economies. 
Crucially, they were characterised by a complex articulation 
of class forces: 
... in these countries, a broad stratum of intermediate classes stretches between the 
proletariat and capitalism: classes which seek, and 
to a certain extent succeed in carrying on, policies 
of their own, with ideologies which often influence 
broad strata of the proletariat, but which 
particularly affect the peasant masses (CPC: 122). 
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As Adamson points out, Gramsci did not proceed to analyse the 
political economy of this peripheral status. Rather, he set 
out to-examine how the mediation of intellectuals, 
particularly in the South, determined the nature of class 
(particularly peasant) allegiances to the agrarian--bloc-(see. ---- 
Adamson, 1980: 625-6). This was the subject of his notes on 
the Southern Question. There he distinguished the Northern 
proletariat from the Southern peasantry by reference to the 
make up of 'intellectuals' that characterised the class forces 
in each area. Whereas industrial capitalism had introduced a 
technical division of labour based on functional 
specialisations in the factories, agricultural areas retained 
a more complex layer of social divisions. This-included state 
administratives, the big, medium and small rural bourgeoisie, 
the clergy and the peasantry (CPC: 150-3). Gramsci argued 
that while the peasantry was amorphous with no autonomous 
political programme, it was drawn into the-agrarian bloc by 
virtue of its place'in the complex articulation of forces: ' 
'The Southern, peasant is bound to the big land owner through 
the mediation of the (petty bourgeois] intellectual' (CPC: 
152). The agrarian bloc was dominated politically by the big 
land owning classes, but found its ideological cohesion 
through'the leadership of high intellectuals such as Fortunato 
and Croce, who 'have seen to it that the problem of the South 
would be posed-in a way which did not go'beyond certain 
limits; did not become revolutionary' (CPC: 155). Thus 
Gramsci argued that Croce'exercised a crucial 'national 
function', helping sustain the conservative Southern bloc by 
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cultural means, so preventing the dissolution of Northern 
bourgeois dominance (CPC: 150-6). 
Gramscils political analysis before his arrest was 
characterised by a shiftfrom a concentration on the decline 
on the bourgeois state in Italy and its replacement, to a 
concern with the composition of class forces that underlay the 
state. This shift from state to society as the central object 
of analysis was accompanied by a realisation of the complex 
relationship between economy and politics that he had 
underestimated in his earlier writings. Gramscits focus on 
the relation between intellectuals and peasants in the South 
and the unstable bloc of forces sustaining the Fascist regime 
indicated a form of class analysis that was sensitive to the 
peculiar cultural and political makeup of class societies. 
Although at that time his analysis was not a great success, 
particularly given the Comintern's 'left turn' in 1929, it was 
later in his Quaderni, which extrapolated and deepened this 
later analysis, that his-initial investigations have come to 
be appreciated. For, in a manner similar to his conciliar 
theory, Gramsci aimed to locate revolu. tionary agency in the 
concrete circumstances of the decline of the Italian state. 
Part Three: Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that Gramscits-analysis between 
1916 and 1926 must be seen as both an interpretation of and 
response to the social and Political crisis that engulfed 
Italy after the First World War. This response had two 
characteristic strands: the presentation of political 
intervention as the construction of a united moral community, 
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and the grounding of that intervention in a realistic 
understanding of the old regime. While both those strands 
underwent significant revision in his political career, they 
do reveal continuities in his thought that were inevitably 
carried over into his prison writings. 
The dominant theme in Gramscits analysis before his 
incarceration was that revolution signified a fundamental 
change in the relationship between leaders and led, i. e. 
authority relations. The two strands of his analysis 
illustrate this constant point of reference. The first 
stressed this possibility in terms of consciousness and ideas 
generated by the praxis of the proletariat in the factory and, 
later, with the aid of the Party. Hegemony has since become 
associated with the issue of consciousness or ideology. But 
equally important in Gramscils account of the politics of 
subjectivity was the division of labour in practical activity. 
For it was in terms of this division of labour, whether in the 
factory or the Party, that the unification of consciousness 
was seen to take place. This will be examined in Chapter 
Three on the role of the intellectuals. Gramscils insistence 
that the subjective organisation of the masses was rooted in 
real practices was further elaborated in his analysis of the 
conditions for revolutionary change which characterised the 
second strand of his thought. In that strand, the 
relationship between class, politics and the changing 
political structure was examined. In 1919-20 the potential 
moral community of the proletariat was theorised as a 
substitute for the imminent collapse of the bourgeois liberal 
state, including its role in organising the production 
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process. In his later work, " the precondition of class 
political leadership over the rest-'of society was made' 
problematic. It was this relationship between state, society 
and class politics that Gramsci endeavoured to clarify in his 
ouaderni. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HEGEMONY: STATE, SOCIETY AND THE POLITICS OF CONSENT 
Gramscils concept of hegemony is widely considered a 
distinctive contribution to the analysis of consent in 
capitalist society. His recommendation that class power ought 
to be conceived in terms of the political and ideological 
neutralisation of conflict has become an almost paradigmatic 
approach in modern political science. 
' Yet the value of 
Gramscils contribution has in recent years become disputed, 
especially in light of the demise of Marxism as a theory of 
human progress and Leninism as a means to its achievement. 
2 
Whereas in the earlier stages of the revival of his thought, 
Gramsci was deemed to have provided the basis for the 
political and theoretical revival of Marxism, his reception in 
later years has been much more sceptical in terms of the 
validity of his analysis in a contemporary context. 
3 The aim 
of, this chapter is to clarify the manner in which Gramscirs 
account of hegemony served him as framework for the analysis 
of consent. Only by so doing will it be possible to grasp any 
relevance of his approach today. 
1., See Ransome (1992: 9-27), Lukes (1974), Femia (1981: 35- 
50), Hoffman (1984: ch. 1), and Mouffe (1979: 1-15). 
2. See, for example, the comments by Bellamy (1987: 131-40) 
and compare Femia (1989) with the more laudatory remarks 
in his earlier study (1981: 253-5). 
3. For an enthusiastic account of Gramscits Marxism, see 
Macciocchi (1974: ch. 1). For a more critical overview, 
see Dimikratos (1986). 
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Gramscits presentation of hegemony as a feature of the 
relation between 'state' and 'Civil society' posed proletarian 
revolution in terms closely associated with modern liberal 
political theory. For his Marxist interpreters, one, of the 
major issues has been whether his analysis provided a coherent 
and radical'solution to what is seen as a fundamentally 
'bourgeois' problem: the correct understanding of the 
relationship between force and consent in capitalist society, 
and the consequent role of political action within that 
relationship (Hoffman, 1984: 13-17). The relation between 
private and public spheres is fundamental to that problem. 
My argument in this chapter is that Marxist critics have 
failed to understand the distinctive character of Gramscits 
use of the concepts state and civil society. As a 
consequence, they have misunderstood the political nature of 
consent that his work suggests. serving as indicators of 
class political action, rather than strictly formal referents, 
Gramsci's use of the state/civil society distinction 
presupposed a period of political transition rather than one 
of structural cohesion. As such, politics was conceived as 
the achievement of civil society rather than a process 
constrained by it. For Gramsci, it was necessary to outline a 
non-economistic class analysis in, order to interpret the 
struggle for a unified civil society. This entailed a 
critique of vulgar Marxism and an approach designed to 
investigate the mediations involved in linking base'and 
superstructure. 
In Part One of this chapter, Gramscils distinction 
between state and civil society will-be examined in the light 
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of subsequent criticisms. His stress on the decisive role of 
political agency, rather than economic structure, in 
organising consent, will be further assessed in Part TWO, 
where the notion of 'historical bloc' will be elucidated. 
Part One: Class and Community 
Gramscils, notes on the state and civil society stemmed from a 
much broader theoretical project, conceived in prison, on the 
role of intellectuals in Italian society. In the earlier of 
his occasional study plans he expressed his intention, amongst 
other things, to undertake a general analysis of Italian 
intellectuals (LC: 58-9), and his first notebook listed, as one 
of its 'principal arguments' the 'Formation of Italian 
intellectual groups: development, attitudes', -(Q: 6). This 
project was located in a general interest in Italian culture, 
its sociological construction, history and development (see 
LC: 322-3; Q: 6). Gramsci made reference, in a letter of 
March 1927, to his unfinished essay 'Some Aspects of the 
Southern Question', suggesting he would like to expand it into 
a more academic study (LC: 58-9)-. However, he was aware that 
such a research project would require a range of materials 
unavailable to him in prison (LC: 378-9). By November 1930 
his initial project had been reduced to a narrower range of 
enquiry. Then, in August 1931 he shifted his attention to the 
state, stating clearly that this was an antecedent and 
integral part of his interest, in intellectuals and Italian 
culture: 
one of the themes which has interested me most in 
the last few years has been the defining of a few 
characteristic features in the history of the 
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Italian intellectuals. This interest has its 
origin, on the one hand, in my desire to make a 
thorough examination of the concept of the state; 
-and on-the other, in my attempts to extend my 
knowledge of certain aspects of the Italian people's 
historic development (LC: 459-60). 
Gramsci did not devote a specific notebook to the concepts of 
state and civil society. Rather, the concepts served, in a 
more general way, to delineate, in a number of theoretical 
investigations, differential forms of political action. 
Having emerged from a more general, enquiry into intellectuals 
and Italianýculture, the relation between state and society 
was fundamentally bound up with Gramscits presumption that 
class struggle was central to the transformation of 
intellectual relationships. Hegemony signified the operation 
ý of intellectual relations across the most basic division of 
modern politics. I shall examine the topic of intellectuals 
in Chapter Three. This section of the chapter will outline 
the distinctive character of Gramscils use of state and civil 
society as concepts integral to the analysis of hegemony. 
Contrary to recent Marxist critics, Gramscils analysis 
suggested, a 'politics of consent, centred on, the achievement 
of a unified civil society, n. pt a 'consensual politics' - 
subordinate to a preconstituted 'bourgeois, civil society. 
The distinction between state and society served as a general 
framework for analysing the conditions for revolution rather 
than as a formal analysis of capitalism. This suggested that 
the struggle between classes to generate a 'universal' 
presence in society was premised on the absence of a 
reconciliation between private and public spheres. 
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The Transformation of Politics 
In his writings immediately prior to his arrest, Gramsci posed 
the problem of the PCd1I leading an alliance of the 
proletariat and other politically disaffected classes under a 
'national' banner. In his Quaderni, the question of how a 
class funiversalizest its interests was reconceptualised 
through the distinction between state and society. 
Presupposing the struggle for societal unity as the key to 
revolutionary strategy, Gramsci endeavoured to pose the 
achievement of a unified civil society as part of a general 
framework in analyzing, class struggle. This emerged as a 
heuristic principle in his analysis, although he sought to 
ground it in the social and political developments, of Western 
societies. In his 'Notes on Machiavelli', written between, 
1932 and 1934, he reformulated material from an earlier 
notebook of 1931-2 (see Q: 973). Here, he analysed the 
historical transformation of class relations since 1870 in 
terms of a substantial change between state and society. This 
development had important consequences for political strategy: 
Political concept of the so-called 'Permanent 
Revolution', which emerged before 1848 as a 
scientifically evolved expression of the Jacobin 
experience from 1789 to Thermidor. The formula 
belongs to an historical period in which the great 
mass political parties and the great economic trade 
unions did not yet exist, and society was still, so 
to speak, in a state of fluidity from many points of 
view: monopoly of Political and state power by a few- 
cities or even by a single one (Paris in the case of 
France); a relatively rudimentary state apparatus, 
and greater autonomy of civil society from state 
activity; a specific system of military forces and 
of national armed services; greater autonomy of the 
national economies from the economic relations of 
the world market, etc. In the period after 1870, 
with the colonial expansion of Europe, all these 
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elements change: the internal and international 
organisational relations of the state become more 
complex and massive, and the Forty-Eightist formula 
of the 'Permanent Revolution' is expanded and 
transcended in political science by the formula of 
'civil hegemony'. The same thing happens in the art 
of politics as happens in military art: war of 
movement increasingly becomes war of position, and 
it can be said that a state will win a war in so far 
as it prepares for it minutely and technically in 
peacetime. The massive structures of the modern 
democracies, both as state organisations, and as 
complexes of associations in civil society, 
constitute for the art of politics as it were the 
'trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the 
front in the war of position: they render merely 
'partial' the element of movement which before used 
to be the 'whole' of war, etc. (Q: 1566-7). 4 
Here, summarised rather densely, were the major institutional 
developments that for Gramsci characterised the transformation 
of class relations. He saw this development in the expansion 
and interaction of state and, civil society. From a period of 
relative independence, state and civil society, each rather 
poorly developed in component parts, were transformed. The 
reach of the state expanded both nationally and 
internationally as modern democracies were formed. Likewise, 
civil society had been organised into representative 
institutions: mass political parties, trade unions and 
'complexes of associations'. 
This expansion and interaction carried with it important 
changes in political practice. As we can see, Gramsci 
presented this as a decline in relevance for the concept 
permanent revolution, which he associated with the 
revolutionaries of 1848, and its replacement by the concept 
hegemony. The practical significance of this change in 
terminology was given in the final part of the passage. Here 
4ý See also Q: 1621 for a similar argument. 
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the consequences of-the interaction between state and civil 
society resulted in the 'protection' of the state by the non- 
state sphere. Anotherresult of the new strategic importance 
of civil society was theýsuccessful maintenance of state 
authority. Civil society, devalued a direct revolutionary 
assault on state institutions. 
- Politics, in Gramscils view, was substantially 
transformed by the inclusion of, working people into the 
political system as the state became increasingly involved 
with'the economic and non-economic institutions of society. - 
Whereas pre-capitalist states were characterised by-, the 
autonomy of, various social groups, and the exclusive nature of, 
state control, the bourgeois state 
substitutes for the mechanical bloc of social groups 
their subordination to the active hegemony of the 
directive and dominant group, thus abolishing 
certain auton? mies, which are, however, reborn in 
other forms, as parties, trade unions, cultural 
associations (Q: 2287). 
A fundam 
I 
ental feature of the modern bourgeois state, 
therefore, was its tendency to integrate previously autonomous 
institutions into its rule. 
This new form of politics, which Gramsci elsewhere called 
'modern political technique', is our starting point for 
investigating the concept hegemony. Gramsci was still 
committed to grounding revolutionary strategy in an analysis 
of current social and political conditions. However, the 
language he used was not that of political economy but 
'liberal' political thought: namely the distinctions between 
state and society, and force and consent. This has led to 
confusions over his account of consent in class society, and 
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it is important here to stress Gramscils attempt to subvert 
that language to revolutionary ends. For although he borrowed 
that terminology, his Quaderni writings presupposed the crisis 
of liberal institutions and hence the amenability of its 
language to more radical goals. 
The merger of state and society, political power and 
consent, had been at the heart of Gramscils factory council 
theory. Political activity could not be reduced to an 
instrumental or 'mechanical' taking of power. He aimed to 
combine the instrumental idea of revolution with anticipatory 
forms of the new political community. This stress on the 
political organisation necessary for class activity meant that 
the state could not be conceived as external to the political 
constitution of a class, but was instead an integral part of 
it. A non-economistic view of the state was also visible in 
his earlier work, in which he recognised its role in 
facilitating the unification of heterogeneous class forces, 
because the bourgeoisie was unable to dominate Italian 
society. Hence Gramscils thought diverged considerably from 
the tradition of Second International Marxism, which tended to. 
view the state as an institution parasitic on a class-based 
society or as a simple instrument used by the ruling class. 
Italian society had not conformed to this simplistic model 
(see Sassoon, 1978; Jessop, 1982: chs 1-3). 
In the Ouaderni, Gramscils proposed 'examination of the 
state" continued to be theorised as a central component of 
class dominance. However, two factors distinguished this 
discussion from his earlier articles. Firstly, he was 
concerned primarily with the different forms of the bourgeois 
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state, notably in Italy. Secondly, he was interested in the 
relationship of the state to civil society, an area he had 
come to consider the primary field of struggle. 
In his notes on intellectuals, Gramsci made a crucial 
methodological distinction in the analysis of the 
'superstructure': between the state, 'conceived narrowly as 
'political society', and the realm of social life outside that 
institution, understood broadly as 'civil society' (Q: 1518). 
Gramsci clearly took political society to be power based on 
coercive capacity, whereas civil society was a realm in which 
, spontaneous consent' was generated. Two forms of power were 
therefore postulated: political society effecting 'direct 
domination', and civil society constituting 'social hegemony'. 
This apparently rigid distinction had its roots in the 
division Croce made between the purely coercive function of 
political society and the realm of ethical relations in civil 
society (see Croce, 1966a). For both Croce and Gramsci, the 
state as an institution had no ethical content, and its 
authority therefore pertained to its juridical function (see 
Q: 690-2). on that basis, Gramsci identified civil society as 
the realm in which hegemony was exercised. It was therefore 
in civil, society that a 'social group' or class had to command 
a degree of 'leadership', or consensual support, if it was to 
enter the institutions of political society. In his notes on 
Italian history, he expressed the point as a principle of 
analysis: 
The methodological criterion on which our own study 
must be based is the following: that the supremacy 
of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 
'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral 
leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic 
9 3' 
groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or to 
subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads 
kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already, exercise leadership' before 
winning governmental power (this indeed is one of 
the principal conditions for the winning of such 
power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it 
exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in 
its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well (Q: 
2010-11; see also 2287-88). 
Though Gramscils distinction between political and civil 
society was indebted to Croce, he was also keen to avoid a 
simple characterisation of civil society an arena of ethical 
relations devoid of any structural foundation in economic 
relations. Because hegemonic, leadership in civil society was 
based on the economic interests of a class or class fraction, 
the ethical relations of civil society could not be considered 
apart from their foundation in economic relations. civil 
society was not merely the sphere of common ethical bonds, it 
was an arena in which ethical relations were organised by a 
particular group or class in its own interests. 
Gramsci extended his interpretive criteria by introducing 
the concept 'integral state', which he defined as the 
combination of political With civil society, 'in other words 
hegemony protected by the armour of coercion, (Q: 763-4). 
This Hegelian concept of the state, defined broadly as the 
whole gamut of political and social relations, was employed to 
signify that the state, as a particular agency, and civil 
society, as a plurality of interests, were not mutually 
exclusive. The state, narrowly speaking, had no ethical 
content, but the 'integral state' concept suggested that 
political society was crucially dependent upon consensual 
support in civil society. 
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The dominant interpretive category in Gramscils Quaderni 
was the 'integral state, concept, which in a letter of 
September 1931 he defined as: 
an equi 1 rium between 'political' society and 
'civil' society (i. e. the hegemony of a social group 
over the entire society of a nation, a hegemony 
exercised by means of and through the organisations 
commonly called private, such as the Churcg, the 
Trade Unions, the schools etc. ) (LC: 481). 
His use of the word 'equilibrium, suggested a degree of 
variation in the hegemonic relation. Under some 
circumstances, the consensual basis of support in civil 
society will be less pervasive than at others, and it may be 
necessary to rely more on coercion. Thus, although 
commentators such as Femia argue that hegemony referred 
strictly to consent, it was necessarily coupled with the 
threat of force (Femia, 1981: ch. 2; Sassoon, 1987: 109-19). 
This suggested that hegemony was more an interpretive concept 
than a strictly empirical fact in Gramscils Quaderni. While 
the threat of coercion still existed, hegemony remained a 
contingent phenomenon. 
6 
Gramsci devoted a number of notes to contemporary studies 
of 'the state' that he believed deficient. Understood simply 
as 'government', the importance of the symbiotic relationship 
between state and civil society was undermined. Gramsci took 
issue with the concept 'night-watchman state', which 
postulated minimal interference by the state in society. To 
5. Gramsci explicitly identified the Hegelian origin of the 
notion 'ethical state'. See Q: 1049-50,2302. 
6. Femia (1981: 46-81 55) distinguishes three different 
levels of hegemonic rule by which to assess degrees of 
social integration. 
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assume such a rigid separation of state from society, the 
autonomy of each from the other, was to forget that hegemony 
'belongs to private forces, to civil society', and thus'that 
the two were mutually reinforcing. Gramsci used the 'integral 
state' to represent this (Q: 2302). The concept 'night- 
watchman state' signified less a generally applicable model 
than a particular stage in class development before hegemony 
in civil society had arisen (Q: 763). 
Gramsci used a further concept to illustrate the 
interaction between state and society: 'ethical'statel (Stato 
etico): " 
every state is ethical in as much as one of its 
most important functions is to raise the great mass 
of the population to a particular cultural and moral 
level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the 
needs of the productive forces for development, and 
therefore to the interests of the ruling classes (Q: 
1049; see also 1565-6,1570-1). 
The educat ion system and the 'negative functions' of the law 
were cited as the central 'apparatuses' of the institutional 
structure of the state in promoting and regenerating consent 
in civil society. However, Gramsci was insistent that consent 
was generated primarily by bodies outside the formal state 
structure: 
... but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called 
private initiatives and activities tend to the same 
end, and which form the apparatus of the political 
and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes (Q: 
1049; see also 56,800). 
For Gramscils interpretive scheme the capacity of a class to 
dominate civil society, by forming an alliance of 
hI eterogeneous forces, was crucial. In this sense, the 
apparently 'private' groups and forces outside the 
institutional sphere of the state served as apparatuses of 
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class dominance, and so constituted elements of the state in 
the 'integral' use of the term. Gramsci, therefore, indicated 
the importance of alliances, the integration of other groups 
and classes under the leadership of one class or class 
fraction: 
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that 
account be taken of the interests and the tendencies 
of the groups over which hegemony is to be 
exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium 
should be formed--in other words, that the leading 
groups should make sacrifices of an economic- 
corporate kind... (Q: 1591). 
Unlike many Marxists, who perceived capitalist society as 
racked by a fundamental antagonism between classes, Gramsci 
recognised the Political prowess of the bourgeoisie in seeking 
to generate a genuine political community: 
7 
- 
The bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in 
continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire 
society, assimilating it to its own cultural and 
economic level. The entire function of the state 
has been transformed; the state has become an 
'educator', etc. (Q: 937). 
Yet for Gramsci this specific feature had contradictory 
consequences, especially in the period of imperialism and the 
dominance of finance capital, as state and society were more 
inter-related than ever before. "The nature of class dominance 
was dispersed. 
The hegemonic or consensual nature of class domination, 
as given by the organisational and integrative capacity of the 
modern state, was now central to an understanding of class 
power. However, Gramsci also recognised in this new 
state/society relation a transformation of political strategy. 
7. Femia (1981: 49-50) argues that Gramsci is distinctive in 
virtue of his rejection of conflict models of capitalist 
society predominant amongst Marxists at that time. 
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The incorporation of the working classýinto bourgeois 
democratic politics subordinated it to the hegemony of the 
ruling class, but at the same time developed it as a 
potentially hegemonic class. Bourgeois hegemony was thus 
inherently undermined by the class antagonisms that underlay 
its consensual rule (Sassoon, 1978: 20-1). 
For Gramsci, it was necessary for the Communist Party to 
engage in a lengthy struggle to recompose civil society in 
proletarian form. This required a 'war of position' on the 
political and cultural fronts, -developing support amongst 
other classes and groups in order to generate, a broad-based 
'bloc' under the authority of the Party (Q: 866,1559,1565- 
7). The theorisation of such a project compelled Gramsci to 
undertake a full-scale rejection of vulgar Marxist 
leconomism', which in his view overestimated the revolutionary 
potential in economic antagonism (see Q: 1589-97). It was 
precisely the historic interpenetration of state and society 
that militated against disruptions caused by economic crises 
1615) - 
In his factory council writings of 1919-20 Gramsci had 
presupposed that a united working class constituency would act 
as a morally disciplined society. The central Political-task 
was one of transforming this society of producers into a 
workers' state. In his Quaderni, however, Gramsci came to see 
the problem of uniting civil society as the major political 
task. Whereas earlier a society of producers was thought 
possible by virtue of the apparent chaos and disorder of 
Italian society, in his later work a new political community 
had to be wrought from the lorganisational reserves'--the 
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social and normative structures--of the existing order. 
Gramscits reference to the interpenetration of state and 
society after 1870 served to substantiate his belief that the 
Ordine Nuovo movement had fatally misperceived the strengths 
of the regime (see above, p. 76-8). By focusing narrowly on 
the replacement of state structures, the council movement had 
neglected to pose adequately the new state in relation to a 
broader strategy integrating the disaffected peasantry and 
petty bourgeoisie. A proper analysis of the conditions for 
revolutionary change, then, had to begin from the principle 
that state and society in the West were only analytically 
distinct, and that their increased fusion in recent decades 
meant that class struggle was principally directed to the 
formation of a unified civil society. 8 
This activity was the basis of Gramscils discussion of 
the tasks of the Communist Party. In his view, the Party must 
assert itself as a 'Jacobin force', as a 'collective will, 
that brings about 'not only a unison of economic and political 
aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the 
questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate 
but on a 'universal' plain' (Q: 1584). The tasks, of-the Party 
mirrored, to some extent, Gramscils view of the ability of the 
bourgeoisie to renew its support in civil society. 
Though Gramsci noted that political struggle after 1870 
became increasingly defined by the term hegemony, he was not 
8. See Gramscils remarks on the characteristic difference 
between East (i. e. Russia) and West in terms of the 
strength of civil society (Q: 866). See also Q: 1615, 
where he described the superstructures as 'trench-systems 
of modern warfare', and 1566-7. 
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suggesting that the bourgeoisie simply had a solid base of 
consensual support to hand. Instead, the term denoted the 
dominant form of Political strategy by which consent was 
secured, a strategy based on the increased fusion of state and 
society. As such, civil society, the realm in which 
consensual relations were generated, was not conceived as a 
specifically bourgeois concept, i. e. 'an arena in which private 
and public were already reconciled by virtue of the separation 
of-economic and political spheres. Indeed, it was not 
considered a preconstituted sphere, but rather one in which 
unity was yet to be achieved. 
Marxist Critics 
The expansion of the concept of the state beyond-a strictly 
bounded definition, indeed its conceptual fusion with civil 
society in the notion 'integral state', has caused confusion 
amongst some of Gramscils interpreters. Inevitably, the 
variable definitions of the state/society relationship given 
in the ouaderni have provoked a critical response, 
particularly from Marxists for whom a general and formal 
definition of the capitalist state could be given in 
principle. The essence of this criticism lies in the 
rejection of Gramscils dichotomies state/society and 
force/consent. Considered as formal accounts of capitalist 
society, his analysis is deemed inadequate by its failure to 
conceive properly the correspondence-between the two terms in 
each division (see Hoffman, 1984: ch. 3). Perhaps the mostý 
widely known criticism of Gramscils thought in this area comes 
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from Perry Anderson (1976-7), for whom Gramscils ambiguity 
ultimately led to Political 'errors'. 
Anderson recovers three definitions of the state/society 
and force/consent relationship 
Together those definitions give 
misleading understanding of the 
society, and of the location of 
capitalist society. Anderson's 
follows: - 
Ln his reading of the Quaderni. 
'a partial and in-his view 
relationship between state and 
force and consent iný 
three definitions are as 
In the first, the state is regarded by Gramsci as 
dominated by civil society., Consent generated in civil 
society diminishes the coercive function of the state. For 
Anderson this definition represents a 'social democratic 
illusionl, in which the masses are subject not to the force of 
the state but rather to ideological mystification. The state 
as a coercive force has become redundant (1976-7: 12,22-31 
26-31). 
The second definition suggests a balanced, ' relationship 
between state and society, coercion and consent. 'Here the 
coercive role of the state is recognised and also its ability 
to generate consent. However, the twin roles of coercionýand 
consent are similarly identified as characteristic of civil 
society. ý Anderson points out that in normal democratic, 
capitalist regimes society can only be seen as the 'realm of 
freedom' and not as legitimately coercive (1976-7: 31-3). 
, In the third definition Gramsci identified both state and 
civil society as essentially the same sphere. The formal 
distinction between the two has been dropped, non-state 
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superstructures are held to be 'as good as' the state in 
performing the function of bourgeois rule. According to 
Anderson, this definition fails to grasp the crucial 
distinction between state and society, that is central to the 
capitalist mode of production (1976-7: 33-41). 
Anderson contrasts Gramscils conceptual 'slippages, with 
his own version of the state/society and coercion/consent 
relationships. His definition displays the 'key asymmetry, in 
bourgeois capitalist democracies (1976-7: 41-9). The basic 
feature of the capitalist state is its exclusive claim to be 
the final juridical arbiter of social relations and 
consequently the only institution that exercises legitimate 
force. The exercise of force and consent in capitalist 
society is guided by this fundamental principle: 
There is always a structural asymmetry in the 
distribution of the consensual and coercive 
functions of this power. Ideology is shared between 
civil society and the State: violence pertains to 
the State alone. In other words, the State enters 
twice over into any equation between the two (1976- 
7: 32). 
According to Anderson, Gramscils first formulation 
mistakenly depreciates the coercive role of the state in 
favour of the primacy of civil society-generated consensus. 
The second correctly attributes to the state a coercive and 
consensual function but does so, falsely, to civil society. 
The third, likewise, mystifies the basic principle of 
bourgeois rule by obliterating the differences between the two 
spheres, so undermining the distinction between coercion and 
consent. 
In Anderson's view, Gramscils use of the term hegemony 
'tends to accredit the notion that the dominant mode of 
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bourgeois power in the West--liculturell--is also the 
determinant mode, either by suppressing the latter or fusing 
the two together' (1976-7: 45). The correct formulation for 
Anderson is that a dominantly consensual bourgeois rule is 
ultimately determined by the threat of force via, the state. 
This, he claims, 'is a law of capitalism, (1976-7: 43-4). At 
the same time the ideological or consensual nature of 
bourgeois rule is'not, as Gramsci suggested, to be detected in 
civil society, but rather in the state. The very nature of 
capitalism presupposes a privatisation of economic relations 
and an alienation of politics to a separate institutional 
realm. This realm is that of the state, and it is here that 
a society's 'universal' interests as a community are, 
represented. The effect of this separation of politics and 
economy is to produce amongst the people the 'ideological 
belief that they exercise self-government in the 
representative State' (1976-7: 42). Hence the very structure 
of capitalist social relations presupposes a division between 
private self-interest and public cooperation. In this way 
consent is presupposed by the v. ery structure of capitalist 
society by means of a division of the public and the private. 
The state and not civil society is the institutional channel 
that mobilizes legitimation. While Anderson concedes that 
civil society may be the site of certain consensual relations, 
these are entirely secondary to the dominant state-constituted 
consensus. 
However, Anderson's criticisms presuppose a model of 
capitalist society of which Gramsci had no real experience. 
As Sassoon points out, Gramsci is more concerned to register 
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the political consequences of the relation between state and 
civil-society in the--period of monopoly capitalism, than to 
analyse the classical liberal state (Sassoon, 1978). The 
consequences of the development of monopoly capitalism include 
the increased political presence of the working population, 
hence the compulsion of the state to intervene in both the 
economyýand civil society in order to integrate various 
political interests. - As such, the boundaries between state 
and society became less precise, and the influence of the 
bourgeoisie, so Gramsci argued, more pervasive. In his view, 
monopoly capitalism had permitted the working class to present 
itself as a unified, potentially hegemonic, political 
community, a view that underlay his factory council theory. 
In response, the state was more and more reliant on its own 
1civilising' institutions and on those outside its formal 
boundaries in order to subordinate the working people. Rather 
than consisting of fixed models of state and society, as 
Anderson suggests, Gramscifs work represents 'the attempt to 
grasp the complex reality of this modern state' (Sassoon, 
1978: 22) . 
Anderson criticises Gramsci for locating consent in civil 
society rather than in the state. However, Gramsci did not 
deny that the separation of politics from economics in 
capitalist society was itself ideological, so generating 
acquiescence. 
9, Rather his approach suggested that this can 
not be considered the entire basis of bourgeois Political 
dominance. That the state claims to represent the universal 
9. Indeed Gramsci had claimed this was illusory in 1917, see 
above, p. 36. 
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interests of society was more a matter of political 
contingency, in Gramscils*view, than a formal presupposition. 
Far from seeking to analyse the formal characteristics of the 
bourgeois state, Gramsci presupposed that the present 
conjuncture was one of transition. The emergence of potential 
forms of proletarian self-management had so threatened 
'normal' bourgeois politics that 'consent' became the object 
of political struggle to unify under one dominant 'bloc' the 
disparate components of society. I will return to this notion 
of /transition' later on. 
10 
From a similar standpoint, Gramscits concept of civil 
society has also been subject to criticism. Again this 
revolves around the accusation that his uncritical acceptance 
of liberal terminology led to the 'illusion' that political 
power rested on consciously formed consent. Although he 
acknowledged that his notion of civil society was derived from 
Hegel (see Q: 703), Gramscits was a much more limited 
transposition from the philosopher than he himself claimed. 
For both Hegel and Gramsci, civil society denoted the realm of 
heterogeneous forces outside ýhe formal institutions of the 
state, which yet formed part of the state in the broader 
('integral' or 'ethical') sense. Gramsci specified these as 
'the ensemble of organisations commonly called private' (Q: 
1518), which were not of a strictly economic character. For 
Hegel, however, civil society did include market relations 
(i. e. individual and organised trade and commercial 
10. See Jessop (1978) for a critical view of the claim that 
liberal democracy is the 'best possible Political shell' 
of capitalism. 
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interests), as well as corporate associations and the public 
administration of justice. Civil society was a system of 
mutually self-serving needs, a sphere of 'ethical life' 
characterised by 'particularity' and only just anticipating 
the universal ends of the state proper (see Hegel, 1991: 220- 
6). Its very particularity, however, classified civil society 
as the 'external state' (1991: 221), a moment of ethical life 
to be transcended by the moral unity represented by the state 
(see Walton, 1983). 
Gramsci remarked that 1[b]etween the economic structure 
and the state with its legislation and its coercion stands 
civil society' (Q: 1253), a separate sphere comprising 'the 
political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the 
entire society' (Q: 703). Whereas Hegel took the state to be 
the dialectical transcendence of particularity into 
Sittlichkeit-the moral core of the community-Gramsci, in 
accordance with his Crocean definition, associated civilý 
society with 'the ethical content of the state' (Q: 703). 
Similar to his council writings, Gramsci appeared to see civil 
society as the site of moral unity irreducible to the. economy 
or the state. Civil society denoted a realm of social 
consciousness without any necessary dependence on other 
aspects of the-social structure (see, however, Q: 1254). As 
such this realm was consistently presented as beyond coercion. 
Gramscils stress on the superstructure as the major 
sphere of political domination has led some to argue that 
Gramsci assigned analytical primacy to superstructural 
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activity" or at the very least failed adequately to theorise 
the importance of economic relations in determining consent, 
resulting in a misunderstanding of the relations between 
economy,, society and state in capitalism. 
One of Gramscils critics in this latter vein is Geoffrey 
Hunt, who argues that his was an excessively superstructural 
definition of civil society (Hunt, 1986: 206-19. See also 
Hunt, 1985: 11-23). For Hunt, Gramsci took a Hegelian concept 
of civil society as the sphere of private interests and 
associations, but deprived it of the economic-relations that 
Hegel had admitted were included. For Hegel the egoism of 
civil society was only partially overcome by the forms of 
solidarity and cooperation, that existed in that sphere 
(corporations). The true universality that civil society in 
itself was unable to reach was represented by the state. 
For Hunt, Gramscils use of the term civil society 
signified the 'socio-ontological or reality defining sphere" 
between 'the coercive apparatus of the state and the more 
fundamental economic structure' (Hunt, 1986: 208). Where 
Hegel saw the cooperation generated in civil society as fully 
articulated only in the state, Hunt claims that Gramsci 
instead recognised that very universality--as promoted by the 
state--in civil society: 
Hegell's principle of universality at work in the 
self-interested activity of individuals and 
corporations is translated by Gramsci into the 
principle of 'hegemony', the 'mental' result of the 
state's activity of, maintaining class rule, achieved 
through the medium of intellectuals, churches, 
clubs, newspapers, etc. (Hunt, 1986: 209). 
The best exponent of this view is Norberto Bobbio. See 
especially Bobbio (1979). 
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This state-directed universality operated at the socio- 
ontological level that Gramsci defined as superstructural- 
i. e. at a level of social consciousness. 
For Hunt, Gramscits use of a Hegelian notion of 
universality marked only a limited advance over vulgar Marxist 
reductionism. Gramsci separated the superstructural sphere of 
civil society from any determinate influence of economic 
relations, thus divorcing its analysis from 'an adequate 
consideration of the essential inner structure and dynamic of 
capitalism' (1986: 210). Vulgar Marxism gives us economic 
causalism and an inadequate epiphenomenalist view of 
superstructure which tends to its total neglect; Gramsci 
offered 'a disarticulated base and superstructure with all the 
emphasis on the superstructure and tending to the total 
neglect of the base' (1986: 211). 
In Hunt's view Gramsci failed to grasp the basic Marxist 
tenet that civil society is an effect of deeper relations of 
production. Inequality in the relations, of production, where 
labour-power is purchased at a value less than the value it 
creates, is hiddqn by the apparently equal exchange of wages 
and labour; the surplus-creating character of labour is 
obscured by its presentation as a commodity with a determinate 
value, the value required to reproduce it. 12 
This obfuscation of the inequality within the wage-labour 
relation has crucial consequences for the, whole capitalist 
social formation. The appearance of inequality throughout 
12. Hunt (1986: 212-3). For an analysis of Marx's use of 
civil society see Hunt (1987: 263-76). - For a defence of 
civil society as the sphere of exchange relations and a 
critique of Gramsci, see also Urry (1981: chs 2 and 3). 
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capitalist exchange relations generates a conceptual reality 
for the members of civil society: 
In capitalism the phenomenal form of exchange 
relations, i. e. the surface of the economic 
structure, comes to dominate all human relations and 
impressing us immediately and habitually in our 
daily lives is taken as the 'type' of all truly 
social relations. 'Civil Society' is precisely the 
ideological elaboration of these posited opposites 
of the deeper, essential relations of capitalist 
society (Hunt, 1986: 213). 
The sphere of civil society is for Hunt -both structural 
and superstructural, and in its analysis both sides must be 
grasped. The ideological forms of freedom, individuality, and 
equality must be seen as the real effects of essential 
production relations. In capitalist society it is these 
ideological forms that dominate human discourse. 
Gramscils failure to grasp the linkage between the 
economic structure of capitalism and the superstructural forms 
of consciousness rendered his concept of civil society, in 
Hunt's view, inadequate. By not recognising this linkage 
Gramsci made the legitimation of the capitalist mode of 
production dependent on the introduction of ideology from 
outside the relations of production. Similar to Anderson, 
Hunt claims that Gramsci ignored the 'structural process of 
legitimation' that stems from the wage-labour relation. 
Because Gramsci 'cannot conceive how a complex of ideas arises 
as the 'natural' and inverted form of the essential production 
relations he tends to present that complex as the conscious 
creation of a 'thing' standing over society: the State, " 
(Hunt, 1986: 215). Hegemony as a form of legitimating 
relations of power is outside those relations: 
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Thus it appears to him that if the state, which he 
takes as a given, maintains bourgeois rule even 
through crisis and proletarian challenges, it must 
be because it actively gains consent to that rule. 
He then focuses all his attention on the way in 
which 'it' does this: by using the legal apparatus, 
the media, the schools, trade unions, churches and 
other 'private associations' of 'civil society* 
(Hunt, 1986: 215). 
Finally, when liberal regimes undergo crises of 
legitimation Gramsci was unable to see how these develop from 
the relations of production (1986: 216-17). A failure to 
reproduce consent is not a failure of the bourgeoisie to 
maintain the dominance of an arbitrary ideology but is instead 
the inability to reproduce the legitimating principle of 
/free' exchange relations, a problem that Hunt associates with 
welfare capitalism in particular. 
13 
In short, Hunt believes that Gramsci failed to recognise 
the dual character of civil society--its existence at both a 
structural and superstructural level. Gramscils emphasis on 
the superstructural side has thwarted his understanding of the 
capitalist social formation to the point that the socio- 
ontological (i. e. superstructural) nature of civil society is 
conceived independently of the crucial influence that economic 
relations have in structuring it. Hegemony, both as a form of 
domination and as a strategy of collective action, is 
conceived one-sidedly, as social consciousness without a 
determinate origin in capitalist relations of production. 
Central to Hunt's criticism is the accusation that 
Gramsci misconceived the nature of consent in capitalist 
13. Hunt (1986: 217). Hunt goes on to argue that the 
misperception of consent as something introduced from 
outside structured relations of production has led to 
bureaucratic resolutions of class conflict by the Left. 
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society by presenting civil society as purely superstructural. 
Hunt recognises that Gramsci referred to the significance of 
the economic base, but those references are considered mere 
flip service' to a Marxist agenda based on class struggle. 
However, I will attempt to)defend Gramscils concept of civil 
society, albeit with some qualifications. 
As I have suggested, Gramscils division of the 
superstructure into the realms of state and society was not as 
such a formal account of capitalism, but rather a framework 
for, theorising political strategy under specific conditions. 
This entailed a number of presuppositions and generated 
consequences that Gramscils critics fail to recognise. 
Marxists have attacked Gramscils account of state and 
society for misperceiving the determining presence of the 
economy in the generation of political relations (see Urry, 
1981: 24-5). Consent, it has been argued, must be understood 
in relation to its determination within the structure of 
social relations in general. For some', Gramscil's failure to 
specify some economic causal mechanism to consent repre sented 
his subordination to libeiýal, indeed-Crocean, categories 
(Hoffman; 1984: 74). 
Far from suggesting the absence of economic relations in 
the production of political relations, Gramsci presupposed the 
presence of the economic, but in a specific way. For him, 
economic relations of production were the basis of moral 
relations. - They formed the foundations for moral symmetry, as 
I have argued'in Chapter One, and not primarily for the 
division and egoism of the market place. Gramscits analysis 
was rooted in his interpretation of the crisis of the 
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bourgeois state in Italy which he believed had opened up the 
possibility of a new political order based on the 
proletariat's productive capacity. As Biagio De Giovanni 
(1977: 229-30) has argued, Gramscils views on the 
interpenetration of state and civil society (see above, pp. 
89-90) were a response to the fact that the division of 
politics and economy had broken down. This constituted an 
'organic crisis' of the bourgeoisie. As such, politics, far 
from remaining separate from the economy, was now deeply 
involved in the organisation and regulation of the production 
process (1977: 231). Economic relations had become political 
in that they were integral to the re-elaboration of a 
universal interest that had failed to establish itself in 
Italy. In short, Gramsci presupposed circumstances of 
transition, where a bourgeois model of consent was absent and 
a new form had the opportunity to make itself available. For 
Gramsci, economic relations had provided the embryonic forms 
of unity around which classes as collective political agents, 
rather than passive structural 'bearers', were active. 
Gramscils concept of civil society was not critically 
developed, but it would be wrong to assume that this 
inevitably entailed its subordination to a 'bourgeois' 
conception of 'private life'. As I have shown, it was 
precisely the absence of this sphere that brought Gramsci to 
theorise state and society. Rather than assume that civil 
society is a bourgeois concept, 14 we should ask what use it 
14. John Keane (1988: 32-3) argues it would be wrong to label 
civil society a purely 'bourgeois, concept, since it 
considerably pre-dates the development of capitalist 
society. See also Jacques Texier's most recent defence 
of Gramscils notion of civil society (Texier, 1990). He 
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served in Gramsci analysis. Essentially, it provided a 
conceptual guarantee of the autonomy of social consciousness 
from any reduction to either the political or the economic 
spheres. Hence in one formulation, civil society was located 
between the economy and the state (Q: 1253-4). Yet at the - 
same time, he made it clear that state and economy were 
crucially involved in organising civil society. Thus social 
consciousness was both constructed by economic and political 
relations, and independent of them. 15 
This paradox was an intrinsic part of Gramscils analysis 
of the crisis. For it illustrated his concern to-grasp the 
ultimate class nature of the political structure whilst at the 
same time avoiding a simplistic reductionism. Consequently, 
civil society served to denote the indeterminate effect of 
economic relations on political relations. Such an effect- 
could only be understood pragmatically, by analysing the 
extent to which social consciousness had been unified by the 
collective political intervention of class forces. It is to 
the principles behind this analysis that I turn next. 
Part Two: Analyzing the 'Historical Bloc, 
Gramscits proposal that civil society be seen as the crucial 
site of political contest was strongly affirmed in his 
critique of positivist Marxism and his attempt to reconstruct 
theoretically the relation between the economic and the , 
argues that Gramsci surpassed Marx by separating civil 
society from any necessary correspondence with capitalist 
relations of production (1990: 29). 
15.1 examine this issue in Chapter Four. 
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political. In this reconstruction, he sought to affirm the 
autonomy of the 'superstructure' from the base' and to convey 
their mediated correspondence via political agents who 
articulated human consciousnesses. Once again, it is clear 
that Gramsci was sensitive to the dynamic nature of political 
relations and consequently aimed to construct Marxism as a 
general, rather than formal, framework for evaluating the 
interaction of base and superstructure. Foremost among his 
concerns was to undermine the view that economic crises 
inevitably led to political transformation; in a period of 
transition, it was the political structure of civil society 
that needed attention. What emerged was a form of class, 
analysis focused on the contingent interplay of political 
'forces' and economic relations, one which situated the 
analyst as a participant in a complex and often unpredictable 
series of 'situations'. on this pragmatic theoretical basis, 
hegemony suggested an analysis of the forms of political 
closure that could not be derived simply from an awareness of 
strictly 'economic' antagonisms. 
Rethinking Base and Superstructure 
Gramsci denied a single causal explanation for historical- 
development. The economistic view--that base and 
superstructure were two distinct realms in which the former 
independently produced the latter--was untenable as a theory 
of history. The two realms, in so far as they could be 
distinguished, were in Gramscils view 'organically' linked, 
neither one dominating the other or reducible to it. This he 
established through 
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the conception of 'historical bloc' in which 
precisely material forces are the content and 
ideologies the form, though this distinction between 
form and content has purely didactic value, since 
the material forces would be inconceivable 
historically without form and the ideologies would 
be individual fancies without the material, forces 
(Q: 869). 
However, before addressing the issue of their interaction, 
Gramsci first asserted their autonomy: 
The claim (presented as an essential postulate of 
historical materialism) that every fluctuation of 
politics and ideology can be presented and expounded 
as an immediate expression of the structure, must be 
contested in theory as primitive infantilism, and 
combated in practice with the authentic testimony of 
Marx, the author of concrete political and 
historical works (Q: 871). 
He denied that the structure of the social totality is pre- 
constituted by a dominant economic base, and he went on to 
suggest that an authentic Marxist analysis would be a 
historical one. Between the first anti-economistic statement 
and the second historically-minded assertion we find in 
Gramsci's Quaderni an effort to elaborate the explanatory 
power of Marxism. 
Gramscils notes on the philosophical and explanatory 
status of Marxist theory arose in the reconstruction of his 
political project: Marxism as the foundation of a new 'world 
view'. For him the analytical coherence of the doctrine was 
crucially bound up with its potential as a moral and political 
force. In a series of comments on Bukharin, though largely 
negative and polemical, Gramsci attacked the latter's Popular 
Manual for its positivist Marxism and reductive sociology. In 
that attack, which set the discussion in a dominantly anti- 
economistic framework, Gramsci made many suggestions 
115 
concerning his own conception of the explanatory power of 
Marxism. 
A central theme of Gramscils critique of Bukharin was the 
presentation of Marxism as a method of historical explanation. 
The main features of this interpretation were the discovery of 
causal laws and the employment of a 'metaphysical materialism, 
that treated society as a natural object, hence subject to 
predictive analysis through quantitative assessment. For 
Gramsci this synthesis-of Marxism and positivism denied the 
distinctive and revolutionary character of Marxism as a 
16 'philosophy of praxis'. 
Gramsci disputed the need to search for causal laws in 
Marxism, although he did accept that tendential laws could be 
discovered (see Q: 1432-3). In the Quaderni he lamented what 
he saw as the 'near-fetishism, Cguasi feticismo) of the 
physical sciences (Q: 1413). The assumption that natural 
science exclusively provided the kind of knowledge that a 
Marxist revolutionary project required was, in his view, 
absurd. If science were deemed toýbe concernedýwithýthe 
search for laws, as Positivists had taken it to be, then this 
incorporation of the methods of natural science into Marxism 
negated the critical and transformative power of that body of 
thought. For the regularity of human behaviour that social 
laws identified would certainly presuppose a non-revolutionary 
and non-critical population: 
... statistical laws can be employed in the science 
and art of politics only so long as the great masses 
16. For a critical commentary on Gramscils polemic against 
Bukharin, see Finocchiaro (1988: ch. 3)-. See Martin 
(199o) for a critique of Finocchiaro's method. 
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of the population remain (or at least are reputed to 
remain) essentially passive, in relation to the 
questions which interest historians and politicians 
(Q: 1429). 
The implication here was that in order to comprehend and 
perform revolutionary action, behavioural regularities must 
not be hypostatised but rather recognised as transient and 
amenable to political action. That, of course, meant 
rejecting natural science as the model for all knowledge. 
Instead Gramsci proposed that there could be a plurality of 
research methods and 'sciences' (see Q: 1404). 
The recognition of the transient and historically 
specific nature of regularised human behaviour was for Gramsci 
the foundation of the philosophy of praxis (see Morera, 1990). 
It was this recognition that conferred upon Marxism, in 
Gramscils view, its 'absolute historicism'. The search'for" 
social laws was an ahistorical exercise inimical to the 
philosophy of praxis. Human behavioural regularities should 
not simply be accepted, but investigated. Gramsci identified 
this method with Marx's work on political economy: 
The 'critique' of Political economy (i. e. Capital) 
starts from the concept of the historical character 
(storicit&] of the 'Oetermined market' and of its 
'automatism', whereas pure economists conceive of 
these elements as 'eternal* and 'natural'; the 
critique analyses realistically the relations of 
forces determining the market, 'it analyses in depth 
their contradictions, evaluates the possibilities of 
modification connected with the appearance and 
strengthening of new elements and puts forward the 
'transitory' (caducit&] and 'replaceable' nature of 
the science being criticised ... (Q: 1478). 
From here Gramsci went on to assert: 
it is not a question of 'discovering' a metaphysical 
law of 'determinism', or even of establishing a 
'general' law of causality. It is a question of 
pointing out how in historical development 
relatively 'permanent' forces are constituted which 
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operate with a certain regularity and automatism (Q: 
1479). 
In a way similar to his earlier critique Of Positivism, he 
insisted that social behaviour was always filtered through 
consciousness (see above, pp. 42-3). Human behavioural 
regularities and the 'sciences, that purport to discover them 
(and in doing so help to continue them) were to be overcome by 
'revolutionary praxis'. In this view Marxism was an 
emancipatory project aimed at revealing the transient nature 
of human regularity and the forms of knowledge (or sciences) 
associated with it. By asserting the historically contingent 
form of societies it facilitated the search for possible new 
forms. In short, it emphasised action and the creative 
undermining of structure. Thus Gramsci refuted the predictive 
power of positivist sociology and remarked: I ... prediction 
reveals itself therefore not as a scientific act of knowledge, 
but as the abstract expression of the effort made, the 
practical way of creating a collective will' (Q: 1403-4). 
Additionally, Gramsci objected to the correlative notion 
of materialism. By treating humans as just another form of 
quantifiable matter Bukharin had opened the way to 
constructing a positivist sociology of human action. Gramsci 
countered this view with a conception of historical 
materialism that promoted a new understanding of the dialectic 
of 'quantity' and 'quality' (see Q: 1446-7). This meant 
understanding social life not merely in terms akin to natural 
science--quantitative terms--but more hermeneutically, as both 
material and subjective. 
Gramsci criticised Bukharin's naive objectivism, his 
assumption that an objective world existed outside human 
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interpretation. Bukharin had undermined the crucial 
importance of subjectivist philosophy in the philosophy of 
praxis. 17 The positing of a fixed (if dynamic) reality 
outside human belief was in Gramscils view 'a hangover from 
God', an assertion of the dominance of a non-man-made reality. 
Gramsci appeared to deny the possibility of a privileged 
position from which an objective, real world could be 
perceived. 'Objectivity' was not a simple given: 
Objective always means 'humanly objective' which can 
be held to correspond exactly to 'historically 
subjective': in other words, objective means 
, universal subjective' (Q: 1415-16). 
objectivity was conferred by human subjects in historical 
time. The historical applicability of the term objective-- 
which indicated universal agreement--was essentially 
political, a process of cultural unification. In that way 
Gramsci linked the truth status of scientific knowledge to the 
harmonious constitution of society generally: 
Man knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real 
for the whole human race historically unified in a 
unitary cultural system; but this process of 
historical unification occurs with the disappearance 
of the internal contradictions which tear apart 
human society... (Q: 1416). 
Despite the implicit relativism in this view--that objectivity 
is merely a matter of human agreement and that this relativism 
can be overcome by reducing human disagreement to social 
17. At one point Gramsci remarked: 'It is surprising that 
there has been no proper affirmation and development of 
the connection between the idealist assertion of the 
reality of the world as the creation of the human spirit 
and the affirmation made by the philosophy of praxis of 
the historicity and transience of ideologies on the 
grounds that ideologies are expressions of the structure 
and are modified by modifications of the structure' (Q: 
1413; see also 1415). 
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contradictions--Gramsci'went on to elaborate some political 
and methodological consequences. If reality were not a simple 
given but the object of a definitional struggle, then the 
materialist dialectic could not be seen as referring to a 
purely material development of matter. Instead, he suggested 
that the dialectic refers to the ongoing struggles to confer 
meaning upon reality. Social development could not be 
explainedýby referring to a preconstituted, self-sufficient 
material world, whether it was comprised of humans reduced to 
unreflective automatons or to a technological determinism, 
which spun out superstructures as it developed. 18 Rather, the 
process of conferring meaning upon economic activity, thus 
making it 'objective', had to be recognised. That constituted 
the importance of the superstructures. The unification of the 
superstructures, of which state and civil society were the 
fundamental components, was simultaneously an integration with 
the economy, resulting in a unified culture: 
What the idealists call 'spirit' is not a point of 
departure but a point of arrival; it is the ensemble 
of the superstructures moving towards concrete and 
objectively universal unification and not a unitary 
presupposition. (Q: 1416). 
Such abstract theorising had a clear analytical purpose. 
His rejection of absolute causal laws and any reduction of 
humans to a crudely material status were designed to redirect 
attention to the importance of the superstructures, as a realm 
irreducible to fixed economic interests, in understanding 
social change. 
18. For Gramscils critique of technological determinism, see 
Q: 1439-42. 
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In opposition to economism Gramsci proposed a more 
complex view of history and political action. Economic 
relations could only be conceptualised in relation to the 
superstructures that realised them. Superstructures were not 
reflexes of a material base but had an autonomy, both 
conditioning economic relations and being conditioned by them. 
Ultimately, the relation between base and superstructure was 
indeterminate, because it required political agents (e. g. 
parties, -class fractions) to unite the, two. The matching of 
base and superstructure, of given economic relations, with a 
set of social and political relations, was not a foregone 
conclusion, but the very substance of political action itself. 
What emerged in Gramscils work was a displaced concept of the 
social-formation. Society-could not be conceived as a unified 
totality whose components rest either side of a central class 
axis. The harmonisation-of state, society andýeconomy was an 
achievement, the attainment of which constituted the substance 
of political struggle. Gramscils presupposition of 
disjuncture reflected his concern with transition and 
represented Marxism as the analysis of political 'Possibility' 
rather than-'inevitability,. 
These philosophical remarks had a crucial bearing on the 
analysis of class struggle. If the unity of base and 
superstructure was not an a-priori, assumption but a political 
achievement, then the position of the analyst was one of 
permanent engagement in the field of struggle, not of 
externality. This required a continual assessment of the 
present situation from a pragmatic rather than schematic point 
of view, and it required an ability to distinguish the various 
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ways in which economic forces were active in the political and 
cultural field. Two sets of concepts were relevant here: the 
distinction between the organic and conjunctural moments, and 
'relations of force'. 
Gauging Class Relations 
Gramsci distinguished between organic and conjunctural moments 
in order to detect the impact of economic forces in the social 
formation. Organic movements, he suggested, were developments 
that occurred within the economic structure itself and 
corresponded only to fundamental social changes. Conjunctural 
phenomena, on the other hand, corresponded to immediate forms 
of political activity that operated within structural 
arrangements. While conjunctural moments designated the day- 
to-day arguments, decisions and actions--i. e. politics-- 
organic moments suggested a phase of historical development in 
which the totality of social relationships was transformed 
(see Q: 1579-80). 
For Gramsci, the confusion of those two or the reduction 
of one to the other could lead to mistaken judgements. If all 
political (conjunctural) phenomena were seen as the direct 
manifestation of an organic moment, then the result would be 
economism. The mediation of economic transformations by 
political agency would be undermined (see Sassoon, 1987: 189). 
Likewise, the overestimation of conjunctures would attribute 
too much to the day-to-day activities of political agents, 
thus undermining the deep structural basis to social 
transformation. This Gramsci termed lideologism' or 
'voluntarism', since it exaggerated the role of agency by 
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identifying it too immediately with its organic basis (see Q: 
1580-81). 
Both judgments failed to distinguish between the organic 
and the conjunctural, and hence oversimplified the question of 
causality in political analysis. For Gramsci, the distinction 
between the two moments needed to be clarified. However, this 
was not always an easy task, since the effectiveness of 
structural, change and that of political agents was a matter of 
historical interpretation. How much political agents at a 
day-to-day level actually contributed to organic changes, or 
to what extent organic changes had actually occurred, was very 
much in debate. 19 However, it 
single economic cause could be 
developments and therefore the 
politics and structural transf, 
in a more complex manner. 
Taking as his example the 
was clear to Gramsci that no 
attributed to historical 
relationship between day-to-day 
ormations would have to be posed 
French Revolution, Gramsci 
argued that the events of 1789 were not caused by any economic 
factor. The 'rupture of the equilibrium of forces', as he put 
it, was a product 'of conflicts on a higher plane than the 
immediate world of the economy', antagonisms that corresponded 
/to class "prestige" -(future economic 
interests), and to an 
inflammation of sentiments of independence, autonomy and 
power. ' The actual spark of revolution seemed to have been 
the product of accumulated antagonisms at the conjunctural 
level, the level of day-to-day decisions and ambitions. This 
was reaffirmed in the following passage: 




The specific question of economic hardship or well- 
being as a cause of new historical realities is a 
partial aspect of the question of the relations of 
force, at the various levels. Changes can come 
about either because a situation of well-being is 
threatened by the narrow self-interest of a rival 
group, or because hardship has become intolerable 
and no force is visible in the old society capable 
of mitigating it and of reestablishing normality by 
legal means. Hence it may be said that all these 
elements are the concrete manifestation of the 
conjunctural fluctuation of the totality of social 
relations of force, on whose terrain the passage 
takes place from the latter to political relations 
of force, and finally to the military relation which 
is decisive (Q: 1588). 
The relationship between political action at a conjunctural 
level and action at an organic level was a crucial one for 
Gramsci. For it was at the conjunctural level that 'forces of 
opposition organisel and thereby open the way to fundamental 
organic movements. organic changes were not always available, 
and when they were, conjunctural activity was required to 
seize the opportunity for transformation. Again the necessity 
of agency was stressed, as this next passage made clear: 
If this process of development from one moment to 
the next (from economic conditions to political 
action] is missing, and it is essentially a process 
which has as its actors men and their will and 
capability, the situation is not taken advantage of, 
and contradictory outcomes are possible: either the 
old society resists and ensures itself a breathing- 
space, by physically exterminating the elite of the 
rival class and terrorising its mass reserves; or a 
reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces 
occurs, and the peace of the graveyard is 
established, perhaps even under the surveillance of, 
a foreign guard (Q: 1588). 
The failure to intervene Politically in a given situation, to 
intervene in a particular conjuncture in order to promote an 
organic development, was thus a failure to recognise the role 
of collective human agency in determining the possible outcome 
of that situation. 
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Gramscils aim in making this distinction was to emphasise 
the possible displacement between the economic and the 
political realms. Not all political-superstructual activities 
were instrumental in realising economic relations (see Q: 871- 
2). The possibility of political error, or the matching of an 
economic base with a political superstructure that no longer 
fully realised economic relations, was always available. 20 
The configuration of forces that united the economic and 
political in the historical bloc was coordinated by political 
agents. In that conception the historical bloc was open to a 
number of variations, since the forms were not to be deduced 
in an a Driori manner from the economic base. The forms 
available to the configuration of the historical bloc were 
conditioned by the 'relation of forces' (rapporto di forge) in 
which political agents found themselves. 
The relation of forces referred to the specific 
interaction of groups and classes in society, their relative 
strengths and weaknesses, and the way in which they related to 
each other and internally. The purpose of this perspective on 
social forces was to enable a realistic assessment of the 
possibilities for intervention by a political agent (the 
Party). Hence the analysis of the concrete interactions 
between social groups was considered superior to an a Driori 
analysis which presupposed a teleology of class struggle. 
This analysis of concrete struggles--described above as 
conjunctural moments--simultaneously indicated a space for 
political activity and thus eschewed the assumption that the 
20. See Gramscils remarks on the possibility of errors of 
calculation in politics, Q: 872. 
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Party"s, role was supplementary to a preconceived historical 
'logic'. In the analysis of the relations of force, Gramsci 
considered some 'principles of historical methodology'. The 
anti-economistic basis to this discussion was visible in his 
frequent reference to Marx's 'Preface' to the Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy: 
Two principles must orient the discussion: 1. that 
no society sets itself tasks for whose 
accomplishment the necessary and sufficient - 
conditions do not either already exist or are not at 
least beginning to emerge and develop; 2. that no 
society breaks down and can be replaced until it has 
first developed all the forms of life which are 
implicit in its internal relations ... From a 
reflection on these two principles, one can move on 
to develop a whole series of furtýyr principles of 
historical methodology (Q: 1579). 
The possible 'development, available to a social formation 
indicated the room for manoeuvre by political agents in 
reorganising the historical bloc, rather than simply 
succumbing to revolutionary transformation. As he pointed out 
later: 
a social form 'always' has marginal 
possibilities for further development and 
organisational improvement, and in particular-can 
count on the relative weakness of the rival 
progressive fqrce as a result of its specific 
character and way of life: a weakness it is 
necessary to preserve ... (Q: 1622). 
22 
Revolutionary transformation could not be read off from class 
antagonisms at the narrowly economic level. The way in which 
21. Gramsci elsewhere pointed out that this text should be 
interpreted in a non-economistic manner. 'It goes 
without saying that these principles must first be 
developed critically in all their implications, and 
purged of every residue of mechanicism and fatalism' (Q: 
1774). 
22. See Gramscils notes on 'Caesarism' which relate to this 
argument about 'room' for development (Q: 1604,1622, 
1680-81). 1 discuss Caesarism in the next chapter. 
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these were developed into political antagonisms was 
indeterminate, having as its basis the ability Of Political 
forces to organise and intervene. 
Gramsci divided the relation of forces into three: the 
structural, political and military levels (see Q: 1583-86). 
That division of levels indicated the form of interaction 
between groups that determined the likelihood of revolutionary 
transformation. The structural level denoted relations that 
were -*independent of human will', and Gramsci claimed these 
'can be measured with the systems of the exact or physical 
sciences. ' The analysis of those relations established a 
descriptive understanding of human interaction at a narrow 
economic level, isolated from broader social and political 
conditions. This included an examination of 'the level of 
material forces of production', the division of labour and the 
geographical organisation of human masses. The study of this 
level did allow, he pointed outI, the discovery of *the degree 
of realism and practicability of the various ideologies which 
have been born on its own terrain, on the terrain of the 
contradictions which it has engendered during the course of. 
its development' (Q: 1583). Thus Gramsci did not entirely 
separate this level from the superstructural forms of 
consciousness that were supposed to correspond to it. 
The second level, the 'relation of political forcesf, was 
where the development of an economic unit into a hegemonic 
class was examined. This 'most purely political phase', from 
class to hegemon, was the most crucial aspect of the relation 
of forces, since it was there that structural rationality 
changed to hegemonic rationality. A narrow economic interest 
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hý7- 
was elaborated at a universal political level, and this 
specific interest was transformed into the organising 
principle of the whole political community. An-'absorption, 
based on a crucial compromise of interests would recast 
economic interests into a political mould. Gramsci 
characterised the political activities of a class by referring 
to its relationship with other groups in civil society, and so 
discerned thelvarious stages in the 'relationship of political 
forces' through which 'the degree of homogeneity, self- 
awareness, and organisation attained by the various social 
classes' (Q: 1583) could be evaluated. The first stage was 
termed the 'economic corporate level', a slight degree of 
collective awareness amongst members of a class or set of 
professions, but with little or no collective organisation. 
The second stage was 'that in which consciousness is reached 
of solidarity of interests among all members of a class--but 
still purely in the economic field' (Q: 1584). Here a 
collective consciousness was organised, but was bounded by its 
own immediate interests and had not yet formed an integrated 
relationship with groups and classes outside the boundary. 
Thus the third stage was: 
that in which one becomes aware that one's own 
corporate interests, in their present and future 
development, transcend the corporate limits of the 
purely economic group, and, can and must become the 
interests of other subordinate groups too. This is 
the most purely political phase, and marks the 
decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of 
the complex superstructures (Q: 1584). 
That phase indicated a type of political action in which the 
economic interests of a class became fused with the interests, 
both cultural and economic, of civil society generally. it 
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constituted for Gramsci the arena of struggle and political , 
contestation that propelled a class to leadership, a hegemony, 
which dominated the social totality. Consistent with his 
extended conception of the state, Gramsci conceded the 
classical Marxist conception as the instrument designed to 
promote the needs of one class in particular, but he qualified 
this with the requirement to promote the hegemonic base. 
... the dominant group is coordinated concretely 
with the general interests of subordinate groups, 
and the life of the state is conceived of as a 
continuous process of formation and superseding of 
unstable equilibria (on the juridigal plane) between 
the interests of the fundamental group and those of 
the subordinate groups, equilibria in which the 
interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up 
to a certain point, i. e. stopping short of a 
narrowly corporate economic interest (Q: 1584). 
The third, military level was regarded by Gramsci as 
being -decisive' only 'from time to time. ' Military forces, 
however, were open to analysis and the manner in which 
military blocs were constructed was considered crucially 
important (see Q: 1585-6). Nevertheless, Gramsci proposed 
that the second moment, the political, was the most important 
to comprehend. 
23 For the other two levels only became 
historically relevant when the political permitted. The 
analysis of conjunctural relations of force, assessing the 
I 
strengths of a hegemony or of an alternative hegemonic force, 
allowed an appreciation of the possibilities for organic 
change. 
23. Gramsci also pointed out the importance of international 
relations in assessing national relations of force. See 
Q: 1585. This part of his work, however, was not 
theorised to any great extent. For a discussion, see Cox 
(1983: 162-75). 
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The pragmatic approach to conceiving the relation between 
the economic and political was fundamental to Gramscils 
notions of consent and civil society. Clearly, analysing 
hegemony suggested not merely locating ethical bonds in civil 
society, but also treating that realm as an inescapably 
political contest. Gramscils reconstruction of the relation 
between base and superstructure in terms of a series of 
'blocs' aimed to make Marxist theory sensitive to the 
specificity and contingency of a society in transition such as 
Italy. 24 In such a context the political and cultural 
mediations of economy and state took on a vital role in 
securing the dominance of a class. The capacity of a class to 
'lead' these mediations could not be assumed by virtue of 
intellectual fiat; it was necessary to make more pragmatic 
judgments as to the precise balance of forces. Gramsci began 
this interpretive process in the Ouaderni with essays on the 
Party, the Catholic Church, forms of popular culture, Italian 
literature, Fordist production methods etc. Those phenomena, 
in his view, had a crucial effect on the formation of a 
unified social consciousness in civil society. Thei. r precise 
effect could not be assumed in advance, however, and Gramsci 
was remarkably undogmatic: in his investigations into these 
areas. 
At the centre of his interest in the mediating elements 
of civil society, Gramsci stressed not so much the permanence 
of the'disjuncture between the economic and the Political but 
24. Portelli (1974) reconstructs Gramscils prison writings 
around the notion of historical bloc. However, his 
interpretation tends to formalise that notion in a manner 
opposed to that which I suggest here. 
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I 
rather the likelihood of inadequate and temporary forms of 
closure unless the proletariat could generate its own, 
'rational' civil society. In the context of transition, civil 
society was not a realm of utter contingency, as some 
commentators have suggested, but a. sphere whose disunity was 
temporary and hence dangerously open to resolution. 25 ýIt was 
the anticipation of temporary resolutions to the 
fragmentedness of civil society, rather than its complete 
contingency, that seemed to motivate Gramscils analysis (see 
1619-22). 
Part Three: Conclusion 
In parts One and Two above I have argued that Gramscirs 
concept of hegemony entailed an analysis of consent focused on 
the achievement of a unified civil society. As a general 
framework, state and society were employed as interpretive 
categories in analysing a period of transition rather than 
constructing a 'formal' account of consent. Consequently 
Gramsci treated Politics as a process of unifying the 
different spheres of society, rather than an activity 
subordinate to a preconstituted unity. This was underlined by 
his reconstruction of Marxism as an analysis of the 
'historical bloc' in which the mediation of economy and polity 
was emphasised as the major site of political contest. only a 
pragmatic analysis of the forms of political closure that 
operated on civil society and the relative unity of class 
25. See Laclau and Mouffe (1985). 1 examine this issue in 
more depth in Chapter Four. 
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forces could adequately grasp the potential for proletarian 
intervention. 
Consent was an intrinsic part of revolutionary politics 
in Gramscits Quaderni. For him, this politics implied the 
transition between alternative forms of class-based community. 
His remarks on state and civil society and his reconstruction 
of Marxism as a class analysis confirm this view. For a new 
political order could not be constructed if the constellation 
of class forces that characterised the previous order were not 
reconstructed around a new alliance. The reconstruction of a 
universal interest around the aims of the bourgeoisie was 
still possible, given the relative indeterminacy of civil 
society. 
I will return to the issue of transition in chapter Four 
in which I sugg 
. 
est that Gramscils account Of Politics and 
ideology should be understood as a form of political realism. 
in the next chapter, however, I will discuss how consent for 
Gramsci was bound up with the analysis of intellectuals. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE'AUTHORITY OF INTELLECTUALS 
Consent, in Gramscils analysis, was a fundamentally 
'Political' rather than statically 'structural' issue. 
Understanding it meant grasping the dynamic nature of class 
relations in a particular conjuncture. This required the 
interpretive 'space' to see classes as potential, existing or 
declining forms of political unity, as 'relations of forces'. 
The basic components of these forms were the 'intellectuals', 
and in the Quaderni they constituted the principal objects in 
the analysis of class relations and the functioning of 
consent. 
In this chapter I will argue that Gramscils analysis of 
the intellectuals was crucial in conceiving the 1politics of 
consent'. For it was in terms of the division of labour 
between intellectuals and masses that classes were to be 
evaluated as political forces. The intellectuals were seen to 
mediate the conscious praxis of individuals, articulating the 
relation between private subjects and public interests. Part 
one emphasises that the struggle to unify civil society was 
inextricably linked to the expansion of the role of 
intellectuals in the crisis period of the bourgeois state. In 
the Quaderni, Gramsci sought to analyse the historical 
configuration of intellectuals supporting the bourgeoisie and 
to outline the terrain on which a new bloc could be generated. 
Part Two goes on to examine Gramscils view of the division of 
labour between masses and intellectuals as the basis for 
133 
establishing normative commitments. This effectively equated 
'consent' with 'leadership'. 
Part One: Intellectuals, Crisis and the State 
The analysis of intellectuals is widely considered one of the 
centre-pieces of Gramscits investigations in the Quaderni. 1 
Indeed, the substantive analyses around which the notion of 
hegemony was constructed (the Party, Risorgimento, Americanism 
and Fordism, Italian culture, Marxism as a philosophy of 
praxis etc. ) all had in common an emphasis on the 
fundamentally political role of intellectuals. More 
generally, the shifting relations between state and civil 
society, examined in the previous chapter, and the 'strategic' 
nature of the politics which followed, derived from a concern 
with the complex structure of relations between masses and 
intellectuals comprising the current bloc of class forces. 
For Gramsci, the struggle for civil society was essentially a 
contest aimed at winning over intellectuals whose increased 
importance in the period of organic crisis rendered them 
fundamental to the reassertion of political authority. In 
this section I will outline the significance of intellectuals 
in Gramscils writings with reference to his interpretation of 
the crisis of the state. 
Garin (1969), Vacca (1977) and Lo Piparo (1979) all make 
the issue of intellectuals the central focus of their 
interpretations of Gramsci. See Merquior (1986: 104) for 
a more critical view. Monasta (1987) argues that the 
first published edition of the Quaderni effectively 
obscured the centrality of intellectuals and political 
leadership in Gramscils analysis by artificially dividing 
the text into separate thematic volumes. 
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The Lecracy of Italian Politics 
As Biagio De Giovanni (1977: 221-7) points out, Gramscits 
concern with the superstructures, and particularly the 
division between state and civil society, stemmed from his 
interpretation of the 'organic crisis, of the bourgeois state 
(see above, pp. 112). The absence of a progressive and 
powerful bourgeoisie had resulted in attempts to integrate 
state and society by co-opting party leaders, subsidising 
industry and, during the War, increasing use of planned, 
rather than market, mechanisms to control production. The 
increased intervention of the state in civil society, as a 
consequence, had substantially altered the nature of 
revolutionary action by making political authority coterminous 
with areas of civil life outside the formal realm of the 
state. 
At the centre of the crisis was the transformation of 
relations between intellectuals and masses. As we saw in 
Chapter One, Gramsci had initially identified the emergence of 
a new state with the moral symmetry arising in the factories. 
Self-management of workers was seen to provide a new relation 
between masses and political authority in terms Of common 
ethical goals transcending the division of labour. The 
divisions inherent in the planned control of production and 
the increasingly specialised occupational structure would be 
overcome by a new political identity, that of the 'producer' 
(see above, pp. 45-8). 
Following the failure of this project, Gramscils analysis 
turned to the broader political basis of the bourgeois state, 
again identifying the relation between intellectuals and 
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social classes as the major object of analysis. In 1919-20 he 
had focused narrowly on the division of labour inside the 
factory; in his later writings he was more concerned with the 
plurality of intellectual relations comprising the bloc of 
support for the bourgeoisie. Both the PSI and PCdfI had 
failed to confront, this, bloc as part of their revolutionary 
strategies. In his Quaderni, he developed this analysis into 
a discussion of how the PCd1I could generate a collective 
leadership over society as a whole (see Forgacs, 1984). His 
essay on the 'Southern Question' was the highpoint of his pre- 
prison research into this issue, focusing on the historical 
formation of the bloc that sustained the bourgeois political 
structure throughout the crisis. In the Quaderni, he took as 
a major point of departure the significance of those 
intellectuals outside the immediate realm of production 
previously overlooked, seeking to grasp in a much broader 
scope the nature of the crisis to which the Party had failed 
to respond: 
In the modern world the category of intellectuals 
... has undergone an unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a 
great mass of functions which are not all justified 
by the social necessities of production, though they 
are justified by the political necessities of the 
dominant fundamental group (Q: 1520). 
Gramsci defined the intellectuals as the link between the 
economic sphere, and civil and Political society: 'The 
intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies, (comessi) 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and 
political government' (Q: 1519). The expansion of 
intellectuals corresponded to the increased importance of 
hegemony as the dominant political strategy. On this basis, 
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Gramsci sought to recompose theoretically the terms of 
analysis for reaching a 'concrete approximation of reality, 
(Q: 1519). In a letter of September 1931 to his sister-in- 
law, he announced what he saw as his particular innovation: 
The study that I have made on the 'Intellectuals, is 
very vast in scope, and as a matter of fact I don't 
think that books on this subject exist in Italy.... I 
greatly extend the concept of the 'intellectual', 
and I do not let myself be limited by the current 
notion that equates the term with 'great 
intellectuals' (grandi intelletuali] (LC: 481). 
Gramsci ,s principal innovation consisted in defining - 
intellectuals by their social function. For him, their 
primary characteristic lay not in their immediate technical 
ability but in the organising and coordination of others: 
The most widespread error of method seems to me that 
of having looked for this criterion of distinction 
in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, 
rather than in the ensemble of the system of 
relations in which these activities (and therefore 
the intellectual groups who personify them) have 
their place within the general complex of social 
relations (Q: 1516). 
Gramsci was keen to insist that because the processing of 
knowledge was a universal feature of humankind, the criteria 
for distinguishing intellectuals as a social category lay in 
their diverse social capacities (Q: 1516-17; see also 1375). 
His concern was thus less with the specific division of labour 
implied in the category of the intellectual than with the 
social and political implications of the intellectual division 
of labour in society. His definition enlarged the notion of 
intellectual considerably, making it applicable to a vast 
range of social relations. 
Aware of the complexity of intellectual-mass relations, 
especially in underdeveloped and predominantly rural societies 
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like Italy, Gramsci--attempted to accommodate geographical and 
historical variation by using a conceptual division between 
'organic' and 'traditional' intellectuals. 'organic, 
intellectuals referred to those individuals playing a direct 
part in the economic activity of a class; this ranged from 
those involved at the most immediate level of production to 
more indirect roles in the circulation of capital (Q: 1513, 
1518-19)., For'Gramsci, those intellectuals had the function 
of securing'the expansion of their own class and as-such were 
endowed with particular capacities that set them apart from 
other members, of that class: 
It can be observed that the 'organic' intellectuals 
that every new class creates alongside itself in the 
course of its-development are for the most part 
, specializations' of partial aspects of the 
primitive activity of the new social type that the 
new class has brought into prominence [ha messo in 
luce) (Q: 1514). 
organic intellectuals were in the position to mediate their 
own-'specialised'economic function within the broader social 
and political realms, thus providing-their class with a 
'homogeneity and awareness of its own function' that it would 
not-otherwise have had. The organic intellectual thus gave 
its own class a coherence in its economic interests and a 
further presence. in civil society. 
However, aware that societies were not composed of two 
classes alone, Gramsci employed the notion of the 
'traditional' intellectual to account for those organisers who 
were not'directly functional to a current economic class. 
Traditional intellectuals may once-have been organically 
connected'to a class, but with the decline of that class they 
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became intellectuals whose status was defined by a self- 
assumed autonomy from immediate economic interests: 
However, every 'essential' social group which- 
emerges into history out of the preceding economic 
structure and as an expression of development (of 
this structure), has found, at least in history up 
to the present, pre-existing social categories (of 
intellectuals] and which appeared indeed to 
represent an historical continuity uninterrupted 
even by the most complicated and radical changes in 
social and political forms (Q: *1514). 
For Gramsci, these were primarily ecclesiastics, state 
administratives and philosophers. However, their apparent 
distance from any precise economic interests belied their 
actual political complicity in class-divided society--a point 
that Gramsci stressed frequently in reference to Croce (Q: 
1516; LC: 481,608-9). 
Having distinguished between organic and traditional 
intellectuals, Gramsci conducted a brief investigation of the 
social relations Of Political power in the different societies 
of Europe. He noted the varying combinations of the two types 
in the formation of capitalist states, and attributed the 
complex historical formation of class forces in Europe to the 
organisational functions and complex formations of 
intellectuals. Gramsci was clearly interested in the 
negotiations of political power that in different ways in 
different countries characterised the rise of the bourgeoisie. 
In some countries (notably England and Germany) there 
emerged an economically dominant but, politically weak 
bourgeoisie in which organic intellectuals had failed to 
develop their class beyond a strictly 'economic-corporate, 
agenda. This allowed the traditional intellectuals of the 
landed classes to retain command over the military and state 
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apparatus-(Q: 1526-7). In those situations, the bourgeoisie 
had its economic power negotiated by its intellectuals 
combined with the aristocracy. This alliance was formed 'by a 
kind of suture (un tino di sutura], (Q: 1526). In the case of 
France, by contrast, Gramsci registered 'the harmonious 
development of the energies of the nation and especially the 
intellectual categories' (Q: 1524). In that case, the organic 
intellectuals of the ascendant bourgeois class managed to 
achieve economic and political domination over society. 
These European comparisons served to indicate the 
specificity of the nature of bourgeois power in Italy (see 
Prestipino, 1990: 35,41). There, the combination of an 
economically and politically weak bourgeoisie resulted in the 
construction of a state without widespread popular support , 
throughout society. The state, as Gramsci argued before his 
arrest, became the facilitator of compromises between'the 
Northern bourgeoisie and the large landowning community in the 
south. The absence of strong organic leadership by the 
bourgeoisie, in Gramscils view, gave the Piedmont state the 
function of incorporating intellectuals of differentýclasses 
into a closed political alliance (Q: 1822-24). Furthermore, 
the legacy of a 'cosmopolitan' intelligentsia had sustained 
2 the non-popular' character of bourgeois rule. 
2. See his remark that 'the Italian medieval bourgeoisie 
could not pass from the corporate to the political phase, 
because it could not free itself completely from the 
medieval-cosmopolitan conception represented by the Pope, 
the clergy and also by the lay intellectuals (humanists), 
that is, it was unable to create an autonomous state, but 
remained within the medieval, feudal and cosmopolitan 
framework' (Q: 658). 
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Gramscils concern with classes as formations of 
intellectual--mass relations undermined the-notion-of 
preconstituted classes. It also made their historical 
importance contingent upon the abilities of intellectuals and 
the capacity of collectivities (notably parties, see Q: 1521- 
3) to synthesize a broad movement. I will examine the 
intellectual--mass relation later. But first it is important 
to note how Gramsci analysed the relation of class forces in 
Italian history. This was done not in terms of , 
preconstituted, coherent classes, but as a series of 
strategies linking organic intellectuals and their 
constituencies to other intellectuals. 3 This was the relation 
of forces that underlay the history of state and society in 
Italy-. Only to the extent that they succeeded in generating a 
form of state and society, their own division of labour 
between leaders and led, were they of political significance. 
In, his notes on Italian history, Gramsci confirmed this 
perspective by identifying two 'yardsticks' by which to 
measure the development of class forces: 
The study of how these innovatory forces (of the 
Risorgimento] developed, from subaltern groups to 
, hegemonic and dominant groups, must therefore seek 
out and identify the phases through which they 
3. In parentheses, Gramsci noted that his projected study 
'will not be of a "sociological" character, but will give 
rise to a series of studies on "cultural history" 
(Kulturgeschichte) and the history of political science. 
Nevertheless, it will be difficult to avoid certain 
schematic and abstract forms which recall that of 
,, sociology": thus it will be necessary to find the most 
appropriate literary form since the exposition is 11non- 
sociological". The first part of the research could be a 
methodological critique of already existing works on 
intellectuals, almost all of which are of a sociological 
character' (Q: 1515-16). For Gramscils own critical 
interpretation of sociology, see Q: 1428-34. 
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acquired autonomy from the enemies they had to 
defeat, and support from the groups which actively 
and passively supported them; for this entire 
process was historically necessary before they could 
unite in the form of a state (Q: 2289). 
This was similar to his recommendation concerning the analysis 
of the relations of forces. Yet in these notes Gramsci drew a 
more explicit lesson from Italian history, specifying that the 
second of the yardsticks implied an engagement with 
intellectuals: 
The hegemony of a directive centre over the 
intellectuals asserts itself by two principal 
routes: 1. a general conception of life, a 
philosophy (Gioberti), which offers to its adherents 
an intellectual 'dignity' providing a principle of 
differentiation from the old ideologies which 
dominated by coercion, and an element of struggle 
against them; 2. a scholastic programme, an 
educative principle and original pedagogy which 
interests that fraction of the intellectuals which 
is the most homogenous and the most numerous (the 
teachers, from the primary teachers to the 
university professors), and gives them an activity 
of their own in the technical field (Q: 2047). 
Gramscits vision of the French Jacobins inspired his view of 
class politics in terms of a unification of intellectuals. 
The Jacobin fusion of economic demands with popular 
aspirations represented for him a model against which to 
measure the transition from economic-corporate class demands 
to autonomous, morally united forces (see Q: 2027-28). The 
intellectuals were the central agents in this process. 
In his view of the development of Italian politics since 
the Risorgimento, the intellectuals played a decisive role in 
the articulation of class interests both, within and between 
classes. The historical failure of the Italianbourgeoisie to 
provide an autonomous and popular project was reflected in its 
failure to extend its own organic class relationship to a 
broader constituency in society. The limited alliance of 
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intellectuals in the Moderate and Action Parties reflected a 
failure to extend bourgeois economic interests into a wider 
political and cultural realm. Unable to dismantle the 
leadership of the Moderate Party over bourgeois intellectuals, 
the Action Party failed also to extend their influence over 
the peasantry, so forfeiting an opportunity to sustain an 
alternative bourgeois rule with popular support (see Q: 2012- 
15,2023-24). The hegemony of the Moderates over bourgeois 
intellectuals was the foundation for the 'success' of the 
Risorgimento, but also the basis for the crisis that the 
Italian state was ill-equipped to resolve in the second decade 
of the next century. For the Moderates' leadership enunciated 
the practice of trasformismo and consequently sustained and 
intensified the state's lack of popular support by 
neutralising conflict by 
... the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which varied in their effectiveness, of 
the active elements produced by allied groups--and 
even of those which came from antagonistic groups 
and seemed irreconcilably hostile. In this sense 
political leadership became merely an aspect of the 
function of domination, in as much as the absorption 
of the enemies' elites means their decapitation, and 
annihilation often for a very long time (Q: 2011). 
The result was an unstable alliance of the bourgeoisie, 
Southern landowners and traditional intellectuals and, later, 
4 
reformist socialists. This was Italy's 'passive 
5 
revolution'. The Moderates' success stemmed from their 
4. For Gramscils, periodisation and analysis of 
Itransformist' politics, see Q: 962-4. 
5. Gramsci borrowed this term from the Neapolitan Vincenzo 
Cuoco. See SPN: 59, note 11. For accounts of Gramscils 
characterisation of Italy's bourgeois revolution as 
'passive', see Davis (1979b) and Ginsborg (1979). See 
also Sassoon (1987: 125-8,204-17). 
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concentration of organic intellectuals and their capacity to 
exercise 'a powerful attraction "spontaneously", on the whole 
mass of intellectuals of every degree who existed in the 
peninsula' (Q: 2012). 
Yet the narrow, elitist politics that followed 
undoubtedly precipitated the crisis of later years. The 
separation of intellectuals from the people entailed by 
trasformismo generated conditions directly opposed to what at 
one point Gramsci identified as 'a certain tendency to 
overestimate the contribution of the popular classes to the 
Risorgimentol (Q: 2052). Italy's intellectuals achieved 
something much less: 
They said that they were aiming at the creation of a 
modern state in Italy, and they in fact produced a 
bastard. They aimed at stimulating the formation of 
an extensive and energetic ruling class, and they 
did not succeed. The paltry political life from 
1870 to 1900, the fundamental and endemic 
rebelliousness of the Italian popular classes, the 
narrow and stunted existence of a sceptical and 
cowardly ruling stratum, these are all the 
consequences of that failure (Q: 2053-54). 
The precarious alliance began to give way after the First 
World'War and Gramsci described it as a 'crisis of authority' 
in which previous forms of representation between 
intellectuals, masses and political institutions broke down: 
In ev 
- 
ery country the process is different, although 
the content is the same. And the content is the 
crisis of the ruling class's hegemony, which occurs 
either because the ruling class has failed in some 
major political undertaking for which it has 
requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the 
broad masses (war, for example), or because huge 
masses (especially of peasants and petty-bourgeois 
intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of 
political passivity to a certain activity, and put 
forward demands which taken together, albeit not 
organically formulated, add up to a revolution. A 
'crisis of authority' is spoken of and this is 
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precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis 
of the state (Q: 1603; see also 311). 
The PSI had not adequately responded to the crisis of 
authority opened up by the War, and for Gramsci the absence of 
a coherent and 'organic' alternative state was also 
illustrated by the disaffection of traditional intellectuals: 
... the traditional intellectuals, by detaching themselves from the social group to which they have 
hitherto given the highest and most comprehensive 
form, and hence the most extensive and perfect 
consciousness of the modern state, are accomplishing 
an act of incalculable historical significance; they 
are marking and ratifying the crisis of the state in 
its decisive form (Q: 690-91). 
Whereas the decline of feudal society had been characterised 
by the regrouping of traditional intellectuals, notably within 
the Church, around the bourgeoisie and its state form, the 
present crisis offered no centre. Consequently, the 
ideological influence of traditional intellectuals was 
detached from the productive practice of the proletariat: 
Today, the 'spiritual' which is detaching itself 
from the 'temporal,, and distinguishing itself as 
autonomous of the latter, is something disorganic, 
decentred, an unstable diaspora of great cultural 
personalities, 'without a Pope' and without a 
territory (Q: 691). 
It was noted in Chapter Two that Gramsci was concerned 
with the possibility of the regrouping of class forces around 
a reconstructed political alliance (see above, p. 130). His 
notes on 'Caesarism' as the characteristic strategy of Fascism 
were illustrative of this concern. During periods of crisis, 
he suggested, 'the immediate situation becomes delicate and 
dangerous, because the field is open for violent s6lutions, 
for the activities of unknown forces, represented by 
charismatic "men of destiny"' Cuomini provvidenziali o 
carismatici) (Q: 1603). For Gramsci, it was important to 
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distinguish whether the intervention of a 'third force' was 
progressive or regressive with-regard to the promotion of 
class interests (Q: 1619-22). This could only be established 
by means of a concrete analysis of the relations of force. 
Where Caesarist solutions to class conflict inhibited the full 
realisation of class antagonisms, then it was a reactionary 
force. Fascism, in his view, was a reactionary form of 
Caesarism, intervening to help reconstruct bourgeois political 
control by posing itself 'above' class conflict, whilst 
employing corporatist methods of planned production to 
neutralise class antagonisms. In this way, Fascism 
represented a continuity with Italy's 'passive revolution', 
because it used the increased interaction between state and 
society to stop any transfer of political power to the 
proletariat (Q: 1226-29; see also 2156-58). - 
Towards an Organic Resolution 
In the Quaderni, Gramsci remained committed to factory 
production as the site of a working class Political order and 
affirmed his continued belief that the'Ordine Nuovo movement 
had adequately represented the initial nurturing of a new 
state, even if that strategy had been flawed. The movement 
had promoted the union of 'spontaneity' and 'conscious 
leadership' of working class intellectuals (Q: 330-31). 
However, his later emphasis on the Party reflected his concern 
that factory democracy had not been properly posed as a 
resolution to the crumbling bloc of class relations'. This 
formed the basis of his argument that the PCd1I had to 
'exercise a balancing and arbitrating function' between 
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I 
different classes and social groups (Q: 1601-2). Gramscils 
concern with that broader class basis illustrated the 
diminished importance he gave to the factory as the site of 
revolutionary transformation. The resolution to Italy's 
'passive revolution' was thus conceived as the integration of 
proletarian intellectuals with those traditional intellectuals 
of other classes. As such, the centre of ideological struggle 
was the Party. 
in his prison writings Gramsci treated the issue of the 
productive basis of the future proletarian state much more 
tentatively than he did in his 1919-20 writings. The issue of 
factory production was dealt with most closely in his long 
essay entitled 'Americanism and Fordism"6 in which he 
questioned the revolutionary significance of Fordist and 
Taylorist methods of industrial management. Rather than 
suggest the nascent form of moral community arising from 
within the factories as he had done earlier, Gramsci was more 
concerned with the conditions which permitted the successful 
adaptation of scientific, methods of regulated production to 
different societies. Such methods of rationalisation 'derive 
from an inherent necessity to achieve the organisation of a 
planned economy (economia-proqrammatica]'. This implied 'the 
passage from the old economic liberalism to the planned 
economy' (Q: 2139). The failure of market mechanisms to 
prevent the decline of the rate of profit had been at the root 
of these new efforts to discipline the worker into more 
efficient labour techniques. Yet the effect was different in 
6. Q: 2137-81. See De Felice (1972) for a commentary on 
this essay. 
147 
different countries. - Because America lacked a complex history 
of overlapping classes, the introduction of Fordism occurred 
almost 'naturally'. However, in Europe 'there did exist 
numerous classes with no essential function in the world of 
production, in other words classes which are purely parasitic, 
(Q: 2141). Consequently, the rationalisation of industrial 
production was resisted. It was precisely this large number 
of 'traditional' and intermediary classes (peasantry, 
landowners and the petty-bourgeoisie) that had to be 
confronted by the PCd'I. 
Despite'the difficulties in adapting Fordism to Italian 
conditions, Gramsci recognised a possibility for 
reconstructing proletarian identity. Yet as Baratta (1989: 
31-2) indicates, Gramscils Quaderni differed significantly 
from his Ordine Nuovo writings because he no longer identified 
the workers' identity strictly with a productive role. 
Instead, he suggested that rationalised production would 
permit"the achievement of a freedom that transcended labour. 
In America, methods of scientific management had promoted a 
, gap ... between manual labour and the "human content" ý)f 
work' (Q: 2169), so creating 'a new type of worker and of man' 
(Q: 2165): 
... developing 
in the worker to the highest degree 
automatic and mechanical attitudes, breaking up the 
old psycho-physical nexus of qualified professional 
work, which demanded a certain active participation 
of intelligence, fantasy and initiative by the 
worker, and reducing productive operations to the 
mechanical'and physical aspect alone (Q: 2165). 
Yet where the spirituality' of the workers was denied in the 
workplace, it was further regulated'in their 'private' lives 
outside of work. Puritanism in the sexual and leisure aspects 
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of workers' lives was supposed to preserve their capacity to 
be 'mechanical' components of industrial production (Q: 2164- 
9). 
For Gramsci, it was precisely this mechanisation of 
production that could serve as the basis for a new 
'intellectual' and a new 'intellectualism' (Q: 1551,1517). 
The mechanical performance of rationalised tasks would allow 
the worker to develop intellectually (Q: 2169-71), so 
integrating his specific and specialised practical activity 
with a higher collective identity (see Q: 1551). Whereas in 
1919-20 he had seen the factory councils as nurturing a new 
moral identity around the labour process, in his Ouaderni he 
suggested that this collective moral identity lay outside the 
specific practice of the worker, in what he called a new 
humanist philosophy. Proletarian hegemony was still to be 
rooted in the workplace (see Q: 1551,2146), but specialist 
tasks were now thought marginal to the goal of proletarian 
leadership: 
... from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic 
conception of history, without which one remains 
Ispecialised' and does not become 'directive' 
(specialised and political) (Q: 1551)o 
For Gramsci, the 'humanist 
Marxism. As a philosophy, 
ideology to bring together 
intellectuals of different 
serve as a 'modern popular 
1854-64). 
ic conception of history, was 
Marxism could act as a unifying 
organic and traditional 
classes. In this way, it would 
reformation' (Q: 1860; see also 
As I showed in Chapter Two (see above, pp. 113-22), 
Marxism was presented as a distinctly critical philosophy. 
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Gramscifsý extensive notes on the philosophy of praxis were 
designed to outline Marxism, not as a form of metaphysics 
(which he believed Bukharin had done) but as what heat one 
point called a Weltanschauung (Q: 881-2). Thus he elaborated 
a general theory of history as a culturally unifying ethical 
discourse. 
It was most important for Gramsci to distinguish Marxism 
from other philosophies: 
At the level of theory the philosophy of praxis 
cannot be confounded with or reduced to any other 
philosophy. Its originality lies not only in its 
transcending of previous philosophies but also and 
above all in that it opens up a completely new road, 
renewing from top to bottom the whole way of 
conceiving philosophy itself (Q: 1436). 
Marxism transcended all other philosophies and consequently 
was 'sufficient unto itself (basta a stessa)l (Q: 1443). The 
problem was to avoid the reabsorption of Marxism back into 
older systems. of thought. This was the mistake Bukharin had 
made in attempting to reconstruct Marxism as a materialist 
sociology, although Gramsci also suggpsted Croce was guilty of 
this error (Q: 1435). For Gramsci, the search for Marxist 
'orthodoxy' was 'not to be looked for in this or that tendency 
connected with currents extraneous to the original doctrine' 
but in the realisation that: 
... it contains 
in itself all the fundamental 
elements needed to construct a total and integral 
conception of the world, a total philosophy and 
theory of natural science, and not only that but 
everything that is needed to give life to an 
integral practical organisation of society, that iq, 
to become a total integral civilisation (Q: 1434). 
7. These remarks are similar to LukAcs' claim that Marxist 
orthodoxy referred more to method than substantive 
predictions (see 1971: 1). Gramsci, however, in his 
brief mention of Lukdcs, appeared to disagree with the 
latter's account of Marxism (see Q: 1449 and the editors' 
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The core of -this autonomous philosophical status was Marxism's 
general account- of the historical correspondence of thought 
and being. 8 In conceiving of 'historical materialism', he 
suggested:, .. 
one should put the accent on the first term-- 
'historical'--and not on the second, which is of 
metaphysical origin. The philosophy of praxis is. 
absolute 'historicism', the absolute secularisation 
and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of 
history. It is along this line that one must trace 
the threads of the new conception of the world (Q: 
1437). 
The historicity of all truths and the general correspondence 
of forms of consciousness to practical activity, notably but 
not exclusively material production, was seen by Gramsci as a 
radical transcendence of any philosophy that sought to fix 
truth outside history. It was this central feature of Marxism 
that encapsulated its emancipatory drive and consequently 
served to reinforce the role of intellectuals as educators. 
For the -'humanistic' account of history central to the 
philosophy of praxis revealed the transcience of all form's of 
social division and as such provided a common perspective for 
all subaltern classes wishing to transcend their oppression. 
Unlike the identity of the producer within the factory, 
Marxism could embrace a much broader range of social 
identities when conceived'as a humanism. 9 With the aid I of the 
note in SPN: 448). See L6wy (199o) for a discussion of 
the similarities and differences between the two. 
8. Gramsci argued that a reconstruction of Marxism as a 
philosophy of praxis ought to entail a recognition of 
Labriola's contribution (Q: 1507-9,1366-68) and also a 
distinction between Marx and the work of Engels (Q: 1840- 
44). 
9. See Golding (1992) for an 
, 
account of the philosophy of 
praxis as an emancipatory discourse. 
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Party, 'intellectuals would integrate the individual into the 
new philosophy: 'giving him a cultural formation and helping 
him to elaborate his own thoughts critically so as to be able 
to participate-in an ideological and cultural community, (Q: 
1401). 
Although Gramsci did not go into great detail, about the 
working class intellectuals, and his work on that issue 
remained merely suggestive, 'it is clear that the functional 
division of labour within the factory had been replaced by the 
political division between Party and society as his object of 
concern. A 'universal' ideological core was no, longer defined 
through the identity of the 'producer', but rather through 
Marxism's status as a philosophy. Production remained the 
fundamental activity in the identity of the proletariat, but 
its moral identity lay in the philosophy of praxis. This 
necessitated a role for the Party in organising proletarian 
intellectuals as leaders of a broad constituency in civil 
society. 
Part Two: Consent and the Division of Labour 
The struggle to achieve hegemony over civil society by 
unifying intellectuals suggests that consent is-not simply a 
form of behaviour reducible to the will of isolated 
individuals. Gramscits view was far from this 'liberal, 
definition. For him, consent was achieved through the 
mediation of consciousness by intellectuals. He analysed 
political communication as a distinctly educational rather 
than strictly contractual process, so presenting consent as 
the practice of leadership. For Gramsci, the problem of 
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generating this leadership over society as a whole meant 
confronting forms of consciousness and formations of 
intellectuals outside solidarities located in the factories. 
To analyse past, present and potential strategies aimed at 
forming blocs of support he required a conception of how 
ideologies worked to integrate different social classes. 
Gramsci provided this in his distinction between philosophy 
and common sense. Intellectuals, in his view, were uniquely 
situated to articulate the relation between 'private' and 
'public' by means of their authority over beliefs. In this 
section I will show how consent, in Gramscils writings, was a 
function of the division of labour between intellectuals and 
masses. 
Unifyina Subjects 
As we saw in Chapter One, the role of intellectuals was 
central to the normative project-that Gramsci identified with 
socialism and, later, communism, as he wished to extend the 
workers' experience beyond union politics. Hence the factory 
council was seen as the ba. sis for reconstructing human freedom 
by organising politics around proletarian praxis. Central to 
that aim was a notion of productive interests, which he 
entirely assumed, as well as the recasting of human 
relationships in terms of moral symmetry and conscious 
participation. These themes were also visible in his earlier 
educational interests which combined a demand for a socialist 
civic culture with the overcoming of ignorance, illiteracy and 
indifference, by celebrating intellectual autonomy and 
discipline (see Chapter One). 
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In 1919-20, Gramsci had sought to integrate these values 
into a theory of industrial democracy. In his QM_adLe_rni, he 
deliberated on questions of praxis and political participation 
in different terms. Gramscils shift to a direct analysis of 
intellectuals and an examination of the alliances or blocs 
they-sustained-Andicated not only a political concern in 
linking the PCd1I to other classes in a united front strategy, 
but also a deepening of his inquiry into the subjective bases 
of political authority. For the proletariat had to transcend 
its corporate, production-centred identity and pose itself as 
a national' class (Totaro, 1979: 150-1). His analysis was no 
longer based on the encouragement of a 'spontaneous' moral 
unity. Praxis and participation were now seen to occur across 
a wide area of civil society, not merely in the factory, and 
they were the key to political, failure as well as success. 
The intellectuals functioned as the mediators of praxis, and 
their collective organisation could not be presupposed in 
generating a national-popular bloc. 
Gramsci did not devote attention to theorising the 
relation between intellectuals and masses in theýr numerous 
and specific locations throughout society. Rather his 
insights into that relation were centred on his critical 
reconstruction of Marxism as a philosophy aimed at unifying 
theory and practice by serving as a general 'conception of 
life'. From the stand-point of this philosophy of praxis, 
Gramsci drew comparisons and registered differences with other 
modes of apparently consenting behaviour which involved 
divisions between leaders and led (Totaro, 1979: 157-8). 
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Conceived as a philosophy of praxis, Marxism represented 
a uniquely critical foundation for the analysis of political 
relations. By grounding forms of human consciousness in 
practical activity, Marxism served as an emancipatory 
philosophy that was to unveil inappropriate beliefs and 
conceptions of the world. By so doing, the rational unity of 
thought and being would be achieved. This critical 
perspective was to be applied universally to forms of belief 
and knowledge held at every level of social activity. Hence 
even Marxism was to be seen as a transient ideology, having 
relevance to the specific practical circumstances in which it 
arose (see Q: 1488). This critical standpoint made it 
possible to expose inauthentic relations between leaders and 
led: 
... is it better ... to participate in a conception 
of the world mechanically imposed by the external 
environment, i. e. by one of the many social groups 
in which everyone is automatically involved from the 
moment of his entry into the conscious world (and 
this can be one's village or province; it can have 
its origins in the parish and the 'intellectual 
activity' of the local priest or aging patriarch 
whose wisdom is law, or in the little old woman who 
has inherited the lore of the witches or the minor 
intellectual soured by his own stupidity and 
inability to act)? Or, on the other hand, is it 
better to work out consciously and critically one's 
own conception of the world and thus, in connection 
with the labours of one's own brain, choose one's 
sphere of activity, take an active part in the 
creation of the history of the world, be one's own 
guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely 
from outside the moulding of one's personality? (Q: 
1375-76). 
As a political force, Marxism engaged with people as 
subjects, encouraging critical thinking, raising them to a 
higher level of intellectual autonomy. Thus political 
subordination was measured in terms of people's participation 
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in conceptions of the w orld. For Gramsci, this participation 
was measured on a scale of different forms of intellectual 
activity: 'philosophy' being the highest and most 
sophisticated mode of human reflection and elaboration; 
'common sense' being a less sophisticated and more widespread, 
'popular' form of consciousness. 'Folklore' he described as a 
much more diffuse set of 'beliefs, superstitions and opinionst 
with no existing practical basis (Q: 1375,1378-80). 
10 
Gramsci accepted that participation in a conception of 
the world was rarely enacted at the philosophical level (see 
Q: 1375-6). Common sense was the dominant mode of 
consciousness and was often internally contradictory, complex 
and composed of multiple elements. In Gramscits view, this 
multiplicity corresponded to the complexity of practical life: 
, one's conception of the world is a response to certain 
specific problems posed byreality, which are quite specific 
and "original" in their immediate relevance' (Q: 1377). 
History had rendered human subjects 'an infinity of traces' 
(Q: 1376). At the level of common sense, human subjects were 
immersed in an unco9rdinated array of collective identities: 
10. In one note, Gramsci suggested that philosophy and common 
sense were intimately connected: 'Every philosophical 
current leaves a sedimentation of "common sense": this is 
the document of its historical effectuality. Common 
sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is 
continually transformed, being enriched with scientific 
notions and philosophical opinions which have entered 
into use. "Common sense" is the folklore of philosophy 
and always stands between true folklore (as it is 
commonly understood) and philosophy, science, and 
economic science' (Q: 2271). Gramsci devoted a very 
small notebook (number 27, written in 1935) to 
'observations on folklore'. In it he discussed the 
relation between religion, superstition and the idea of 
'natural rights' (see Q: 2311-17). 
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In one, 's own conception of the world one always 
belongs to a particular grouping which is that of 
all the social elements which share the same mode of 
thinking and acting. We are all conformists of some 
conformism or other, always man-in-the-mass Cuomini- 
massa) or collective man. The question is this: of 
what historical type is the conformism, the man-in- 
the-mass to which one belongs? When one's 
conception of the world is not critical and coherent 
but disjointed and episodic, one belongs 
simultaneously to a multiplicity of mass human 
groups. The personality is strangely composite: it 
contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more 
advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of 
history at the local level and intuitions of a 
future philosophy which will be that of a human race 
united the world over (Q: 1376). 
The issue was reiterated when Gramsci raised the philosophical 
issue 'what is man? -*: 
... each individual 
is the synthesis not only of 
existing relations, but of the history of these 
relations, that is, he is a pr6cis of all the past 
... The societies 
in which a single individual can 
take part are very numerous, more than would appear. 
It is through these 'societies' that 1 
ýhe individual 
belongs to the human race (Q: 1346). 
Encouraging a critical consciousness inevitably meant 
eliminating the episodic and disjointed nature of common 
sense. As with his early pre-factory council thought, this 
involved the disciplining of consciousness: 'To criticise 
one's own conception of the world means therefore to make it a 
coherent unity and to raise it to the level reached by the 
most advanced thought in the world' (Q: 1376). This process 
of unifying consciousness Gramsci described as the struggle of 
political hegemonies (Q: 1385). Furthermore, this struggle 
was seen as an effort to unite theory with practice: 
Consciousness of being part of a particular 
hegemonic force (that is to say, political 
consciousness) is the first stage towards a further 
See also Q: 1780. a more personal perspective, see 
Gramscifs letter of October 1931 to his sister-in-law, 
LC: 501. 
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progressive self-consciousness in which theory and 
practice will finally be unified (Q: 1385). - 
However, unlike the way he treated much of his factory council 
theory, Gramsci was clearly aware that the unification of 
theory and practice could not simply be assumed. His focus on 
common sense, with its implications of fragmented and 
undisciplined thought, indicated that he understood, more than 
before, the difficulties involved in forming a unified 
proletarian consciousness. 
In light of the emphasis placed on the transcience of 
social forces in Marxist philosophy, perhaps the greatest 
difficulty was convincing people that reality was not fixed: 
The popular public does not think that a problem 
such as whether the external world exists 
objectively can even be asked. one just has to 
enunciate the problem in these terms to provoke an 
irresistible and gargantuan outburst of laughter. 
The public 'believes' that the external world is 
objectively real, but it is precisely here that the 
question arises: what is the origin of this 'belief' 
and what critical value does it 'objectively' have? 
In fact the belief is of a religious origin, even if 
the man who shares it is indifferent to religion (Q: 
1411-12). 
inevitably, Marxist intellectuals had to confront 'common 
sense' beliefs if the philosophy of praxis was to become a 
'mass philosophy' (Q: 1397-8). 
Gramsci noted the presence of disjunctures between theory 
and practice in his discussion of 'contradictory 
consciousness': '... is it not frequently the case that there 
is a contradiction between one's intellectual choice and one's 
mode of conduct? ' (Q: 1378). The apparent disjuncture between 
thought and activity was not, in Gramscils view, a 
confirmation of the validity of, the term 'false 
consciousness'. If the proletariat had not spontaneously 
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adopted a revolutionary consciousness, this was not due to its 
being cognitively defective. The explanation was Political, a 
matter of the ideological presence of other groups or classes: 
Self-deception (nalafede] can be an adequate 
explanation for certain individuals taken , 
separately, or even for groups of a certain size, 
but it is not adequate when the contrast occurs in 
the life of great masses: in these cases the 
contrast between thought and action cannot but be 
the expression of profounder contrasts of a social 
historical order. It signifies that the social 
group in question may indeed have its own conception 
of the world, even if only embryonic, which 
manifests itself in action, but only occasionally 
and in flashes--when, that is, the group is acting 
as an organic unity. But this same group has, for 
reasons of submission and intellectual 
subordination, adopted a conception which is not its 
own but is borrowed from another group; and it 
affirms this conception verbally and believes itself 
to be following it, because this is the conception 
which it follows in 'normal times'--that is when its 
conduct is not independent and autonomous, but 
submissive and subordinate (Q: 1379). 
Here he argued that praxis could never be entirely divided, 
that the absence of a fully coherent revolutionary 
consciousness was best conceived as its suppression by another 
ideology. For fall action is political' and thus an embryonic 
critical consciousness is retained in any practice. In this 
way, Gramsci maintained a view of political education as the 
nurturing of an authentic consciousness that was implicit, if 
not spontaneously realised. This was the task of the 
intellectuals. 12 
Gramscils early work had aimed to nurture the spontaneous 
self-emancipation of the proletariat, but his Quaderni laid 
out a more pessimistic view of this process. While the 
development of a critical consciousness remained central to 
12. See the discussion by Femia (1981: 42-6). 
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the formation of a new hegemony, the mediation of 
intellectuals occupied a dominant theoretical concern: 
Critical self-consciousness means, historically and 
politically, the creation of an dlite of 
intellectuals: a human mass does not 'distinguish' 
itself, does not become independent 'for itself' 
without (in the widest sense) organising itself, -and there is no organisation without intellectuals, that 
is without organisers and leaders, in other words 
without the theoretical aspect of the theory- 
practice network being distinguished concretely by 
the existence of a group of people Ispecialised' in 
conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas 
(Q: 1386). 
Gramsci emphasised the importanceof political parties in 
performing this function of coordinating intellectuals, acting 
as the 'historical "laboratory'" of new conceptions of the 
world. 
13 Intellectuals represented higher levels of conscious 
activity, less restrained and pacified by the contradictions 
of common sense: 
... 
innovation cannot come from the mass, at least 
at the beginning, except through the mediation of an 
dlite for whom the conception implicit in human 
activity has already become to a certain degree a 
coherent and systematic ever-present awareness and a 
precise and decisive will (Q: 1387). 
Gramsci accepted, therefore, as a prima facie necessity the 
division of labour between intellectuals and the people. In 
terms of political mobilisation this meant working on the 
basis of a division between leaders and led: 
... there really 
do exist rulers and ruled, leaders 
and led. The entire science, and art of politics is 
based on this primordial, and (given certain general 
conditions) irreducible fact (Q: 1752). 
13. See Q: 1601-21 1627-28,1939-40. At one point he 
remarked that parties could be 'considered as a type of 
collective society to which the entire mass Must be 
educated' (Q: 920). 
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Although this division was in some sense an instance of the 
technical division of labour in any group or community (Q: 
1752), it did raise the issue of 'the most rational lines 
along which to proceed if one wishes to secure the obedience 
of the led or ruled' (Q: 1752). For Gramsci, this obedience 
could not be assumed and if it was, serious errors would- 
ensue. 
14 This revealed his concern over Bordigals conception 
of the Party and also the growth of bureaucracy in the Soviet 
State. Although Gramsci worked on the principle of a division 
between leaders and led, he consistently attempted to qualify 
this assertion with a stress on the necessity of intellectuals 
remaining in contact with their mass base, continually and 
actively negotiating the unity of theory and practice. 
Indeed, it was precisely the function of intellectuals to 
integrate people into a hegemonic worldview. A dynamic 
relationship between intellectuals and the people was thus 
visible in the development of a class hegemony: 
The process of development is tied to a dialectic 
between the intellectuals and the masses: the 
intellectual stratum develops both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, but every leap forward towards a 
new breadth and complexity of the intellectual 
stratum is tied to an analogous*movement on the part 
of the mass of the simple, who raise themselves to 
higher levels of culture and at the same time extend 
their circle of influence towards the stratum of 
specialised intellectuals, producing outstanding 
individuals and groups of greater or less importance 
(Q: 1386). 
Gramsci realised the danger of a loss of contact between 
intellectuals and their constituencies. This would result in 
the separation of theory and practice with the consequence 
14. Q: 1752-53. See also his remarks on 'Cadornism', Q: 1753 
and on bureaucracy, Q: 1505-6,1632-35. 
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that a united consciousness would dissolve. Theory would then 
become the exclusive property of an elite, divorced from the 
daily practice of the people, or at best a matter of secondary 
importance (Q: 1386-7). 
In his discussion of. the role of intellectuals, Gramsci 
. 
sought to reconcile the Political requirement of leadership 
with a continued emphasis on praxis--the proletariat becoming 
conscious of its own revolutionary interests. At times, 
however, he was not Optimistic about the ability of non- 
intellectuals to develop their own critical consciousness. 
Indeed the authority of intellectuals over the masses was 
conceived by him as less a matter of logical persuasion than a 
relationship akin to religious belief: I ... in the masses as 
such, philosophy can only be experienced as faith' (Q: 1390). 
For Gramsci,, this meant that popular allegiance to a new 
conception of the world would be highly unstable. It was 
necessary, then, to propagandise continually and, more 
importantly, to attempt to 'raise the intellectual level of 
ever-growing strata of the populace' (Q: 1392) by enlisting 
various intellectuals whilst maintaining their link with their 
constituency. The organic intellectuals were required to 
discipline themselves to the 'collective doctrine' of the 
Party whilst simultaneously representing the authentic values 
and interests of their social base. 
At one point Gramsci rephrased this relationship of 
, 'representation' between masses and intellectuals as one 
between feeling' and 'knowing' (Q: 1505-6). The 
characteristic status of popular consciousness was one of 
uncoordinated passion, whilst intellectuals employed a more 
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sophisticated and elaborated knowledge. If either were left 
to develop unchecked, then intellectual leadership would be 
transformed into 'pedantry' and popular feeling would 
degenerate into sectarianism. The proper relation between 
popular sentiment and dlite knowledge, in Gramscils view, was 
one that was interactive and dialectical: 
If the relationship between intellectuals and 
people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the 
rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic 
cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes 
understanding and thence knowledge (not mechanically 
but in a way that is alive), then and only then is 
the relationship one of representation., Only then 
can there take place an exchange of individual 
elements between the rulers and-ruled, leaders and 
led, and can the shared life be realised which alone 
is a social force--with the creation of the 
'historical bloc' (Q: 1505-6). 
Gramscils continued interest in the Catholic Church as 
the disseminator of a particular worldview attested to his 
conception of the intellectual as an authority over belief. 
The intellectual commands support by virtue of a superior 
judgment. But if the Church was an empirical model for the 
power of an organised worldview, Gramsci was adamant that 
Marxist intellectuals would not seek to maintain the gulf 
between the ruling elite and the obeying mass (Q: 1378,1383- 
84,1861-63). For the belief over which the intellectual had 
superior Judgment was not a transcendental truth, a hidden 
structure o. r telos (a view he associated with religion) (Q: 
1445 and 1415ý-16), but a grasp of the interests i'uPlicit in 
the proletariat's productive activity. The intellectuals, 
superior position within the division of labour granted them a 
more sophisticated understanding of proletarian praxis. Yet 
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this was only so if they sustained their capacity to 
understand, nurture and organise those under their command. 
Gramscils presentation of consent as intrinsic to the 
formation of a 'collective will' was premised on a distinctly 
non-liberal conception of consensual behaviour. The role of 
intellectuals in mediating consciousness suggested that for 
Gramsci consent was a distinctly collective mode of behaviour. 
only by means of a division of labour between the intellectual 
and his constituency was consciousness brought into 
correspondence with practical activity. While subjects 
remained at a level of common sense in which categories of 
experience had not achieved a philosophical status, 
intellectuals performed a function of leadership understood as 
an educational process (see Kiros, 1985: ch. 3). Consenting 
behaviour was seen, therefore, in teleological terms whereby 
functional differences established through divisions of labour 
were transcended by a common moral goal. However, hegemony 
involved not the formation of a single class but the 
regrouping of other classes into an alliance. Consequently, 
the representation of other social classes by intellectuals, 
especially the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie, needed to be 
confronted. For Gramsci, the forms of consciousness in these 
relations were largely primitive and superstitious--hence his 
notions of common sense and folklore. Because he assumed that 
in the period of transition it was the wider context of class 
relations that needed to be brought under the wing of the 
proletariat, he did not question the adequacy of 
intellectuals' representation of their social bases. I shall 
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examine some of the problems in Gramscils arguments concerning 
intellectuals in the following section. 
Assessment 
Gramscits suggestion that civil-society was the site of-a 
struggle for consent must be understood in relation to the 
crisis of hegemony that in his view characterised the post-War 
period in Italy. I have shown firstly how this crisis was 
conceived in terms of intellectuals and the various strategies 
designed to reintegrate them back'into the political system. 
Secondly, I argued that the intellectuals were crucial in 
conceiving consent as a process of leadership. Consequently, ' 
the struggle for consent was one of unifying intellectuals and 
elaborating their relationship with their class base, then 
regrouping intellectuals from other classes. In this section 
I shall make some remarks concerning the peculiarity of 
Gramsci's theory of intellectuals. 
Gramscils analysis implied a complex'analysis and 
empirically sensitive politics of class. His focus on 
intellectuals clearly undermined the anti-intellectualism of 
the Italian Syndicalist tradition, represented by Sorel, and 
Reformist vacillation with respect to bourgeois society (see 
Vacca, 1977: 442; Macciocchi, 1974: 260). ' By making the 
intellectual division of labour central to his inquiry and'his 
political project, he avoided attributing to the proletariat 
an A_p3Liori revolutionary class consciousness, as did Lukdcs 
(1971: ch. 1). Equally he also avoided presupposing an 
absolute division between leaders and led in revolutionary 
politics, as Bordiga had recommended in his vanguardist 
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Leninism. While Gramsci promoted a conception of a 
disciplined, vanguard Party, subject to a democratic 
centralism, his conception of intellectuals emphasised the 
importance of linking the Party's leadership to the concrete 
experiences of the working class, not keeping the two 
separated. 
15 
If class, as a political agency, was contingent on the 
capacity of intellectuals to elaborate and organise a 
collective project, then it followed that any strict, causal 
reading of the base--superstructure metaphor would misconstrue 
the complex process of building a political force. The 
'organic' relation between intellectuals and people--i. e. the 
authentic representation of their interests--was best 
conceived as an on-going and dynamic process, reflective and 
dialogical, not static--a process of mutual education and 
self-discipline. This required granting a certain autonomy 
and indeterminacy to intellectuals as agents. As I have shown 
in Chapter Two, this political process was at the heart of his 
version of class analysis (see above, pp. 113-31). 
Yet it is possible to ýýiew Gramscils discussion of 
intellectuals from another Position--that of the Italian 
political tradition. In emphasising the leadership of 
proletarian political consciousness by intellectuals and their 
role in integrating people into a 'national-popular, movement, 
Gramsci inevitably touched on a familiar theme in Italian 
15. For Gramscils notes on democratic centralism, see Q: 
1632-35,1691-92. For a commentary, see Sassoon (1987: 
162-80); Totaro (1979: 178-82). Kiros (1985) attempts to 
elaborate a theory of participation from Gramscils 
writings on intellectuals. 
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social theory (Bellamy, 1987: 131). Like many other 
theorists, he was influenced by Mazzini's invocation to 
intellectuals to educate the masses into a common civic 
consciousness (see Gentile, 1982: 11). The central importance 
attributed to intellectuals in uniting the fragmented 
political culture of post-unification Italy was visible in the 
works of many of the great political theorists. Both Pareto 
and Mosca made the functioning of dlites central to their 
analyses, seeing the predominance of Idlite circulation' as a 
necessary, if unfortunate, feature of democratic government 
(see Bellamy, 1987 and Bottomore, 1964). Even Benedetto Croce 
privileged the intelligentsia, the 'world historical 
individuals', as instigators of a united common culture (see 
Bellamy, 1990: 320). 
Gramsci certainly followed that tradition by bringing to 
the fore the creative, superior capacities of the , 
intellectuals. Equally, however, he aimed to subvert theý, 
tradition-16 Whereas the other Italian theorists had fixed 
the distinction between ruling elite and a passive Population, 
conceiving it as an immutable. feature of modern society, 
Gramsci asserted, the primacy of class in accounting for the 
social division of labour. The intellectual division of 
labour, in his view, was bound up with the class structuration 
of society. 'Howevert the proletariat provided the 
preconditions for that division to be eventually overcome. It 
16. See his reference to 'the worst currents Of Political 
romanticism such as the Popularisations of the doctrines 
of Mazzini which carried on all the time about "Missions" 
and "ideals" and suchlike vague, nebulous and sentimental 
abstractions' (Q: 1408-9). 
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was this potential that Gramsci perceived in the factory 
council movement and which he retained, albeit in a-more 
complex and less optimistic sense, in his conception of the 
intellectual (see Sassoon, 1981). 
In his theory of intellectuals, the achievement of class 
unity by the Party was clearly prioritised over the issue of 
freedom in the workplace. The construction, of a national- 
popular leadership outside the proletariat's basis in 
production relations was given attention rather than the 
generation of a collective identity inside production. As I 
have noted at the end of Part Two (see above, pp. 150-52), 
class unity was achieved through the philosophy of praxis as 
an ideology of 'intellectual and moral reform'. 
If Gramscils notion of the intellectuals rejected Marxist 
economism and, simultaneously sought to challenge the received 
categories of Italian social theory, the absence, in his work 
of the concept of alienation distinguishes it further. In his 
Paris Manuscripts of 1844, Marx-had subjected the labour 
process to a-devastating critique Ly means of the notion 
'alienation'. The commodification of human labour, he 
observed, had separated the productive capacity of, humans from 
their natural enjoyment of their own praxis. Proletarians - 
suffered an alienation from their 'species being' by selling 
their labour, rather than enjoying the products of labour as a 
free expression of their common abilities (see Marx, 1975: 
345-79). Although the Manuscripts were not published until 
the 1930's, the emphasis on praxis and a suppressed 
subjectivity was anticipated by LukScs and later developed by 
the Frankfurt School. Lukdcs identified Marxism not as a 
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predictive science, but rather as an analysis of conscious 
praxis. Capitalism, and especially the commodification of 
labour, he argued, distorted the subjective recognition by the 
proletariat of true and Itotalising' consciousness. The theme 
of distorted consciousness as a consequence of the capitalist 
labour process was taken up by the early Frankfurt School, who 
also presupposed a notion of repressed subjectivity (see 
LukAcs, 1971). 
Yet Gramsci was ambivalent on this issue. In rejecting 
vulgar Marxism, from a philosophical perspective, he declared 
that there could be no absolute conception of human nature (Q: 
1343-49). Economic rationality was a historical and therefore 
transient phenomenon. Human nature was socially and 
historically constructed, determined by the 'ensemble of 
social relations'. For Gramsci, this critique permitted the 
conceptualisation of a political practice that took the 
reconstruction of human subjectivity through hegemony as its 
foundation. Unlike Lukdcs and later Western Marxists, Gramsci 
appeared uninterested in the possibly alienating effects of 
rationalised Fordist production methods. In contrast to 
seeing modern industrial production as psychologically harmful 
to individual workers and disruptive of a strong, solidaristic 
consciousness, he argued that rationalised industry permitted. 
both increased production and mental freedom. A rationalised 
division of labour within the factory, in his view, would 
permit workers to engage more fully in collective life both as 
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producers and thinkers (see Q: 1551). Rationalisation was the 
key to further integration, not alienation (Q: 2164-71) . 
17 
Yet integration meant adopting a hegemonic I worldview 
articulated outside the factory by the Party. The thought and 
action of the proletariat-would be unified by an all-embracing 
philosophy that would at the same time accommodate a broader 
range of classes and intellectuals than could a narrow 
'worker' identity. The representation of the proletariat by 
its intellectuals within the Party implied a 'distancing, of 
proletarian practice and revolutionary theory, the 
correspondence of which would have to be continually 
negotiated through Party channels. 
Strong objections have been raised by some commentators 
to this 'mediated' account of proletarian praxis if understood 
as a theory of Political participation. 
18 Important for this 
study, however, is the fact that as a form of analysis, 
Gramscils theory took an uncritical view of the relation 
between intellectuals and their class constituencies. The 
Party's role as the bearer of the workers' moral identity 
(philosophy), rather than their self-construction of that 
identity as 'producers', meant that the authority of the 
intellectuals over workers was premised only on an ascription 
17. The absence of the notion of alienation in Gramscils work 
may be related to his suspicion of 'psychological' 
explanation on which he made several notes. Gramsci held 
considerable disdain for explanations of human behaviour 
with reference to psychological factors. For him, such 
recourse was too individualistic, and it undermined his 
own communitarian understanding of subjectivity (LC: ill, 
265,428,572-4). 
18. Femia (1989) suggests the Party intellectuals are 
reminiscent of Plato's 'philosopher kings'. On the other 
hand, Kiros (1985) provides a much more Optimistic 
account. 
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to the proletariat of an interest in increased production. 
For it was in their productive activity that workers could 
find the 'rational' basis for a reconciliation of thought and 
being. This made it difficult for Gramsci to conceive of a 
breach between individual subjects and the intellectuals who 
supposedly represent and educate them, except perhaps as a 
failure of workers to comprehend their own (ascribed) 
interests. 
Part Three: Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that Gramscils account of 
hegemony over civil society was presented as a process 
involving the organisation of intellectuals in class divided 
societies. The intellectuals were fundamental to achieving 
class dominance by virtue of their capacity to represent and 
lead social groups. Consequently, the struggle for 
proletarian hegemony was understood in terms of the 
unification of intellectuals by means of an ideology promoting 
, 'intellectual and moral reform'. For Gramsci this ideology 
was represented by Marxism. 
It is also clear that Gramscifs interpretation of the 
crisis of the bourgeoisie oriented this enquiry. For it was 
the historical failure of the bourgeoisie to provide an 
intellectual and moral reform through its intellectuals. The 
increased interaction of state and society under monopoly 
capitalism provided the bourgeoisie, and later Fascism, with 
an opportunity to integrate the working class into its rule, 
yet without any significant transformation of the Political 
power of the proletariat. Those conditions also provided the 
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opportunity f or the proletariat to initiate its own resolution 
to the crisis. In his Quaderni, Gramsci deemed it necessary 
that the Party lead this transition to a new Political order. 
Conceived as the 'organic' and 'rational' representation 
of class, consent was understood as a form of leadership over 
consciousness, elaborating a latent interest into a universal 
philosophy that could be the meeting point for a Plurality of 
classes. In the next chapter, I will examine in what way the 
politics of consent relates to a general theory of the 
correspondence between class and ideology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IDEOLOGY AND CLASS STRUGGLE 
The recovery of Gramscils political thought has focused 
on his insistence that human consciousness is decisive in 
revolutionary struggle. The claim that class rules by 
'consent' as well as force has raised the question of how the 
category of ideology relates to the theory of class struggle. 
The aim of this chapter is to delineate this relation as it 
arises in Gramscils analysis of hegemony. The fundamental 
issue here is whether political activity corresponds to class 
interests. The concept of ideology is crucial to addressing 
Gramscils transposition of structural economic relations into 
, superstructural' political relations. The basic dilemma for 
Marxists has been the extent to which consciousness is itself 
a determinant in struggles defined as essentially economic. 
By granting effectivity to ideology in political struggles- , 
Marxists, have abandoned economic reductionism, but have had to 
confront the problem of dealing theoretically and 
strategically with stiuggles, conflicts, practices and beliefs 
that do not 'correspond' to-class interests. The concept of 
hegemony is deemed to have provided the groundwork for the 
resolution of this dilemma. 
Ideology clearly has consequences for the notion of 
legitimacy. The appeal to common beliefs and values in the 
validation of political institutions is undermined if those 
beliefs are mere representations of class interest. Indeed 
the marxist, tradition has either rejected or ignored the issue 
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of legitimacy by assuming that political relations are 
fundamentally class relations. Gramsci was exceptional by 
attempting to show how classes were both basic in a social 
formation and simultaneously constrained by prevailing forms 
of ideology. In Chapter Five I suggest how this affects the 
question of legitimacy. In this chapter I argue that, despite 
some one-sided interpretations linking hegemony, ideology and 
class struggle, Gramscils account is plausible if understood 
in relation to his analysis of the crisis, or transitional, 
period in class relations. 
In Part One, I argue that Gramscils account of hegemony 
was linked to aI Positive' view of ideology identifiable in 
Marx's work. I go on to outline three different 
interpretations of hegemony, all of which employ a non- 
reductionist account of ideology. In Part Two, I detail some 
of the ways in which Gramsci used the notion ideology and 
argue that his 'political' account corresponded to a spe6ific 
conjuncture in class relations. In this way, the constitutive 
role of politics and ideology can be reconciled with a class 
theory of politics. 
Part One: Marxism and Ideology 
It is often remarked that Marx, notoriously, never offered a 
systematic analysis of politics to match his Political 
economy. Consequently, those Marxists who believe that a 
general account of politics is implicit in Marx's thought have 
had to glean this theory from his remarks on history, 
philosophy, capitalist society and from journalistic reports 
on contemporary politics. Inevitably, these numerous points 
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of departure have provoked different accounts of how the realm 
of politics, particularly beliefs and ideas, function in a 
class theory of society. Here I shall register briefly some 
analytical points on class and ideology. By establishing the 
correspondence between interests defined in terms of economic 
relations and forms of discourse outside that realm, it is 
possible i) to see how ideology and forms of discourse are 
contributing factors in class domination, and ii) to assert 
that a transformation in economic relations entails a 
necessary change in ideology. 
- The difficulty, perhaps, in recovering a single coherent 
account of the relation between ideology and class, is due to 
the decreasing emphasis over his lifetime that Marx placed 
explicitly on class as the political point of reference in his 
own theories. Class, for instance, has a prominent analytical 
and political significance in the communist manifesto. In the 
gighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte class interests are a 
central point of reference, although their representation in 
politics is presented as less direct than in the Manifesto. 
In the 1859 'Preface' and later in Capital, however, 
references to class as a political force have diminished 
significantly as Marx's analysis turned to the categories of 
political economy (see Hall, 1977; 'Hindess, 1987: ch. 2). 
The concept of ideology also has a number of identifiable 
sources. The two most general definitions have been 
distinguished as the 'negative,, or critical, and the 
'positive', or descriptive (Barrett, 1991; Larrain, 1983: 41- 
5). In the negative version ideology refers to specific 
misleading beliefs which conceal contradictions and so further 
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the (hidden) interests of class. This view arises in Marx's 
critique of philosophical idealism and religion as postulati, ng 
an finvertedl. conception of the world whereby real conflicts 
are concealed beneath an idealised harmony. This harmony was 
expressed in Hegel's concept of the state, and in 
Christianity's transcendent God (Marx, 1975: 69,243-4; Marx 
and Engels, 1970: 46-7,66; see also Larrain, 1983: 10-15). 
The 'illusory' character of these ideas is stressed and their 
consequent ability to prevent a proper perception of 
antagonisms, especially over property. This notion of 
ideology has been dubbed 'epistemological' in that it suggests 
that 'reality' is obscured (Barratt, 1991: 4-7,19-22). 
However, these inverted forms of consciousness were not 
posited by Marx as simply 'false,, because they could be 
traced to real contradictions in society (Marx and Engels, 
1970: 47; Larrain, 1983: 14-15). Thus while the'analyst was 
posited as the holder of a more 'objective' interpretation of 
reality, this, was so only in light of the inadequate account 
offered by ideology, not its complete-falsity. 
1 This critical 
concept of ideology was also visible in Marx's account of 
commodity fetishism outlined in Chapter Two (see above, pp. 
lo8-9), where real relations of exchange generated an 
egalitarian distortion of the inequality present in production 
relations (Marx, 1976: 163-77). In the critical account, not 
all forms of consciousness are considered ideological, only 
those that can be seen to obscure identifiable antagonisms. 
As Larrain (1983: 29-30) points out, Marx's critical 
approach to 'ideology was not premised on an absolute 
distinction between truth and falsity. 
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Furthermore, while those beliefs may serve to further 
particular (class) interests, they are not def ined as having a 
specific class origin. Hence even those classes that gain by 
ideology are also subject to it. 
The positive version of ideology, however, refers not to 
specific misleading beliefs as such, but to 'ideas and forms 
of consciousness' in general that are said to 'arise' on the 
basis of particular modes of production (Marx, 1975: 425-6). 
The special feature of these ideas is not their concealing 
effect but their partiality to particular social classes. 
This view derives from Marx's attempt to provide a 
'materialist' account of history based on the principle that 
, social being determines social consciousness' (Marx and 
Engels, 1970: 47-8). In this account Marx argues that 
consciousness, ideas and forms of discourse in general must be 
seen in relation to the material, or economic, circumstances 
in which they develop and not as 'eternal' or divorced from 
the social conditions in which they are articulated. The 
social conditions which Marx thinks most influential are those 
established around production and property. For him, the 
objectively discernible interests of class characterised these 
relations, and it is the tendency for forms of discourse to 
'correspond' in some way to these interests that formed the 
basis of his claim. Far from obscuring antagonisms, Marx 
implied that ideology expressed those antagonisms (Marx, 1975: 
426; Marx and Engels, 1970: 64-5). In that way ideology is 
understood to be a set of beliefs appropriate to social groups 
(classes) by virtue of their position within the relations of 
production. In its strong version this notion may reduce all 
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ideas and beliefs to particular class interests. In the 
weaker sense, the predominance of class interests in the 
general realm of 'consciousness, figures larger (Abercrombie, 
1980: 12-19). 
Two senses of the positive version have been identified, 
respectively, as leconomism', in which ideas are reduced to 
direct instances of economic interests, and 'historicism,, in 
which beliefs are identified with classes as more or less 
2 conscious representations of interests. 
The critical and descriptive accounts of ideology are not 
mutually exclusive. They do, however, carry different 
connotations in linking beliefs to class interests. Whereas 
the critical view identifies particular ideas with the 
distortion of real interests, the descriptive view identifies 
points at which ideas and interests coincide. In the critical 
view,, class domination may occur despite class interests; in 
the descriptive view, domination is bound up with a 
correspondence between ideology and class interests: ideology 
is thus partially constitutive of classes as political forces. 
The two views permit differing accounts of class as a 
political agency. The critical account suggests that the 
bourgeoisie rules by using an ideological veil to conceal its 
particular'interests; the positive account suggests this rule 
is achieved by making its particular interests universal, i. e. 
by one class making other classes accept its own values. 
2. See Barrett (1991). It would be wrong to attribute these 
analytical extremes directly to Marx himself, as Larrain 
(1983) points out. 
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At different times the Marxist tradition has emphasised 
one or other of, these accounts. Classical Marxism, for 
instance, in its tendency to assume the eventual polarization 
of class interests and their consequent development into 
political antagonists, tended to employ a critical version of 
ideology. Thus it was expected that the illusory freedom of 
parliamentary democracy would give way to the final 
antagonisms of capital and labour (see Przeworski, 1985: ch. 
2). 
However, the second generation of classical Marxists 
(Lenin, Luxemburg, Korsch and Gramsci) had in common a concern 
actively to promote the working class as a political force. 
As such, the positive view of ideology became more important 
in making problematic the coincidence of class interests with 
political aims (Larrain, 1983: 46-9). What became important 
was not when the proletariat was going to lift the veil of 
illusion, but how revolution was to be achieved when those 
interests failed to be perceived as revolutionary. The 
positive generation of class consciousness thus became an 
issue. 
A central problem in the Marxist account of ideology, 
then, is how to reconcile both the critical and positive 
concepts of ideology. As Larrain (1983: 41-5) suggests, 
Marx's perspective was predominantly a critical one, 
indicating how concepts and categories widespread in 
capitalist society (especially those of political economy) 
systenatically distort the accurate perception of inequalities 
located in the relations of production. His Marxist 
followers, however, have sought to combine this with 
179 
positive account which views classes as fundamental social 
forces around which ideology will form. The problem of 
ideology is central to the concept of hegemony. For Gramsci 
suggests that ideas and beliefs appropriate to particular 
classes are the basic components in political struggle, --yet 
ideology is simultaneously involved in distorting class 
interests. 
In the remainder of this section I examine 
interpretations of ideology and the appraisals of Gramscils 
concept of hegemony that they have supported. I will outline 
three perspectives on ideology. The first two, from Marxist 
standpoints, are termed 'class-theoretical' and Imode- 
theoretical' approaches. The third perspective-stems from the 
critique of Marxism offered by post-Marxists. All three take 
a critical, though sympathetic position on Gramscils analysis. 
Class-Theoretical 
This perspective tends to identify ideology with the class 
that holds it. -Abercrombie (1980: 11-26) identifies two 
strands in what he calls the 'conventional' Marxist account of 
ideology: A) The causal importance of class position in 
generating beliefs, so class interests are seen to determine 
or considerably influence beliefs by virtue of a group's 
location in the relations of production. B) The metaphor of 
base determining superstructure yielding a 'dominant 
ideology'. Here, beliefs specific to the dominant economic 
class become widespread throughout society and are adopted by 
other classes. The dominance of beliefs appropriate to the 
ruling class implies that subordinate classes misperceive 
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their own interests. In Abercrombie's view, class-theoretical 
Marxist analysis has tended to draw on those two strands in 
the conventional account (Abercrombie, 1980: 11o). 
The conventional account, however, has a number of 
pitfalls that render it unconvincing. There is a tendency to 
ascribe to classes interests, and consequently beliefs, that 
they do not apparently have or do not have to the extent 
claimed. This was clearly a deficiency in second 
International Marxism, which severely overestimated the 
capacity of the proletariat to generate a cohesive, anti- 
capitalist ideology. Nevertheless, a weaker version of this 
view--that class position can affect, to some extent, beliefs- 
-is not implausible. This may escape the economism of the 
first position, but it still has problems. 
It is not clear why certain classes have particular 
beliefs common to them (e. g. individualism, or Protestantism). 
Thus the various changes in class ideologies over time are not 
addressed. To what extent these beliefs are 'necessary'--i. e. 
in accord 
. 
with economic interests--or merely contingent is not 
explained. The result is what has been termed 'historicismt-- 
the reduction of knowledge and beliefs to their conditions of 
existence ignoring external causes. 
Furthermore, the view that some class ideologies become 
dominant-, i. e. pervasive beyond the membership of the class 
itself, is open to criticism. Based on Marx's proposition in 
the 1859 'Preface' that there is an 'economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness' (Marx, 1975: 425), it has been 
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suggested that classes occupying positions of economic 
dominance will likewise attain political and hence ideological 
dominance. 
However, the view that the economic can simply be mapped 
onto the political is highly contentious. It fails to explain 
the possible disjuncture between dominant economic classes and 
dominant political classes. Equally, there' is little evidence 
that subordinate classes actually endorse the ideologies of 
the dominant (see Abercrombie et al., 1980). 
The class-theoretical view, in its early or 
'conventional' form, was not a sophisticated analysis. With 
the development of 'Western Marxism', however, more elaborate 
approaches to ideology emerged. It is within the theoretical 
context of Western Marxism that Gramscils analysis is most 
often evaluated. The question of ideology as a barrier to, as 
well as a necessity for, revolution, was raised. As a result, 
some of the inadequacies of the conventionalist Position, were 
addressed, though they were not all resolved. 
A more sophisticated view of ideology within the class- 
theoretical perspective came from Lukdcs. He offered a 
positive view of ideology as an integral component of the 
development of class consciousness (Lukdcs, 1971: ch. 1). 
Furthermore his account of Ireified' consciousness was 
developed to explain the absence of a coherent revolutionary 
proletarian ideology. 
In Lukcics-* view, the development of a common self- 
interpretation by the proletariat was a necessary feature of 
the working class revolution. Class consciousness was not a 
mechanical by-product of economic. conditions but a subjective 
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, realisation of common goals developing dialectically over time 
(Lukdcs, 1971: 19-20,23). Only the proletariat, he argued, 
ýcould claim to be a 'universal class'. Only they could truly 
identify the abolition of their exploitation with the 
abolition of all exploiting conditions. While the capitalist 
class also claimed that their interests were the interests of 
all, this was clearly at the cost of perpetuating proletarian 
wage-slavery, and hence not a true claim. However, Lukdcs 
admitted that the proletariat was 'empirically' unaware of its 
own liberatory potential. Themselves commodities in the 
. -labour market, they were subject to the distorting effect of 
capitalist conditions of production. This had the effect of 
furthering the proletariat's reification of production 
relations, obscuring their exploitative character and 
providing them with an appearance of neutrality and permanence 
that in fact belied their specificity (1971: 21,73-80,83- 
209). Lukdcs drew on this distinction between appearance and 
reality in accounting for the dominance of bourgeois ideas and 
the absence of a revolutionary consciousness. He also used it 
ultimately to justi. fy importing a Leninist vanguard in 
political organisation. 
It is clear that Lukdcs' account of ideology is limited 
in so far as it assumes too much and explains too little. The 
distorting effect of reification, for instance, is not an 
exhaustive explanation of working class non-militancy. Even 
if the proletariat recognised-the historically specific 
character of commodity production, it does not logically 
follow that it would recognise either a common political 
interest or see the need to engage in revolutionary struggle. 
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Commodity production, reification and the 'fetishism,, to 
which reification is linked, 3 cannot account for all beliefs. 
Their political efficacy may even be overridden by beliefs 
from outside commodity relations (e. g. democratic or 
nationalist beliefs). Indeed, LukAcs' account is both 
romantic and ultimately economistic. His ascription of a 
common moral interest to the proletariat romanticises the 
economic exploitation it suffers and treats the problem of 
unified consciousness solely in the context of its economic 
activity. Equally, Lukdcs fails to break with a historicism 
that relies more on faith than on reason in ascribing 
consciousness to the proletariat. 
The account of ideology provided by those in the class- 
theoretical camp addresses the issue of human beliefs and 
consciousness in terms of class. In this account beliefs are 
associated directly or indirectly with the economic interests 
of classes. In more sophisticated accounts, some ideologies 
distort class interests (especially, but not exclusively, the 
proleta 
. 
riat's) by concealing the reality of exploitation and 
revolutionary potential. This permits the beliefs to d9minate 
when they are economically or politically advantageous to the 
capitalist class. While the class-theoretical account has 
suffered from an inability to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of, social beliefs, and, in its Lukcicsian version, lapses into 
an 'unscientific' historicism, it places the onus centrally on 
collective agents--classes--as the motivators and recipients 
3. The two are not identical. See Abercrombie (1980: 85- 
90). 
184 
of the benefits of ideology. The focus is on the agency of 
class in directing economic struggle in the realm of ideas. 
Gramsci has most often been associated with a class- 
theoretical account of ideology. Both praise and criticism of 
his work have emerged-through his identification with this 
approach. His stress on classes as agents of intellectual and 
moral leadership; the 'universal isation I of economic interests 
into forms of political integration; the distortion of class 
interests when one class holds ideas attributable to another 
class ('contradictory consciousness'); and his self-proclaimed 
'absolute historicism', all allow Gramsci to be identified 
with a class-theoretical view. Indeed, he is praised for 
deepening this perspective. His division of philosophy, 
common sense and folklore specified different forms of belief; 
his analysis of intellectuals detailed the complex way that 
ideological dominance arises. Within the class-theoretical 
perspective, Gramsci has been identified as the 'theorist of 
the superstructure'. This 'humanist' interpretation tends to 
see Gramsci as advancing a 'primacy of politics, thesis, 
whereby a class, once fully conscious of its own 
interests, 
becomes the author of new, social relations (see, for example, 
Bobbio, 1979; Salamini, 1981). Class consciousness emerges 
from a political subject freed from the economic constraints 
that produced it. Hegemony refers to the struggle to 
elaborate that consciousness as a new form of society. 
4 The 
similarity with Lukdcs is obvious. 
4. See for example Anderson (1992; originally 1964: esp'. 30- 
43). By the time of his 1976-7 article Anderson had 
shifted from his apparent humanism to a more structurally 
oriented Marxism. 
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While accepting the basic premise of Marxism as a theory 
of-ýclass struggle, Gramsci appeared to shift attention away 
from economics and towards ideology and politics. On this 
interpretation, he has also been criticised for failing to 
provide a more coherent account of how ideology and politics 
are structured by class struggle. Anderson (1976-7), as we 
have seen, and Bobbio (1979) have emphasised Gramscils 
i, culturalist' leaning--his flirtation with the notion that 
revolution was predominantly a matter of ideological struggle. 
Within the Marxist camp, Gramscils thought is acceptable, 
then, if, its excesses are filtered through a more 'structural' 
analysis; if the balance in favour of class interest is 
restored. 
Mode-theoretical 
An alternative account of ideology and its correspondence with 
economic relations was provided more recently by the 
Structuralist Louis Althusser (1969,1970,1971). His aim was 
to generate a more rigourous analysis of capitalist society by 
reconstructing, from a. philosophical angle, an orthodoxy based 
on principles which Marx purportedly displayed in "a ital. 
For Althusser, a properly Marxist account of the social 
formation rejects economic reductionism and historicism, both 
of which base themselves on .0 unscientific' accounts of the 
unity of the social totality. Marx, he argued, produced an 
analysis*of capitalist society in his later writings that 
began with the notion 'mode of production'. It is from this 
abstract concept, Althusser suggested, that ideology and all 
other components of the social formation should be theorised. 
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For Althusser, Marx had rejected his early Hegelian 
critique of capitalist society and the state and replaced it 
with a purportedly scientific account.. That earlier critique 
was Hegelian in the sense that it operated with the principle 
of an 'expressive' totality in which all social antagonisms 
stem from a single contradiction (Althusser, 1969: 89-94,101- 
16). Whereas Hegelianism posited the dialectical development 
of, Spirit as the centre of all change, Marx's early 
Feuerbachian-based materialism posited man's economic 
relations as central. The social totality was united by the 
unfolding of Spirit in one, and the economy in the other. In 
Althusser's view, Marx supplanted this notion of a 'simple, 
contradiction with a more complex structuralist analysis of 
the different autonomous structures within the totality 
(Althusser, 1969: ch. 3). This complex totality had no single 
pattern of development, but instead was composed of several 
structures (or levels), each with its own autonomous laws of 
development. These levels consisted of the economic, the 
political and the ideological. None was reducible to either 
of the others nor was any the epiphenomenal f9rm of another. 
All were as real-and autonomous as each other. Each 
influenced the other--a relationship Althusser described as 
loverdetermination'. However, each level was not entirely 
free-floating. Althusser argued that the economic was 
determinant to the degree that it organised the relationship 
between each level and the relative dominance of one over the 
others. The economic was not necessarily determinant as a 
particular level of the social totality (although in 
capitalism it was dominant). Rather it was determinant at the 
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level of the mode of production, at a general level that was 
never revealed empirically (Althusser, 1969: 112-3). 
By emphasising the structuring of the social formation by 
the mode of production, Althusser believed he could avoid the 
dangers of both economic reductionism and historicism. -The 
latter he identified as the reduction of the complex 
structural relations to relations between preconstituted class 
subjects. This approach, which he also dismissed as 
'humanism' and, 'empiricism', was visible in those authors 
associated with class-theoretical analysis. Althusser argued 
that historicists retained the Hegelian principle of the 
expressive totality whereby capitalist social relations were 
ultimately constituted by classes (as agents of the economy). 
Classes were seen as subjects whose conscious activities ý 
determined the relationship between the different levels of 
society. This, he maintained, was founded on a humanist 
principle that autonomous subjects exist who, can consciously 
express 'interests' given by their social position in'the 
economy. Furthermore, this presupposes an 'empiricist, 
epistemology whereby reality is interpreted correctly or 
incorrectly by experiencing subjects. All those Positions, 
Althusser contended, were untenable, and were rejected by Marx. 
By theorising society in terms of the mode of production 
articulated into different levels, thereby denying the 
autonomy of class subjects, Marxism achieved a number of 
things: the 'relative autonomy' and substantial effectivity of 
different levels of society can be accepted and examined; the 
possibility of disjunctures between the different levels (i. e. 
the political and ideological) can be admitted, since the 
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economy determines only the articulation of the levels, not 
the content of each. Importantly for our purposes, this 
relegation of economic determination to the mode of production 
permitted the reconceptualisation of ideology. 
,Iý Conceived as a structural level with the social 
formation, ideology attained a particular effectivity denied 
it by class-theoretical approaches. In contrast to 
historicism, ideology was understood by Althusser as a 
'condition of existence' of the mode of production and not as 
an expression or reflection of one level. If it were an 
expression of the economy, the term ideology'would presuppose 
conscious subjects capable of perceiving their position in the 
relations'of production. But ideology was not a product of 
consciousness, in Althusser's view. It did not originate in 
the economy, mediated by class subjects. Here Althusser 
rejected the base--superstructure metaphor as a model for 
thinking of ideology. Ideology was not traceable to an 
economic origin. For the economy--the base--presupposed 
ideology and politics--the superstructure--in, for example, 
the juridical definition of freely contracting agents. 
Ideology was necessary for the relations of production to be 
effective; it was presupposed by them. It was not a matter of 
correct or incorrect perception, but of necessary 
conditioning. Hence Althusser rejected the view that ideology 
is about falsity or false perception (see Hirst, 1979: ch. 2). 
. In his account it is a 'material practice', as real and as 
significant as any other material practice. As an 
overdetermined instance it cannot be exclusively economic 
either. Other practices in, and levels of, the social 
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formation can determine the nature of ideology. Thus the 
relationship between ideology and economic activity need not 
be direct in all social formations at all times. Furthermore, 
ideology also overdetermined the economic and political 
levels. It could have its own autonomous effectivity 
independent of other levels. 
Finally, ideology for Althusser was concerned with the 
construction of human subjectivity as the capacity to 
experience--the construction of the imaginary'--and was not 
limited to the perception of external reality (Hirst, 1979: 
ch. 2). In his later work Althusser 'called the generation of 
the imaginary the linterpellation' of subjectivity--a term 
derived from psychoanalysis. The subject, in this view, does 
not exist prior to experience but is 'hailed' as a subject by 
the formation of mental 'recognition' structures. As such, 
ideology was defined as the lived relation of a subject to its 
conditions of existence. This 'lived relation' did not grasp 
the social totality as a whole--it was structurally 
conditioned. - 
Althusser's work was elaborated in a political analysis 
by Nicos Poulantzas (1967,1972,1973a, 1973b). Poulantzas 
focused on theories of both class and state from a 
structuralist perspective and emphasised the importance of 
ideology and politics as 'relatively autonomous' levels united 
by the practice of hegemony. His perspective was developed in 
opposition to what he saw as the historicism of class and 
state analyses provided by British Marxists (Poulantzas, 
1967) - 
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Poulantzas defined classes as effects of the articulation 
of the social formation (Poulantzas, 1973a: 64). Classes were 
not reducible to opposed 'interests' transposed from the 
economy. Rather, they should be analysed as a plurality of 
effects determined by the combination of economic, political 
and ideological structures (1973a: 63). Numerous divisions 
(fractions and strata) were generated that were irreducible to 
a single conflict between capital and labour. This was 
, especially so in societies with more than one mode of 
, -_ production. 
Equally, class struggle and political activity 
could not be seen as a single expression of two class 
subjects; this was especially true in the analysis of the 
capitalist state. 
For Poulantzas, the state was defined not as an 
instrument of the dominant economic class but as relatively 
5 
autonomous. The state was autonomous because it served as 
the integrator of classes, without being the direct instrument 
of any fraction, yet it simultaneously functioned to reproduce 
capitalism by virtue of its position in the structure (1973a: 
44). Not directly, but only ultimately did the state aid the 
reproduction of the conditions for capital. This distance 
from any particular class permitted variation in the way that 
class unity was formed in the state. The composition of this 
unity--the hegemonic alliance--forged through the state was 
determined by the combination of structures, not by conscious 
class subjects. The function of the state and the POlitical' 
unification of classes were wide enough apart to permit non- 
5. This was the basis of his criticism of Miliband. See 
Poulantzas (1972). 
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bourgeois ideology to unite classes and so appear dominant, 
whilst simultaneously satisfying the reproduction of relations 
of production. 
Poulantzas' use of the term hegemony was grounded in 
Althusser's notion of the mode of production and did not arise 
from a view that classes are central agents of social 
relations. The hegemonic alliance, although united through 
ideology, was not conceived as the outcome of the struggle by 
a'class to make its own ideology dominant, i. e. to make J&_s 
consciousness all-pervasive (see Poulantzas, 1972a: 193-221). 
This was the error of Anderson and Nairn"s Hegelian use of the 
term: 
Gramscils concept of hegemony is reduced, 
incorrectly, to the Lukdcsian notion of class 
consciousness and the properly volitical 
structuration of a class is reduced to the 
constitution of a 'global conception of the-world', 
which becomes a unifying principle of a determinate 
social formation (Poulantzas, 1967: 61). 
Hegemony is a political practice conditioned by the structural 
network and is a functional necessity, for the reproduction of 
the capitalist mode of production: 
... hegemony designates the objective structuration 
of the sýecific 'interests' of a class or fraction 
as representative of a general political interest of 
the classes or class fractions in power despite 
their deep contradictions: the dominant ideology is 
therefore only one aspect of this organisation of 
the hegemonic class or fraction (Poulantzas, 1967: 
70). 
Although hegemony is contingent upon class struggle, agency is 
limited by the articulation of the structures within the 
social formation. Hegemony is thus a Political resolution to, 
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and a condition of existence of, the reproduction of the 
capitalist mode of production. 6 
Both Althusser and Poulantzas were significantly 
influenced by Gramscils work on hegemony. However, neither 
gave much-attention to this influence, and Poulantzas in 
particular was explicit in rejecting much of Gramscils 
philosophical suppositions (see Hall et al., 1978). Their 
interpretation of Gramsci aimed at extracting his anti- 
P-conomistic emphasis on politics and ideology and their role 
in constituting classes as political subjects. But Althusser 
and, Poulantzas rejected what they saw as historicist elements 
in his thought, notably his philosophy of praxis', his 
apparent stressýon classes as ultimate authors of social 
relations and his notion of civil society. For Althusser and 
poulantzas, Gramsci provided important concepts of historical 
materialism but was too submerged in historicism to be 
accepted in toto. Especially in Poulantzas' work, hegemony 
denoted a conjuncture of structures in which economy, ideology 
and politics combined to unify classes in order to reproduce 
the mode of production. It was not, as he claimed Gramsci had 
suggested, a process occurring in the indeterminate sphere of 
civil society where a preconstituted economic class promotes 
its own ideology. Ideology was an objective structure amongst 
others, and its role in reproducing the mode of production 
could not be reduced to a class weapon. 
6. In his later work Poulantzas tended to emphasise more the 
contingent aspect of class struggle against the 
structural determination by the mode of Production. This 
granted more influence to ideology and politics in 




The most recent interpretation of Gramsci and hegemony has 
come from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), who self- 
identify as 'post-Marxists' (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 4; 
Laclau, 1990: ch. 4). Their reading of Gramsci is both 
positive and critical and centres on the identification of 
ideology as discourse. For them, Gramsci is the most 
elaborate proponent of the discursive constitution of 
political subjectivity within the classical Marxist tradition. 
liowever, hegemony, which signifies to them the recognition of 
contingency in the formation of political agency, implies what 
they call a 'logic of the social' that ultimately abandons the 
g__priori assertion that class is the 'necessary' centre of 
subjectivity. Gramsci is inevitably restricted by his 
retention of economic class as the focal point of hegemonic 
strategy. 
The symbolic constitution of political subjects is 
CI entral to Laclau and Mouffe's analysis. This notion was 
prefigured in their earlier writings where they retained the 
notion of class but sought to theorise its specificity in the 
context of non-class struggles. For both Laclau and Mouffe, 
the merging of class with non-class struggles into a separate 
'popular-democratic' subject was important, and Gramsci was 
congratulated for theorising this advance over economism. In 
their later work, however, they came to reject the economistic 
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and. 'essentialist' assumption, which they had shared, that 
class should be at the centre of hegemony. 7 
In Hegemony and Socialist StrategY, (1985), Laclau and 
Mouffe outline the concept of hegemony as the symbolic 
. __ constitution 
of political subjects by means of a critical 
appraisal of classical Marxist texts. They insist that 
'society' cannot be conceived in terms of base and 
superstructure whereby an objectively discernible foundation 
generates superstructural effects. For them society is itself 
a, metaphor (see Laclau, 1988). Its unity is constituted 
discursively by means of the symbolic relation of numerous 
, subject positions'. This metaphorical unity--equated with 
Althusser's notion of overdetermination--istheorised through 
the notion of hegemony. Hegemony, in their view, suggests the 
. practice of symbolically uniting different groups and issues 
into precarious 'articulated' alliances. Because no identity 
can be fixed outside of discourse, hegemony is necessarily an 
unstable but crucial process in articulating a social 
formation. Political subjects can only exist in discourse, 
and hegemony denotes that discursive unity (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 85-88). 
Classical Marxism, they argue, generated and developed 
the notion of hegemony to deal with the apparent gap between 
, 'historical necessity' and complex Political struggles (Laclau 
_and 
Mouffe, 1985: chs 1 and 2). Through Luxemburgi Kautsky 
and Lenin, the term began increasingly to denote a larger 
7. See Laclauls work on 'popular-democratic interpellation' 
(1977,1980). Mouffe's (1979b) essay on Gramsci offers a 
similar interpretation of ideology as the fusion of class 
and popular discourse. 
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proportion of political concern. The need to articulate other 
, 
ýtasksl, purportedly unrelated to the proletariat, came to 
dominate Marxist discourse. The issue of taking up contingent 
struggles began to monopolise Marxist strategic debate, and 
the normal course of development' became ever less relevant.. 
However, while the term hegemony referred to those strategic 
articulations, the centrality of class as the natural centre 
of alliances testified to the comnlementary nature of the term 
in relation to dominant economistic assumptions. 8 Only with 
Gramsci, they assert, did hegemony become a defining feature 
of the social formation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 65-71). No 
longer a temporary strategy while normal development was 
delayed, hegemony was the very practice of societal unity. 
Gramsci decentred class by making its hegemonic function 
r-onstitutive of a 'national-popular' subjectivity. In Laclau 
and Mouffe's view, Gramsci also understood 'the materiality of 
ideolOgY': 
Ideology is not identified with a 'system of ideas' 
or with the 'false consciousness, of social agents; 
it is instead an organic and relational whole, 
embodied in institutions and apparatuses, which 
welds together a historical bloc around a number of 
basic articulatory principles. This precludes the 
possibility of a Isuperstructuralist' reading of the 
ideological (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 67). 
iience: 
political subjects are not--strictly speaking-- 
classes, but complex 'collective wills'; similarly, 
the ideological elements articulated by a hegemonic 
class do not have a necessary class belonging 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985.: 67). 
This is referred to as a persistent dualism in Marxist 
thought. See Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 47). 
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Despite praising Gramsci for making the symbolic articulation 
of unity a defining rather than, contingent feature of the 
social formation, they also claim that Gramscils insistence 
that classes were the necessary poles around which hegemonic 
blocs were formed restricted him to an 'essentialism' based on 
a 'privileged subject' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 69-71). As a 
political concept, hegemony implies the complete 
discursivity/non-fixity of all identities, not least that of 
class. Hegemony, in their view, negates the centrality of 
class struggle in political strategy and analysis. 
Part Two: Gramsci as a Theorist of the Conjuncture 
The notion of ideology clearly has important consequences both 
in Marxist political analysis and in interpreting Gramscits 
contribution in particular. Ideology signifies a realm of 
symbolic practice that in different accounts can suggest 
significantly different political strategies. In the 
interpretation of Gramscits work, these accounts have 
generated differing views on how to analyse and consequently 
practice class politics. In this section I will discuss some 
of the interpretations of ideology drawn from Gramsci outlined 
above and go on to argue for a particular understanding of 
Gramscits analysis. 
Ideological Politics 
The class- and mode-theoretical and post-Marxist accou . nts Of 
ideology have drawn from Gramscils work differents though 
related, elements. Gramsci is traditionally credited with 
theorising the importance of 'superstructures' in historical 
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development, though some have interpreted this as an 
ascription of 'primacy' to superstructural activity (Bobbio, 
1979), while others have argued that his stress on politics 
and consciousness by no means undermines the classical Marxist 
axiom of the primacy of the economic base (Texier, 1979). -It 
is clear, however, that the concept of hegemony, and the 
significance of ideology attributable to it, transcend the 
simple acceptance or rejection of the base--superstructure 
metaphor. The very interpretation of the relation between the 
economic, the political and the ideological is in question and 
hence the cognate concepts and categories of class political 
analysis. 
A brief look at Gramscils uses of ideology will be 
helpful in judging the interpretations given in Part One. 
Gramscils express interest was in treating ideas as 'material 
forces'. He made frequent reference to the passage in Marx*s 
is59 OPrefacel which states that men become conscious and 
struggle through ideology (Marx, 1975: 426; Q: 868-9,1319). 
Thus his immediate concern was with the political functioning 
of ideology rather than its origin. It would be helpful if we 
examine this functioning by breaking down Gramscils discussion 
into three aspects: the role ideology plays in forming 
subjects, its-relation to a class foundation, and the role of 
class politics in ideological struggle. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, intellectuals exercised a 
crucial function by virtue of their command over the 
consciousness and beliefs of their social bases, which they 
united with a hegemonic ideology. Gramsci presented this as 
unification of subjects whose identities were fragmented and 
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uncoordinated. This was the realm of 'common sense', 
examination of which brings up a number of points concerning 
Gramscils notion of consciousness which are important to 
conceptualisýng ideology. For consciousness, in his view, was 
linked fundamentally to practical activity. This was a major 
principle in the philosophy of praxis, and Gramsci 
incorporated it into his argument against a simple 
, epistemological' version of ideology. He explicitly stated 
that ideology should not be seen as a category denoting 
falsity or misperception: 
Indeed the meaning which the term 'ideology' has 
assumed in the philosophy of praxis implicitly 
contains a negative value judgment and excludes the 
possibility that for its founders the origin of 
ideas should be sought for in sensations, and 
therefore, in the final analysis, in physiology (Q: 
1491). 
Gramsci did not deny that an epistemological claim was 
relevant to conceptualising ideology, but for him it was 
imperative to understand how forms of consciousness operate in 
organising and adapting human subjects to their practical 
activity: 'One's conception of the world is a response to 
certain specific problems posed by reality, which are quite 
specific and "original" in their immediate relevancel (Q: 
1377). The practical naýure of ideology was represented 
clearly in common sense thought with its tendency to 
instrumental and unsystematic modes of reasoning. This was 
the source of both its weakness and strength. For as an 
unsystematic way of thinking, it tended to remain subordinate 
to the dominant and more elaborate (philosophical) thought (Q: 
1379). Yet as a practical mode of reasoning, common sense was 
peculiarly sensitive to 'necessity' and to the constraints of 
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the practical-world on political ideas. This, Gramsci argued, 
was the positive aspect of common sense and it deserved to be 
retained. 9 
Ideology expressed a subject's consciousness of immediate 
practical activity, and it-also worked to articulate the way a 
subject belongs to a community. Again, common sense thought 
provided the initial awareness of commonality, but in a 
heterogeneous and uncritical manner: 'When one's conception of 
the world is not critical and coherent but disjointed and 
episodic, one belongs simultaneously to a multiplicity of mass 
human groups' (Q: 1376). Gramsci did not elaborate in what 
way this sense of belonging was conditioned by practical 
activity nor did he specify how 'conformist' behaviour 
corresponded to a particular state of consciousness. As Femia 
(1981: 32-46) points out, there are numerous degrees of 
psychological attachment and a number of objects over which 
common agreement may arise. It is clear, however, that 
Gramsci believed that individual's identities begin 'locally', 
i. e. in relation to their practical activity and the social 
9. The sensitivity of popular forms of thought to practical 
needs was distinguished by Gramsci with the term *good 
sense' (buon--senso) (Q: 1334-51 1380). At one point he 
attributed this distinction to Manzoni (Q: 1483). Good 
sense, Gramsci argued, was associated with the view of 
the 'man in the street' (Q: 959), although he also saw it 
operating in the literary form of popular journalism 
where it retained a critical value (Q: 2270-71). The 
ambiguous nature of common sense thought is illustrated 
in the following passage where Gramsci discusses the 
popular reaction to abstract thought: 'but "common sensoll 
has in turn been the vulgarisor of a justified reaction 
[to abstract thought] and has fossilized it into a 
permanent mood, into an intellectual laziness which fails 
to address the phenomenon it should be fighting. "Good 
sense" reacted, but "common sense" embalmed that reaction 
and turned it into a "theoretical, "doctrinal", or 
"idealistic" canon' (Q: 959). 
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relations generated around it. As we have seen, it was the 
task of intellectuals to rearticulate this consciousness of 
practical activity and 'conformism, to a plurality of 
collective interests into a philosophically elaborate and 
coherent 'collective will'. 
Gramsci conceived ideology as a crucial component in the 
formation of subjects, and so argued that it must not be 
dismissed by Marxists. The issue it raised was not one of 
simple truth or falsity in perception, but rather the degree 
to which a collective awareness of common aims had been 
reached within and between classes: 
To the extent that ideologies are historically 
necessary they have a validity which is 
'psychological'; they forganisel human masses, and 
create the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc (Q: 
869). 
This leads us to the second aspect of ideology: its foundation 
in the economic practices of social classes. 
Gramscils distinction between organic and 'arbitrary, 
ideologies (Q: 869) revealed an important tension in his 
account of the economic basis to ideology. For while he 
suggested that ideology has a class origin that defines it, he 
accepted that many ideologies actually existing cannot simply 
be reduced to this particular class origin. For example, at 
one point he indicated that the unity of theory and practice 
was the achievement of rationality: 
The identification of theory and practice is a 
critical act, through which practice is demonstrated 
to be rational and necessary, or theory to be 
realistic and rational (Q: 1780). 
This rational unity if theory and practice was barely formed 
in common sense thought, where it remained implicit but 
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subordinate to the prevailing hegemony. Only when it had been 
elaborated at a philosophical level could an ideology be seen 
as fully expressing the interests of a class. Only through 
such a philosophical elaboration could 'necessity' be 
observed: 
Necessity exists when there exists an efficient and 
active Dremissi consciousness of which in men's 
minds has become operative, posing concrete goals to 
the collective consciousness and constituting a 
complex of convictions and beliefs which acts 
powerfully in the form of 'popular beliefs' (Q: 
1479-80). 
At the same time, however, Gramsci insisted that Politics and 
ideology could not be exhaustively explained by the existing 
class structure (Q: 871). People's common sense perception of 
everyday life combined ideologies and *traces' of older ideas 
unrelated to current class interests. In one passage this 
complexity of existing ideas was made clear: 
one should reflect on the fact that in general (i. e. 
sometimes) a concept may arise as an instrument for 
a practical and occasional end and nonetheless be 
intrinsically true. But I do not believe that there 
are many who would maintain that once a structure 
has altered, all the elements of the corresponding 
superstructure must necessarily collapse. What 
happens, rather, is that out of an ideology that 
arose to lead the popular masses and. which therefore 
necessarily takes account of certain of their 
interests, several elements survive: the law of 
nature itself, which may have waned for the educated 
classes, is preserved by the Catholic religion and 
is more alive among the people than one thinks (Q: 
1322). 
Gramsci clearly denied that all ideology could be reduced to a 
reflection of class position, yet he maintained that those 
ideologies that could not be so reduced remained rooted in 
some practical origin, even though that practice no longer 
existed. These older ideologies came to infuse the current 
class structure with beliefs and practices that, while not 
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strictly corresponding to the interests of 'fundamental' 
classes, inevitably defined the field of struggle as a complex 
terrain of ideologies. Older ideologies both inhibited and 
enabled class struggle. They inhibited it by marginalising an 
authentic or rational correspondence of thought and action 
(common sense); and they enabled it when they became fused 
into a hegemonic ideology (philosophy). This leads us to the 
third aspect of Gramscils remarks on ideology: namely, its 
functioning in political struggle. 
In terms of the question of ideology, Gramscils notion of 
hegemony contributes uniquely in positing the simultaneous 
presence and absence of class. For while he saw classes as 
the fundamental political forces, he conceded that in a 
particular conjuncture beliefs and practices could not be 
simply identified with a determinate class location. The 
analysis of the struggle for hegemony was consequently an 
investigation into how older ideologies became fused with 
particular class aims. This synthetic process was suggested 
in one note as follows: 
Creating a new culture does not only mean making 
one's own individual 'original' discoveries, it 
also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in 
a critical form of truths already discovered, their 
Isocialisation' as it were, and even making them the 
basis of vital action, an element of co-ordination 
and intellectual and moral order (Q: 1377-78; see 
also 1406). 
Class was therefore the central collective force behind 
ideology, though ideology was not conceived as a coherent 
system of ideas but as a conglomeration of various forms of 
discourse: 
... therefore the philosophy of an epoch cannot be 
any systematic tendency or individual system: it is 
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the ensemble of all individual philosophies and 
philosophical tendencies, plus scientific opinions, 
religion and common sense (Q: 1410). 
As such, class hegemony was not the imposition of an ideology 
belonging to a specific class but rather the synthesis of 
existing ideologies around a class or class fraction. As we 
have seen, this was the principle behind Gramscils argument 
that political struggle was characterised by the incorporation 
of intellectuals into particular strategies. The 
intellectuals articulated the beliefs and values of their 
constituencies into the leading, hegemonic strategy. 
10 
This specification of class as a source of ideological 
struggle, and the decentring of class in analysing that 
struggle, has been at the root of different interpretations of 
hegemony. It is worth briefly summarising those views 
outlined above. Each offers an alternative account of class 
struggle and ideology, revealing a bias towards one side of a 
persistent dichotomy in Marxist theory: namely, structure and 
agency (Mouzelis, 1990: 157-77). 
The class-theoretical view, by treating ideology as a 
fundamentally class-based phenomenon, lays a particular stress 
on agency. Ideology is the bearer of class interest which 
derives from its location in the economy. Class power is the 
domination of one class over others or over the social 
structure in general (Mouzelis, 1990: 159-62). This power'is 
empirically observable since it takes the form of beliefs or 
material resources. Hegemony signifies a variant of 
10. Lo Piparo (1979) argues that this process of fusion and 
diffusion of ideologies was based on a linguistic 
paradigm whereby existing dialects merge with a dominant 
language. 
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subjective domination, often mediated through state 
apparatuses. 
The mode-theoretical view tried to combat the empiricism 
of the class-theoristsýby eliminating the subject from 
analysis and treating ideology as a structural condition of 
existence of the mode of production. Class power was 
structural and not defined in agency terms (Mouzelis, 199o: 
169-72). Ideology was not a reflection in consciousness of 
class interests, but rather the lived relation of subjects to 
overdetermined levels of the mode of production. The mutual 
conditioning of each level by the other helped to fragment 
classes as political agents. Hegemony served to unite class 
groupings not through the persuasive efforts of a single class 
but through overdetermination on the political level. The 
struggle amongst agents was marginalised in favour of the 
'global' conditioning of the structure. 
The post-Marxists, saw ideology as contrary to historical 
necessity in Marxist discourse. The concept of hegemony was 
gradually 'expanded' to become the defining principle of 
societal unity. This lmpýied the irrelevance of essentialist 
categories of class to political analysis. Agency was 
stressed, in this view, as opposed to structure. The post- 
Marxists enlarged on the structuralist denial of the subject 
yet without insisting on ultimate determination by the 
economy. Conceived as discourse, ideology neither reflected 
interests nor functioned to reproduce the mode of production. 
Ideology was the symbolic substance of all identity. Hegemony 
was not built on 'material' conditions, it was materiality 
itself - 
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The successive interpretations of ideology here 
summarised reveal a progressive undermining of the orthodoxy 
that hegemony refers to conscious classes. Rather, ideology 
is increasingly seen as constitutive of classes as they are 
present only symbolically in hegemonic formations. In this 
movement, ideology is identified less as the emanation of 
preconstituted interests in the political sphere than as 
constitutive of interest itself. 
All interpretations agree on the importance of hegemony 
in conceiving political unification and the predominance of 
some concept of ideology in this. Each stresses different 
aspects: class-theorists are focused on classes as agents, 
bearing and disseminating their own ideological representation 
of interests. However, Gramscits thought cannot be entirely 
equated with this view, for it fails to capture the emphasis 
he placed on the synthetic role of hegemony, whereby a class 
achieves political consciousness by fusing its aims with those 
of other groups and classes. As such, hegemonic class 
consciousness is achieved outside of purely economic interests 
(see Mouffe, 1979b). Mode-theorists are focused on the 
constitutive role of politics and ideology in class formation, 
where ideology unites classes as a functional necessity. 
However, this assertion of the partially constitutive role of 
ideology is achieved by undermining any real significance of 
classes as political agents. Ideological struggle is 
eradicated in favour of the 'global' structuring of the mode 
of production. Post-Marxists see the constitutive role of 
non-class-ideology in political unification as suggestive of 
the absence of any necessary class interest. They recognise 
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the importance of struggle in generating hegemony, but they 
see this as indicative of the contingency of all identities, 
especially class. For the class-theorists, agency and 
structure are separate, and ideology 'reacts back, on 
structure. For the mode-theorists, ideology is a structure 
itself an. d agents are merely its supports. For the post- 
Marxists, structure is dissolved into ideology. 
Each perspective, therefore, is deficient in some way in 
its interpretation of Gramsci and hegemony. The class- 
theoretical view tends to neglect the constitutive role of 
ideology in creating discourses in which class is not central. 
The mode-theoretical and post-Marxist views undermine the 
importance of class agency in Gramscils theory, the first by 
eliminating class struggle as a decisive factor, the second by 
asserting the incompatibility of class with the 'logic' of 
hegemony. These deficiencies clearly stem from the different 
accounts of ideology in Gramscils Ouaderni. In what sense, 
then, can class be central to historical struggle and yet 
simultaneously structured by the politics and ideology of a 
given period? The answer, I submit, lies in conceiving his 
analysis as directed towards a specific transitional 
conjuncture, a period of crisis in which the interaction of 
class with politics and ideology forms the immediate terrain 
of struggle and analysis. 
Philosophical and-Political Realism 
Morera (1990) has attempted to resolve some interpretiva 
problems by reconstructing Gramscils self-identified 
'historicism' as a 'realism'. Gramsci, Morera maintains, 
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employed a notion of the relationship between base and 
superstructure that combined both diachronic (long-term or 
'organic') and synchronic (short-term or 'conjuncturall) 
perspectives (see Morera, 1990: 139-60). In the diachronic 
view, the base has primacy. over the superstructure. This 
means that the historical transience of all social forms, in 
the long run, is determined by economic relations (1990: 74- 
94). Economic relations do not causally determine every 
aspect of social life at every moment, but are constituted by 
'generative mechanisms' which condition and set limits to the 
development of social systems (1990: 103). In the synchronic 
view, any particular conjuncture is open to a complex number 
of determinations consisting of economic and non-economic 
factors. The conjuncture is the concurrence of economic and 
superstructural processes in which structural determination is 
not always visible or clearly available to analysis. In the 
diachronic view, the relation between base and superstructure 
is seen as a temporal process whereby a class comes to 
dominate the superstructures as well as the base over a period 
of time. In the syn. chronic view, Gramsci presented the base-- 
superstructure relation as a continual interaction in which 
classes struggle for dominance with relative degrees of 
success. Gramscils demand for a clear 'analysis of 
situations' asserted the need to combine both diachronic and 
synchronic analyses (1990: 90-94). He aimed to assess in what 
way the general causation by the economy was manifest in a 
particular period: 
Gramscils-analysis of situations is precisely this, 
namely, the investigation of how temporal processes 
of different durations intertwine at any given 
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moment in time, so that their long-term causal 
process and their contemporary relations can be 
clearly understood (Morera, 1990: 139). 
In Morera's view, emphasis on one form of analysis 
without the other, or the reduction of one to the other, would 
misinterpret Gramsci-11 Gramscils realism, he argues, asserts 
the structural conditioning of agency and the autonomy of 
agents from structures. Structures do not directly and 
independently influence social phenomena but instead work by 
what Gramsci called the 'causal nexus'; agents are not 
completely free to organise and influence political alliances 
at will. Rather they are circumscribed by economic relations 
in the long term (See Femia, 1981: 117). In his analysis 
Gramsci sought to unravel the restrictions and possibilities 
in any conjuncture that arise out of economic relations. 
Morera helps to clear up a number of difficulties in 
interpreting Gramsci*Is Marxism: namely, reconciling a general 
account of economic determination with a non-reductionist 
analysis of superstructures as a''complex and determining 
sphere. How does this affect the interpretation of ideology 
and class struggle in the theory of hegemony? The distinction 
between the two temporal dimensions, the diachronic and 
synchronic, allows Gramscils remarks on consciousness and 
ideology to be seen as crucially related to a conjunctural 
analysis of class politics, more specifically, a period of 
economic and political crisis. Understood in this way, the 
various interpretations of ideology suggested by the term 
hegemony seem to make sense. 
11. See Gramscils distinction between organic and 
conjunctural 'moments' discussed in chapter Two. See 
also Morera (1990: 155-7). 
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The relationship between ideology and class in Gramscils 
account of hegemony must be seen in terms of this dual 
temporal dimension. In the long-term, Gramsci hypothesized, 
class interests would be reflected in superstructures as 
ideology. But in the short-term non-class and class practices 
and beliefs would be seen to interact in the complex relations 
of forces. The'conjuncture, or 'situation', was the unit of 
analysis in which nascent class interests, and traditional 
class and non-class superstructures, mutually influenced each 
other. Class, therefore, was'a fundamental historical agent, 
but its presence was clearly visible only in the long-term 
(Morera, 1990: 156). In this sense, Gramsci maintained a 
class-theoretical approach to ideology. 
Yet Gramscils analysis was receptive to the complex 
dispersal of forces, in a conjuncture. He accepted that 
economic interests were represented in blocs that compromise 
those interests and structure them into formations, the 
ideological components of which were not simple reflections of 
class interests. Hence he was aware, because of his knowledge 
of Italian history, that political strategy often worked at a 
broader, 'popular' level. The non-economistic approach to 
ideology and political unification implied here brings Gramsci 
into favour with the mode-theoretical and post-Marxist 
perspectives. Ideology was clearly not conceived as the 
simple imposition of a preconstituted class; as Laclau and 
Mouffe put'it, 'ideology is signalled as the precise terrain 
on which these (political) relations are constituted' (Laclau 
and mouffe, 1985: 67). 
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In what sense was Gramscils analysis of ideology and 
class struggle specifically related to crisis? For Gramsci, a 
crisis was a period in which the representation of class in 
the superstructures is in decline and the possibility of an 
alternative becomes available. A fundamental feature of this 
particular period was the apparent dispersal of class forces 
and the dislocation of economic agents from the political and 
ideological structures. This is how Gramsci perceived the 
period from 1918'onwards, a transitional period for which the 
Fascist dictatorship was no long-term resolution. Gramscils 
assumption was that only a 'rational' resolution in which 
proletarian economic unity in the factories became a moral 
unity in civil society was tenable. By 1926 this project was 
however not an immediate possibility, and in the meantime the 
interaction of class forces, their relationships with the 
dominant bloc and the corresponding forms of ideological 
discourse needed examining. While Gramsci certainly asserted 
the historical dominance of class in the formation of blocs, 
alliances and ideologies, in the analysis of the conjuncture 
class-interes. t was not an obvious empirical determinant. The 
political and ideological practices of previous historical 
social formations were theorised as constraining and 
inhibiting the emergence of class leadership. Class as a 
long-term economic agent was therefore not an a priori 
assumption derived from a schematic and causal base-- 
superstructure model, but rather a contingent result of 
analytical investigation. 
Gramscils point of departure was the crisis in which the 
political and ideological forms of class power became issues 
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of decisive importance. Importantly, Gramscils work was not 
strictly an analysis of capitalism. He largely presupposed 
the long-term determination of classes by the economy and took 
as a guiding principle their eventual domination in the 
superstructures. His concern was with the conjunctural forms 
of political activity and the analysis of political behaviour 
in a period of transition. A preoccupation with formal 
theories of 'mode of production' or laws of development, 
constrain the interpretation of hegemony provided by 
Poulantzas, whose express aim was to reconstruct Marxist 
'orthodoxy', and by Laclau and Mouffe, who explicitly intended 
to reject it. As Morerals analysis suggests, Gramsci did not 
aim to provide a theory of history. Hegemony provided him 
with a way of examining the forms of class struggle 
characteristic of a specific conjuncture. For Gramsci, 
ideology was the arena in which classes fought out their 
struggle. In the interpretation given here, this refers to 
the complex interaction of class forces, blocs and non-class 
ideologies in a period of crisis such as Gramscils own. 
Morerals account of Gramscils philosophical. realism can 
also help in understanding his political realism. For 
Gramscils strongly political account of ideology was designed 
not to suggest the complete discursivity of ideology, but to 
grasp the indeterminacy of politics during the period of 
transition. 12 Gramsci was sensitive to'the danger of a 
regrouping of class forces if no alternative proletarian bloc 
was able to intervene. This tension between a disintegrating 
12. See Morerals arguments against Laclau and Mouffels (1985) 
interpretation of Gramsci (1990: 168-74). 
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social order, and the potential for a new one, is clear in the 
following remark: 
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i. e. is 
no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant', exercising 
coercive force alone, this means precisely that the 
great masses have become detached from their 
traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what 
they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis 
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying 
and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a 
great variety of morbid symptoms appear (Q: 311). 
In such a period of crisis, ideology was not conceived as a 
level or structure quite separate from or simply reducible to 
the economy. It was rather the symbolic form through which 
economic relations were expressed as political relations. 
Ideologies became detached from a unifying hegemony and were 
reintegrated in a new composition of class forces. 
As we have seen, this suggested for Gramsci a pragmatic 
form of class analysis focused on 'relations of force' and the 
'historical bloc' (see above, ch. 2). 1 shall suggest below 
that it also steered him towards developing an analysis of 
politics reminiscent of Machiavelli. 
Gramscils reading of Machiavelli was central to his 
theory in prison, not only in ascribing the appellation 
'modern Prince' to the Communist Party but also in grounding 
the identity of the party in a political metaphysic that set 
the aims and limits of political action. Machiavelli's work 
helped Gramsci to formulate a 'strategic' theory of politics. 
ý Machiavelli, especially in The Prince (1988), dealt 
closely with' the question of Political legitimacy, uniquely 
treating it as a problem of power rather than of morality. 
Indeed he is renowned for his assertion of the autonomy of 
politics from strictly ethical discourse. For him, politics 
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was an independent realm of enquiry whose principles could not 
be understood in terms of the formal position of rulers. In 
the The Prince, Machiavelli recast the language of politics in 
terms of the power position of the individual ruler, and 
stressed the importance of a strategic mentality in dealing 
with the problem of political order. Order was achieved 
through a balance between force and consent. 
Machiavelli's writings also display an awareness of the 
contingency of political life. Indeed this is one of the 
meanings of fortuna, whose indeterminacy the potential ruler 
was advised to conquer through his audacious use of virtfa (see 
Pocock, 1975: 156). - Given the potential irrationality of the 
political world, Machiavelli placed the onus on the political 
agent in employing his knowledge wisely and shrewdly, adapting 
pragmatically to situations and being open to the swift 
changes in circumstances that may affect his position (see 
Wolin, 1961: 201). On this view power is seen as multi- 
dimensional, stemming not from a single source but rather 
coming from a plurality of directions. The political agent's 
role is thus crucially an interpretive one, constantly 
relocating in a constellation of forces characterised by 
permanent flux (see Clegg, 1989: ch. 2, esp. 29-38). 
Significantly, political action is viewed not as determined by 
social or ethical structures, but as determining. 
Machiavelli's political metaphysic is based on the imposition 
of will'(virtii) on chaotic circumstance (fortuna), a species 
of voluntarism guided by a Irealistf knowledge of political 
necessity. Consequently, ethical goals seem reduced to 
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instrumental values. 13 Questions of communicative 
understanding are marginalised compared to the strategic 
position of the agent as a political force. Not suprisingly 
perhaps, Machiavelli's legacy, an ambiguous resolution of the 
relation between politics and ethics, came to have a salience 
amongst later Italian social and political theorists. 
Gramsci, too, drew his own revolutionary conclusions from 
reflection on Machiavelli's work. 14 
Gramsci inherited a Hegelian reading of Machiavelli, 
first outlined by De Sanctis in his Storia della letteratura 
italiana, where Machiavelli was considered as an early 
proponent of Italian unification (see Sanguinetti, 1982: viii, 
ch. 4). Gramsci saw Machiavelli as theorising the early 
bourgeoisie as a hegemonic class (Q: 1559-60,1572). Far from 
outlining a politics devoid of moral content, as Croce had 
suggested, Machiavelli's aim was to provide a realistic route 
to a united Italy-15 Hence Gramsci characterised Machiavelli 
as a 'precocious Jacobin', having anticipated both the Russian 
and French revolutions by stressing the strategic importance 
of political agency in revolutionary struggle (Q: 1555-61). 
Like Machiavelli, Gramscils own view of political 
struggle was based on a"constellation of forces' ('relation 
of-forces') with an emphasis on agency (the Party) as the 
13. See Virioli (199o) for an alternative account of 
Machiavelli's understanding of politics. 
14. See Paggi (1969) for a survey of Machiavelli's influence 
on Gramscils contemporaries. 
15. This reading emerges above all from chapter XXVI of The 
_Prince 
where Machiavelli calls for the liberation and 
unification of Italy by a single leader. 
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determinant, a 'collective will, imposing its stamp on a 
chaotic reality. Thus Gramsci rejected schematism in 
analyzing social phenomena and suggested a more pragmatic 
approach to Party organisation and activity. Femia describes 
this as Gramscils 'empirical cast of mind' (Femia, 1981: 254). 
As Morera (1990: 160-1) has suggested, Gramsci held two 
different notions of politics: one centred on class struggle, 
the other on moral participation. As I argued in Chapter One, 
Gramscils analysis was novel in suggesting that two types of 
politics are intrinsically linked. This was clearly the case 
in his Quaderni, in which the politics of class struggle and 
the politics of ideology were combined in the analytical 
concept of hegemony. Like Machiavelli, Gramsci insisted that 
ethical relations, or ideology, were constrained by the forces 
of class struggle. 
16 Ideology was not free from Political 
struggle, nor could it yet be reduced to class interests. 
Gramsci thus praised Machiavelli's assertion of the autonomy 
of politics, not to suggest a simple voluntarism but rather to 
grasp the fluidity of class and ideology in a period of 
transition (Q: 1600-1). The correspondence of class and 
ideology could not be determined schemat ically, but only 
through careful, pragmatic analysis. This would reveal how 
complex and diffuse conceptions of the world were articulated 
around class positions in a particular conjuncture. This 
suggested that ideology became 'fixed' to class through 
political struggle. For Gramsci, this did not mean a denial 
of classes as the fundamental political forces in a social 
16. For a critique of Gramscits political realism as a 
political project, see Bovero (1988). For a more 
favourable comment, see Adamson (1987-8: 331-6). 
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formation but rather a reconceptualisation of their role as 
determinants of ideology. For in a period of transition, 
class struggle was strategically conceived. Hence by using 
military metaphors he prioritised a 'war of position'. as 
opposed to a 'war of manoeuvrel, suggesting that in a crisis 
period the reorganisation of class forces through ideological 
struggle was of primary importance. 
Gramscils political realism was sensitive to the 
political indeterminacy that prevailed in a period of crisis. 
By arguing against a simple transposition of class economic 
relations onto political and ideological relations, he 
revealed the scope for a recomposition of class forces under a 
new political leadership. This analysis was also reminiscent 
of Marx's in the Eighteenth Brumaire, in which he theorised 
the fluidity of class relations and forms of political 
representation, -and Gramsci made frequent reference to that 
text (see Q: 871-72,1604). As we shall see in the next 
chapter, this indeterminacy linked Gramscils notion of 
hegemony to an analysis of the ideological basis of 
legitimacy. 
Part Three: Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that Gramscits, account of 
ideology must be interpreted in light of the crisis period to 
which his analysis responded. This enabled him to make the 
novel move of arguing a non-economistic theory of ideology 
whilst simultaneously asserting the role of class in 
ideological struggle. This indubitably political account of 
ideology and class struggle has been at the root of differing 
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interpretations of hegemony. These, however, have failed to 
grasp the specificity of Gramscils analysis. Consequently, 
they have emphasised, one-sidedly, aspects of his thought. 
While class was the central terrain on which ideology 
operated, Gramsci did not attribute an. a Priori class 
consciousness either to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, 
suggesting that they had their own coherent worldview which 
they would seek to impose on other classes. Yet at the same 
time, Gramsci did not argue that hegemony indicated a 
completely contingent play of ideologies with no necessary 
basis in class. For him this contingency was characteristic 
of a period of crisis in which the ideological and political 
, fix' of, class dominance had loosened. Only an emphasis on 
the strategic interplay of class interests and ideologies 
could accurately represent the conditions for regrouping class 
forces under the hegemony of'the proletariat. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HEGEMONY AND LEGITIMACY 
In the Introduction I argued that the relation between belief 
and authority was an important, if unresolved, issue in 
political theory. The voluntary submission by subjects to the 
legitimate commands of those in authority requires at some 
stage the subjective recognition of their right to issue 
commands. As I have shown, that recognition may involve one 
of two different kinds of arrangement: either a procedural 
relation of authority, where subjects are obliged to obey 
despite their own beliefs, or a relation of authority over 
belief whereby an individual's superior grasp of a common 
objective is deemed to justify the right to command obedience. 
Whereas the first is premised on the assumed absence of a 
shared concept of the good, the second presupposes a shared 
good. The concept of hegemony is, an important contribution to 
that issue, and its relevance lies in its formulation of the 
second of the above notions of authority. In this concluding 
chapter, I return to the subjects of legitimacy and authority, 
and point to the advantages and limitations of Gramscils 
account of hegemony. I argue that the crisis conditions to 
which Gramsci responded permitted him to analyse civil society 
as a realm of authority over belief. 
However, the specificity of Gramscits analysis also 
reveals severe limitations in linking hegemony to the question 
of legitimacy. The analysis of legitimacy is neither 
exhausted by recourse to the grounding of authority in common 
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beliefs, which he prioritised, nor can the conditions in which 
beliefs are articulated be fully understood in terms of the 
strategic account of class politics he suggested. 
In Part One, I discuss the treatment of legitimacy in 
recent Marxist discourse. This rests on the analysis of the 
relation between the state and the economy, and the role of 
civil society in linking the two spheres. In Part Two, I 
indicate the advantages and limitations of Gramscils analysis. 
His notion of civil society permits the relation between the 
private and public realms to be seen not as a formally 
structured relation, but as a site of political and 
ideological contest. However, the very conditions of crisis 
that enabled his analysis also constrain it as a framework for 
conceiving legitimacy. In Part Three, I provide a summary and 
final conclusion to the thesis as a whole. 
Part One: The State and Legitimacy 
Recent Marxist writings on the state have abandoned a 
simplistic characterisation of the sphere of Politics as one 
of simple coercion or of complete ruling class domination. 
From the 1960's onwards, more sophisticated accounts aimed to 
reconcile the state's apparently 'consensual' character with a 
class-analysis-of capitalist society by insisting on the 
integral role of legitimacy in sustaining both its class basis 
and apparently 'public' image. ' However, different ways of 
characterising the interaction of class and state generated 
see Jessop (1990: chs 1-3) for a review of recent Marxist 
analyses of the state. See also the editors' 
introduction to both Holloway and Picciotto (1978) and 
Clarke (1991). 
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different versions of the role and functioning of legitimating 
processes. In this section I briefly consider three 
perspectives, two of which explicitly employ Gramscian 
concepts and a third which does not. These perspectives by no 
means exhaust the debate on legitimacy and the state, but 
rather provide a useful point of departure for considering 
Gramscils contribution. It will be seen that each has its own 
account of how the political power of the state corresponds to 
the values and beliefs of those whom it governs. I will 
suggest that these differences emerge especially around the 
issue of civil society. This leads on to Part Two in which I 
discuss the relevance of Gramscils concept of civil society in 
contemporary analysis. 
Elites and political Culture 
The earliest English-language interpretation of Gramscils work 
presented the concept hegemony as a contribution to the 
critical understanding of political culture. This analysis, 
submitted by British Marxists such as Anderson (1992), Nairn 
(1981) and Miliband (1973), sought to explain the nature of 
the state (more specifically, the British state for Anderson 
and Nairn) by recourse to the predominance of a relatively 
coherent'elite culture amongst the -*establishment,. Although 
the Anderson/Nairn 'thesis', as it came to be called, differed 
in many respects from Miliband's more general study, all three 
identified bourgeois hegemony as a form of Political culture 
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that inhibited the development of a revolutionary 
2 proletariat. 
For Anderson and Nairn, the peculiar form of class 
relations in Britain provides the key to a weak bourgeois 
culture and consequently an 'immature' working class. The 
absence of a coherent bourgeois consciousness, the result of 
an early. and relatively compromised form of bourgeois 
revolution in the seventeenth century, left an establishment 
whose cultural form was predominantly aristocratic. 
Capitalist rule in Britain has therefore been characterised by 
a fairly strong integration of bourgeois and proletarian 
interests (Anderson, 1992: 39-43; Nairn, 1981: 33-44). 
Miliband's principal object of enquiry is the 'Western' 
state, its personnel and the way capitalism influences it. 
Writing specifically against 'pluralist' political science, 
Miliband draws attention to the proximity of state personnel 
and political elites with bourgeois interests, values and 
beliefs. The consequence of this interpersonal contact is an 
institutionalised bias towards capitalist interests in general 
and against radical change (1973: 60-2, chs 4 and 5). For 
miliband, ruling elites are too closely connected with the 
ruling class--by upbringing and external pressure--for the 
idea of the state as a neutral instrument of 'public, power to 
be accepted. 
Anderson, Nairn and Miliband are all concerned at some 
point with the ideological orientation of the establishment 
and the -class 
basis to the Political culture that unites them. 
2. For an outline of the various definitions Of Political 
culture, see Kavanagh (1983: ch. 4, esp. 66-70). 
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All use the term hegemony to characterise the form of 
political domination exercised by the bourgeoisie. 
significantly, all are concerned with the impact of class 
interests and values on elites, although Anderson and Nairn 
choose to analyse hegemony and the state historically as the 
outcome of class struggle, while Miliband adopts a more 
formal, systematic account of the state as an institution. 
As accounts of the state, all three can be described as 
class-theoretical approaches in the sense that economic 
domination, is transformed into political domination by virtue 
of the ability of the ruling class to impose its own values 
and beliefs on others via its influence on elite culture (see 
above, pp. 180-86). The ideological apparatuses of the state 
are seen as important here. For example, Anderson (1992: 41) 
talks of 'the extreme importance of cultural institutions in 
the British pattern of hegemony', including the education 
system and the media as well as the institutions of the state 
(see also 1990: ch. 2). 'Miliband, too, specifies the same 
'agencies of political persuasion' which 'speak the language 
of adaptation to capitalist society' (1973: 195). For him, 
political socialisation of the masses into the values, 
expectations'and beliefs of capitalist society by state and 
non-state bodies generates a 'culture of conformity' 
favourable to the interests of the bourgeoisie (see Miliband, 
1973: chs. 7 and 8) . 
Although all three recognise hegemony as the permeation 
of the establishment and state with the values of classes 
outside the state structure, their principal concern is to 
assess the effect of that influence at the state level. Their 
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analyses are characterised by a 'top-down' approach in which 
the presence of a dominant culture amongst political elites 
functions to sustain (Miliband) or hinder (Anderson and Nairn) 
the development of class interests. Hegemony is consequently 
seen as an imposition on dominated classes of values and 
beliefs which neutralise class antagonisms. 
In the views presented here, the bourgeoisie is seen to 
'control' the state by means of a dominant political culture. 
This cultural dominance runs over into the established 
institutions in society. Legitimacy is therefore a function 
of the class composition of and influence over the 
establishment, state personnel and non-state agencies. 
Hegemony denotes the peculiar form of class domination ensured 
by elites. 
The State and the Mode of Production 
In Political Power and Social Classes (1973a), Poulantzas 
offered a structuralist account of the state and politics, 
characterising it as a 'relatively autonomous' 'region' of the 
mode of production. In his analysis, hegemony was an integral 
concept in the conceptualisation of the political level in 
capitalist society (1973a: 137-41). In contrast, and in 
explicit opposition, to the treatment of hegemony as a 
political culture, Poulantzas argued that it. was a category 
fundamental to a structural understanding of social class. As 
such, his account treated hegemony as a formal and 
specifically political concept in the analysis of the 
autonomous region of politics, rather than the analysis of 
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culture complementary to class economic power (see above, pp. 
190-93). 
- Poulantzas' account of 
hegemony, as we have seen already, 
was rooted in a structuralist account of the mode of 
production. The advantage of this interpretation was that 
politics, and political culture especially, need not 
necessarily correspond empirically with class economic power. 
As a 'relatively autonomous region', politics is subordinate 
to the economy by virtue of its structural position, not its 
empirical content. Politics, which Poulantzas identified with 
the realm of the state, is seen to have a special significance 
in uniting classes, serving, as he put it, as 'the factor of 
cohesion' in the social formation (1973a: 44-50). The state 
did not serve the bourgeoisie directly but only at a 
structural level. Hence, against British Marxists, he argues 
that the actual control of state institutions of command and 
information, examined in questions of political culture, were 
not strictly relevant (see Poulantzas, 1967,1972). 
The structural separation of the realm of politics from 
the economy grants the 'space' in which political action 
occurs. The transition from feudal to capitalist economic 
relations entailed a separation of the worker from the means 
of production which Obviated the need for extra-economic 
coercion in extracting surplus value. The political then 
becomes an autonomous realm which has its own effects on class 
relations (1973a: 29-33). It is by virtue of this separation 
that hegemony becomes relevant. 
The formal independence of the state from any particular 
class interest is given juridical expression in the division 
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between the public and private. Here the abstract 'citizen', 
individuated into a 'private' subject, is counterposed to the 
state as the 'public interest'. This 'isolation effect' 
serves to obscure collective interests amongst subordinate 
classes in society and to reintegrate them into the national' 
interest-served by the state (1973a: 130-7). The precise 
content of this universal interest is determined by the 
specific hegemonic form of class relations. Thus hegemony 
denotes, not the intellectual dominance of one class but the 
political ensemble of forces, or 'power bloc', which sustains 
an image of public unity: 
The relation between the capitalist state and the 
dominant classes or fractions pushes them towards 
their Political unitv under the protection of a 
hegemonic class or fraction. The hegemonic class or 
fraction Polarizes the specific contradictory 
interests of the various classes or fractions in the 
power bloc by making its own economic interests into 
political interests and by representing the general 
common interest of the classes or fractions in the 
power bloc: this general interest consists of 
economic exploitation and political domination 
(1973a: 239). 
Political domination can be seen, therefore, as the 
interaction of three levels: the structural--where politics is 
separated from the economy; the juridical--where the isolation 
effect generates the division of public and private; and the 
political--where the precise type of public/private relations 
is sustained by the hegemonic form of class fractions and 
alliances. 
Politics, the realm of hegemony, was the space in which 
class forces engaged in struggle and determined the precise 
form of state. The cohesion of classes at the Political level 
was therefore fundamental to the appearance of 'universal# 
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3 interest of the public realm. The state thus had a 
contradictory role: to maintain its separation f rom the direct 
control of any one class, yet at the same time to serve the 
'global' reproduction of the political interests of the 
bourgeoisie by sustaining the unity of the hegemonic bloc. 
Although the universal character of the state, in 
Poulantzas' account, was legitimated by its formal separation 
from the economy, and this was represented juridically in the 
private/public distinction, the specific balance of class 
forces in any particular conjuncture was of fundamental 
importance. Hegemony referred to the on-going interaction of 
class interests, the negotiation of those interests'and the 
reformulation of the dominant ideology that united them. 
Poulantzas, scheme allowed for the disjuncture between class 
domination and political culture. The importance of hegemony 
lay in its political function, not its ideological content 
(1973a: 201-6). 
Poulantzas rejected the notion of an independent 'civil 
society* existing outside the state (1973a: 124-5,128-9). He 
did accept, however, that the juridical notion of 'private, 
interests had an important effect on class struggle--the 
isolation effect. But hegemony did not signify the permeation 
of a political culture arising from a civil society that had 
been ideologically 'colonised' by a class (1973a: 210-21). It 
was instead a form of political cohesion rendered necessary by 
3. Only later did Poulantzas accept that the proletariat 
could generate its own hegemony. This confinement of 
hegemony to the bourgeoisie derived from his 
structuralist account of politics as a fundamental 




the regional autonomy of the state and politics. 
Consequently, Poulantzas tended to treat civil society as just 
another aspect of the state. This is visible in his use of 
the notion 'ideological state apparatuses' whereby 
institutions and bodies formally outside the state (the 
Church, political parties, the media, the family, etc. ) were 
conceived, by virtue of their function in securing the global 
requisite of class unity, as secondary state institutions 
(1972: 250-53). But as Laclau (1977: 67) points out: 'There 
is here a subtle transposition which goes from defining the 
state as the instance which constitutes the factor of cohesion 
between the levels of a social formation to the assertion that 
everything that contributes to the cohesion of a social 
formation pertains, by definition, to the state'. 
This deficiency derived from Poulantzas' structuralist 
account of the relation between state and economy. The most 
serious difficulty lay in its functionalist overtones which at 
times suggested that whatever the nature of class forces, the 
state's political function always secured class domination. 
At other times, 'he would suggest that the interaction of state 
and economy was contingent upon the hegemonic alliance 
achieved by the bourgeoisie. This, it has been argued, tended 
to loverpoliticizel the relation between state and economy. 
Like the very arguments he sought to criticise, Poulantzas 
suggested that the state's relation with the economy was 
mediated by the political and ideological construction of 
class power (see Jessop, 1990: 30-1). This neglected the 
economic role of the state in favour of structuralist-defined 
class-theoretical approach. 
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In the two Gramsci-inspired accounts of the state 
examined so far, the legitimation of political institutions is 
conceived as a function of class forces acting on the state. 
While the first approach identifies hegemony with elite 
political culture, focusing on the manipulation of power 
positions and information apparatuses by class interests, the 
second treats hegemony as a formal category in the 
structuration of class domination, identifying it as a 
specifically political notion within a functional framework. 4 
Before I assess my-own, -interpretation it will be useful to 
outline another account of the state and legitimation which 
differs considerably from these class-based analyses, in which 
Gramsci-is clearly a significant influence. 
Legitimation Crisis 
The relation between state, economy and legitimacy has been 
given systematic analysis by Jargen Habermas (1975,1979). 
Although he accepts a version of a class analysis of state and 
crisis, he sees legitimacy not as contingent upon the hegemony 
of a class but rather as a function of the state's 
contradictory insertion in society. Furthermore, his account 
of legitimacy is framed in terms of the anticipated emergence, 
not of a hegemonic class ideology, but rather of a *universal* 
claim to 'rationality' which undermines the validity of the 
modern state. 
4. See Poulantzas' remarks on legitimacy (1973a: 221-4). 
'Poulantzas' political sociology has influenced a number 
of British neo-Marxist applications of hegemony. See 
Jessop (1990: chs 6 and 7) and Hall et al. (1978b) for 
examples. 
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Habermas's view of legitimacy and the state is 
distinctive because he establishes that relation not in terms 
of hegemonic class leadership but rather as an issue of social 
cohesion based on a theory of capitalism as an integrated 
'system'. His'systems-, rather than class-, analysis 
corresponds to his conception of emancipation. Far from 
committing himself to an emancipatory discourse evolving from 
class ideology, Habermas adopts a Kantian perspective 
concerning the attainment of rational communication 
unencumbered by 'distortion'. In his later work, this has 
involved a 'universal pragmatics' aimed at specifying 
transcendental, a priori conditions for free communication 
(1979: ch. 1; 1988: 16-19). Concerned more with the 
rationalisation of social and political institutions than the 
balance of class forces, Habermas's analysis of the'state and 
its attendant crises is geared towards an appreciation of the 
potential for rational communication free from distorting 
interests or preconceived goals. Although his analysis marks 
a clear, break from the European Marxist tradition, Habermas 
accepts certain principles of 'historical materialism# for his 
examination of capitalist society and explicitly identifies 
legitimation crises as class issues. 
Habermas argues that the relation between the modern 
state and the capitalist accumulation process makes it 
susceptible to any of four types of crises: economic crises, 
rationality crises, legitimation and motivational crises 
(1975: 41-50). The tendency to one or all of these crises 
derives from the contradictory imperatives of political and 
economic sub-systems in capitalist societies. In 'advanced' 
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capitalist society, the state has taken on an increased role 
in the administration of the economy which has transformed the 
nature of the free market. This transformation is partly 
visible in the emergence of capitalist concentration and the 
spread of oligopilistic structures, as well as the increasing 
expansion of the public sector. The state is caught between 
the need to maintain its image of impartiality, and an 
imperative to reproduce the conditions for the accumulation of 
capital (1975: 33-40). -In essence, the tendency to 
legitimation crises is a consequence of this dual imperative. 
There are, however, a number of routes to the apparent 
withdrawal of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy, Habermas claims, is 'the worthiness of a 
political order to be recognised' (1979: 182). He goes on to 
remark that 'the claim to legitimagy is related to the social- 
integrative preservation of a normatively determined social 
identity' (1979: 182-3). This 'social identity' and hence its 
/social-integrative' function are jeopardised during crises. 
Legitimation crises occur when the state's impartiality 
towards capitalist interests is revealed. Mass loyalty is 
threatened when bourgeois principles of justice, freedom and 
equality, which form part of the system's 
identity, are 
undermined by state intervention. Social identity is further 
undermined by crises of 'motivation', closely linked to 
legitimation, which form the Isocio-culturall basis. These 
are behavioural patterns which centre on the family and 
possessive individualism which, as more areas of life are 
politicised by increased state intervention and 
rationalisation, become steadily eroded. These normative 
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structures, Habermas contends, are being replaced with 'post- 
modern' motivations concerned with 'universality' and 
'critique' (1975: 86-92) ., These new ethical motivations will 
increasingly subject political institutions to forms of 
rational justification that are no longer functional to the 
continued development of capitalist societies. 
Habermas's typology of crises has the advantage of 
avoiding class reductionism and economism. Forms of 
consciousness are understood, not as reflections of organised 
class interests or of class fractions, but as 'evolved' forms 
of rationality. Likewise, his analysis of state, legitimation 
and economy, though heavily indebted to Marxism, reveals a, 
Weberian sociology of institutions and institutionalised forms 
of rationality. As such, the relation between state and 
economy is conceived as a contradictory one, where the state's 
increased economic role conflicts with its status as an 
impartial public institution. Legitimacy is a function of, 
indeed functional to, this institutional separation, and 
cannot be identified with any particular class fraction. 
Crisis is thus seen as a dislocation of the sub-system of 
economy, polity and socio-cultural sphere. Not suprisingly 
perhaps, Habermas' analysis has been influential in both the 
USA and Germany where federal structures and an absence of 
strong class politics characterise the political systems (see 
Frankel, 1982: 261-68). 
Habermas conceives of legitimation in institUtional and 
systemic terms, terms which are further linked to his 
'evolutionary' theory of communication. ýUnlike the other 
accounts outlined above, his analysis is not focused on the 
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social forces supposedly underlying legitimacy. Hegemony is 
not a, concept employed by Habermas, although it is in some 
sense implicit in his account of the bourgeois socio-cultural 
system. He tends to overlay his analysis with systems theory, 
presenting normative structures as functional prerequisites of 
the capitalist system and not as strategic components of class 
struggle. -Equally! the attribution of a functional role to 
normative structures of consent overestimates the importance 
of common motivations in social cohesion. Consequently, it 
has been argued, the degree of consent necessary to the 
cohesion of capitalist society is overestimated and so the 
role of beliefs and values overrated as supports of legitimacy 
(see Held, 1982: 189-93). 
The Significance Of Civil Society 
The accounts summarised above each entail a different emphasis 
on the sociological, and consequently political, significance 
of civil society in the generation of legitimacy. Anderson, 
Nairn and Miliband's analyses suggest that the state relates 
to the broader realm of society through elites whose cultural 
disposition favours the bourgeoisie. Civil society is thought 
to be dominated by bourgeois values and beliefs which 
consequently breed acquiescence amongst the dominated classes. 
Legitimation is achieved through a dominant culture. 
Poulantzas, however, offered a structural account of 
legitimation.. in his analysis, the realm of politics in 
general functions to sustain the continued existence-of the 
mode of production. As a result, civil society is derivative 
of this structural tendency to self-reproduction. While civil 
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society may be granted a certain reality to the extent that it 
is where subjects 'live out, their 'individual' existence as 
'private' citizens, it cannot be granted a determining 
significance. By treating hegemony as a feature of the 
political level of the mode of production as a whole, 
Poulantzas appeared to consider state and civil society as 
barely distinguishable aspects of the same functional process. 
Habermas, however, holds a more complex view of how the 
state engages with society and the effect of this relation on 
legitimacy. The division between state and society is 
important here (see Frankel, 1982: 258-60,261-8). For in his 
view this separation leads not to the adaptation of the socio- 
cultural realm, or civil society, to political institutions, 
but to their antagonism. Habermas' recognition of the 
different sectors of the economy permitted him to see the 
realm of civil society as not being governed exhaustively by 
relations of exchange, nor by commodity relations. Class 
economic interests did not fully'define that sphere. 
Consequently, the state is not considered simply a capitalist 
instrument, nor the 'factor of cohesion' unifying classes. 
Rather it has to respond to class demands and to reflect 
values and aspirations that are not simply functional to 
class. For him, these latter demands are increasingly at odds 
with the state's economic function. 
Each of the above accounts recognises the role of 
commonly held beliefs and values in sustaining the-authority 
of the state. Yet, whereas Anderson, Nairn, Miliband and 
poulantza; seek to show how the class character of the state 
entails the class domination of civil society, Habermas, by 
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contrast, argues that civil society has developed as a 'public 
sphere' in apparent contradiction to the state's economic 
role. Those theorists who have explicitly employed Gramscian 
concepts in analyzing the state have in fact aimed to reveal 
the unity of the state and society in capitalist social 
formations. Habermas, however, sought to show how that unity 
was undermined. For the neo-Gramscians, hegemony signifies 
the political and ideological 'adaptation' of civil society to 
the state. As Jessop (1990: 41) points out, their analyses 
direct attention to external influences on the state. 
Habermas is more focused on the institutional structure of the 
state itself than the forces that influence it. Consequently, 
legitimtion is less contingent on the mobilisation of ideology 
and political alliances, and more on the management of the 
contradictory imperatives of the modern state. In the next 
section I will suggest that Gramscils notion of civil society 
is, in some respects, more akin to Habermas' account than to 
that, of his neo-Gramscian followers. 
Part Two:, Gramsci and civil society 
The value of Gramscits notion of civil society lies in his 
attempt to conceive it as a sphere in which authority is 
established. Throughout this thesis I have argued that 
Gramscils prison writings were part of his response to Italy's 
social, and political crisis. This was visible, as I have 
shown, in his reconstruction of Marxist analysis, the role he 
attributed to intellectuals in political struggle, and his 
novel approach to ideology. Consequently the significance 
accorded to civil society in his work follows from his 
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presupposition of crisis. In a contemporary 
Gramscils thought may be helpful in exposing 
nature of the relation between private and pi 
emphasis on ideology, and his account of the 




ablic, but his 
class conditions 
analyzing 
The Politics of the Public Sphere 
Much of the initial English-language recovery of Gramscils 
work has focused on his discussion of the state and how it is 
rooted in consent that is produced in civil society. I argued 
in Chapter Two that the dichotomy of state/civil society in 
Gramscils Quaderni, was not intended to be a formal account of 
the social structure as it is determined under capitalism. 
However, when it is conceived as such it is inevitably found 
lacking. Those who have interpreted Gramscits as an account 
of consent in capitalist society have focused on the way the 
institutions of civil society purportedly support the state's 
authority by means of ideology. In the studies summarised 
above this has taken the form of an analysis of either the 
'establishment' (Anderson, Nairn and Miliband) or 
alternatively the 'ideological state apparatuses' (Althusser 
and Poulantzas). * -In their different ways, these studies seek 
to show, how hegemony builds a correspondence between the 
diverse class structures of society and the universal claims 
of the state by means of an ideological integration of 
classes. Civil society is believed to serve the interests of 
the bourgeoisie by virtue of its hegemonic domination. 
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This interpretation certainly has its roots in Gramscils 
notion of hegemony. However, it fails to grasp other aspects 
of his work which detract from this state-centred approach. 
Gramsci did argue that bourgeois political domination was 
exercised through the 'private' institutions of civil society. 
However, this was a state of affairs that was both 
historically specific and fundamentally unstable in his view. 
As I have argued in Chapter Two, the fusion of the realms of 
state and society was specific to the emergence of modern 
democracies and the dominance of finance capital. These 
conditions not only integrated classes into bourgeois rule, 
they also threatened that rule by allowing the formation of 
alternative sites of class unity outside the formal structure 
of the state. It was toward the possibility of generating an 
alternative bloc of support in that newly politicised sphere 
of civil society that Gramscils analysis of class and 
intellectuals was aimed. The crisis of the bourgeoisie 
consisted in its inability to sustain a unity of class 
relations given the increased importance of that unity in 
maintaining the state's authority. It is the indeterminacy of 
class relations in civil society that Gramsci insisted was 
crucial in providing the conditions for a proletarian 
hegemony. Yet this indeterminacy has either been missed by 
his interpreters or construed as an unacceptable humanism. 
As a consequence of this neo-Marxist emphasis on the 
political domination of the bourgeoisie over civil society, 
the ideological component of hegemony has been construed as a 
'dominant ideology'. Whereas Gramsci was concerned with the 
decline and fragmentation of the ideological basis of support 
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for the bourgeoisie, the class- and mode-theoretical 
approaches outlined above often implied that hegemony entails 
an all-pervasive cultural dominance. Abercrombie et al. 
(1980) have argued against what they call the 'dominant 
ideology thesis'. Their argument is summed up in the 
following passage: 
The thesis argues that in all societies based on 
class divisions there is a dominant class which 
enjoys control of both the means of material 
production and the means of mental production. 
Through its control of ideological production, the 
dominant class is able to supervise the construction 
of a set of coherent beliefs. These dominant 
beliefs of the dominant class are more powerful, 
dense and coherent than those of subordinate 
classes. The dominant ideology penetrates and 
infects the consciousness of the working class, 
because the working class comes to see and to 
experience reality through the conceptual categories 
of the dominant class. The dominant ideology 
functions to incorporate the working class within a 
system which is, in fact, operating against the 
material interests of labour. This in turn explains 
the coherence and integration of capitalist society 
(Abercrombie et al., 1980: 1-2). 
To Abercrombie et al., this argument is false, both 
empirically and theoretically. In the first case, there is no 
evidence that different classes share a common set of ideas 
and values, especially those of an economically dominant 
class. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that 
capitalist societies, on a Marxist analysis, are either stable 
or need to cohere by means of ideology. Indeed, in their 
analysis the ideology of the dominant class is, if anything, 
more crucial to the unity of that class than to that of 
society as a whole. The reproduction of capitalist society, 
they arguet can be traced to the 'dull compulsion* of economic 
relations. 
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However, it would be wrong entirely to associate Gramsci 
with this view. As I have shown in Chapter Four, Gramscills 
discussion of ideology suggested that there was neither a 
single coherent worldview that was adopted by subordinate 
classes nor a view that ideology was a functional prerequisite 
for capitalist society. Rather, Gramsci provided a Political 
account of ideology, suggesting that the struggle to unite and 
integrate classes characterised civil society. The 
persistance of traditional conceptions of the world, and the 
, immaturity' of sections of the working class and peasantry, 
held the proletariat back from mobilising its own organic' 
ideology. Consent, in this instance, was more 'passive' than 
'active' (see Femia, 1981: 42-5). 5 
Gramscils notion of civil society, I have suggested, was 
intended to emphasise the dynamic nature of that sphere in a 
period of crisis. Unlike his later interpreters, Gramscits 
analysis presupposed the breakdown of the authority of the 
state. It was precisely the lack of leadership over civil 
society that made it available to an alternative form of class 
rule. Gramscils use of Croce's distinction between Political 
and civil society was intended to reinforce the idea that 
without that leadership, the state remained a simply juridical 
apparatus. 
Again unlike his interpreters, Gramsci presupposed that 
the capitalist market economy was no longer the basis of 
bourgeois economic dominance. The increased use of planning 
5. Mann (1973) argues that the absence of a revolutionary 
consciousness amongst the Western working class is due 
more to their ideological fragmentation than their 
incorporation into a dominant ideology. 
239 
and corporatist modes of industrial control, in his view, was 
indicative of'the loss of initiative amongst the bourgeoisie. 
Consequently, he saw the economic role of the proletariat as 
the basis for its moral unity, not its fragmentation in 
exchange relations. Thus ideology was thought to unify the 
proletariat as a collective agent, not to obscure that unity 
through commodity fetishism or reification. In short, because 
Gramscils account of hegemony was rooted in his interpretation 
of the crisis of-the bourgeois class, his political thought 
was premised on the assumed absence of a strongly articulated 
bourgeois public sphere which his interpreters have taken as a 
prerequisite in their discussions of civil society. 
6 
Gramscils analysis of hegemony was formulated on the 
assumption that a liberal distinction between private and 
public did not characterise Italian politics. This assumption 
informed, his understanding of the content of civil society. 
For in such conditions the relation between authority and 
belief was thought to lie with 'local' relations rather than 
with preconceived individuals and the state. Consequently, 
authority over belief, rather than a 'procedural' account of 
authority, characterised the plurality of relations in civil 
society. The crisis had generated conditions in which forms 
of authority over belief, established primarily between 
intellectuals and the social groups they represented, became 
fundamental to maintaining political power. The absence of a 
widespread ideology that transcended class and regional 
6. This assumption is also visible in Przeworskils 
application of Gramscian concepts to his analysis of 'the 
material bases of consent'. See Przeworski, 1985: ch. 4. 
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identities made those solidarities and collectively held 
identities all the more significant. It is for this reason 
that I have stressed the role of intellectuals in the analysis 
of hegemony rather than ideological state apparatuses. For 
Gramscils concern was predominantly with the social basis of 
consent rather than its institutional form. Hegemony, in his 
analysis, involved a 'bottom up' rather than 'top down' 
enquiry into authority relations. The struggle to integrate 
these various identities into a hegemonic bloc of support was 
never exhausted by a single set of institutions. 
- The similarities between Gramsci and Habermas can now be 
seen. Neither suggest that civil society is simply adapted to 
the state by means of a dominant ideology or culture. For 
both, it was precisely the emergence of new forms of public 
unity in civil society that reinforced the crisis of the 
state's authority. Gramsci, however, gave no clue as to the' 
cause of crisis, as Habermas attempted to do systematically. 
Indeed, Gramscils starting point was the historical absence of 
a public sphere, while-Habermas' was its 'transformation' in 
late-capitalist society. Yei, unlike the neo-Gramscian 
analyses outlined above, Habermas' account is in line with 
much of the spirit of Gramscits thought as I have presented 
it. 7 
Some recent applications of Gramscils thought have 
employed a society- rather than state-centred approach to 
hegemony. Analyses of popular culture and the mass media 
7. see Texier (1987) for a suggestion on the forms of 
rationality and civil society in Gramscits work. Texier 
explicitly links hegemony to Habermas' theory of 
communication (1987: 26). See also Adamson (1987/8). 
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especially have aimed to show how the plurality of identities 
and collective beliefs amongst different social groups and 
classes have been integral to crises in class relations in 
i3ritish society. In the work by Stuart Hall in particular, 
Gramscils-concept of hegemony has been employed to analyse how 
forms of common sense have been manipulated to redefine the 
public sphere to reflect an aggressive conservative 
individualism. 8 What is important here is that far from being 
dominated by a single pervasive ideology, civil society is 
recognised as a complex sphere of identities and beliefs whose 
correspondence with the state is articulated through a 
relatively unified ideology that synthesizes 'popular' beliefs 
around a conservative political agenda. In opposition to a 
reductionist Marxism that treats all political forms as the 
same, Hall argued that the ideologies that revolved around 
'Thatcherism' represented a novel attempt to reconstruct the 
relationship between state and society on the basis of a 
revived free-market economy. To acheive this, it was 
necessary, not merely to occupy the command structures of the 
state, but also to prepare society ideologically. This was 
accomplished not by the imposition of ideas, but rather the 
rearticulation of existing ideologies--nationalism, anti- 
unionism, ideologies of the family, and of race etc. --in terms 
of a core political project. The relation between private and 
public, therefore, was given a dynamic and indeterminate 
8. See Hall et al. (1978b). Hall's work on 'Thatcherism' as 
a peculiar post-Keynesian 'hegemonic project' has become 
the most widely recognised application of Gramscils 
thought in Britain. See especially his articles on 
'authoritarian populism, (Hall, 1988: chs 1,2,8,9 and 
10). 
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formulation. Hall's work suggested that the unity of civil 
society had been achieved through ideological struggle and 
that the correspondence of local identities and beliefs to an 
overall sense of common political obligation could not be 
deduced from the market economy. 9 
The Limits of Heqemonv - 
Gramscils notion of hegemony was conceived as a response to 
the political and social crisis in Italy, so inevitably this 
context also serves as a limitation on his analysis. The 
difficulties lie both in his characterisation of civil society 
as, the realm in which authority is maintained by belief, and 
in his assumption that class identities predominate in that 
sphere. 
As I have argued above, Gramsci believed that the crisis 
entailed a separation of state from society, with the 
consequence-that a struggle ensued to reconstruct the statels 
authority by ideologically unifying and integrating the 
component forces of civil society. This, however, appears to 
suggest that the validation of a political relationship is 
based on a shared ideology. My discussion of the role of 
intellectuals in Gramscils analysis reinforces the view that 
for him-authority was fundamentally the generation of a 
unified conception of the world. I noted in the Introduction 
9. At one point Hall made reference to Laclau's argument 
that the 'people/power bloc' relation was more inclusive 
than that of 'capital/labourt (1988: 138-46). 
Interestingly, Hall's analysis of Thatcherism was 
explicitly set in the context of the British political 
and economic crisis. In that way Hall also grasped the 
dynamic nature of hegemonic struggle that Gramscils work 
expressed. 
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Beetham's argument that belief was only one aspect of the 
process of legitimation. Gramsci, therefore, provides a 
limited account of legitimacy, because hegemony is construed 
predominantly as an ideological phenomenon. Consequently, the 
role of consenting behaviour and institutionalised rules and 
procedures, which Beetham argues are separate components of 
the legitimation of power, are not addressed. 
Consenting behaviour, in Gramscils analysis, was not 
analytically distinguished from ideology. Gramsci tended to 
associate the observable withdrawal of support with the 
breakdown in the ideological validation of authority. On the 
other hand, the continued acquiescence of the proletariat and 
other subordinate classes was seen as a failure to develop a 
'critical consciousness'. This confusion of consent with 
ideology was due to Gramscils ascription of class interests to 
the proletariat (and indeed to other classes), which he 
believed existed, if only in latent form, as a potential basis 
for moral unity. The failure to realise this essential 
interest at a consciously political level was, therefore, due 
to the inhibiting effects of other ideologies.. As such, 
Gramsci could not conceive of the proletariat's acquiescence 
in the existing political structure without assuming that this 
entailed a validation, albeit 'passive', of its legitimacy. 
Gramsci did not theorise in any way the relation between 
legitimacy and the institutions of political authority. There 
is no consideration of what Beetham described as the rules and 
procedures that govern the conduct of those in positions of 
power. There are two reasons for this absence in Gramscils 
work. 
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Firstly, Gramsci assumed that in a period of crisis the 
authority of the formal apparatus of the state ('political 
society') had-broken away from its ideological basis in civil 
society. This precluded any consideration of the efficacy of 
political institutions, for by definition those institutions 
were thought to elicit the support of citizens no longer. 
This was the basis of my argument that Gramscils notion of 
hegemony did not serve as a formal theory of consent in 
capitalist society. 
Secondly, Gramscils stress on the ideological basis of 
authority in civil society suggested that consent was achieved 
through the elaboration of a common cultural disposition. 
While this did not imply that the institutional organisation 
of hegemony was unimportant, either in a reconstructed 
bourgeois alliance or in a new proletarian bloc of support, 
Gramsci clearlyýassumed that the consent achieved through 
intellectuals' leadership obviated an in-depth enquiry into 
how that support, was regulated through rules and procedures. 
However, he, did discuss the role of the Party organisation and 
the importanceýof both discipline and dialogue in generating 
active support., - Yet his remarks on those issues presupposed 
the intellectuals' capacity to represent their class 
constituencies. As a consequence of those two factors, 
Gramsci neither examined the interaction of ideologies and 
institutions in propagating and organising consent, nor did he 
provide, any clue as to how a future state would 
institutionalise a legitimate representation of those it 
governed. As Bobbio (1986: 5-6) points out, Italian social 
thought before World War Two displayed an emphasis on 
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questions of culture as opposed to institutionsý Only after 
World War Two did the problem of renewing Political structures 
come to dominate political thought. 
Gramscils concern with the ideological aspects of civil 
society does not, therefore, exhaust questions concerning 
legitimacy. In a contemporary light, his notion of hegemony 
appears inordinately focused on issues that are marginal to 
modern capitalist societies. Barker (1990: 87-8,195-200), 
for instance, argues that neo-Marxists' emphasis on culture 
and ideology only touch upon factors that influence 
legitimacy, not legitimacy itself. For in Barker's view, 
political legitimacy in modern liberal states is at heart a 
relationship between the individual citizen and the state. 
Collective beliefs and identities outside of that relation may 
influence legitimacy, but are not constitutive of it. This 
point is similar to that made by some Marxists that the major 
constraint in challenging the legitimacy of the state in 
capitalist, society lies in the separation of politics from 
society, and not in the dissemination of particular 
ideologies. As I have argued, Gramscils, analysis was based on 
the assumption that this relation between Politics and 
society,, state and citizens, did not hold, and consequently 
the 'publicness' of Political authority remained a matter of 
political contest. For him the absence of such a clear 
division provided the conditions for new principles of 
political authority based on a closer relation between the 
subjective beliefs of the people and the power of the state. 
In a contemporary context, however, where the division between 
the individual and the state remains integral to the practice 
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of authority, Gramscils remarks on the contestibility of the 
public realm can only be marginal. 
10 As Beetham points out, 
analysing legitimacy means understanding the various rules and 
principles that define a set of power relations. Challenging 
legitimacy, however, requires the import of new rules and 
principles. Gramscils concept of hegemony is inclined more 
towards the second of these than the first. Friedman 
suggested that the nature of authority derives from the 'prior 
social agreement' that determines the relationship between 
rulers and ruled (see above, pp. 8-12). Wheareas neo- 
Gramscians conceive of legitimacy within the existing 
arrangemnts of capitalism, Gramscils analysis of hegemony took 
as its object the struggle for authority when such 
arrangements were in crisis. 
While Gramscils notion of civil society may be 
illuminating in so far as he suggests that political authority 
is mediated though collective identities and beliefs, it is 
also apparent that his assumption that class and class 
relations were the fundamental forces in civil society limits 
his contemporary relevance. Like many Marxists, Gramsci 
asserted that social and political life revolved around 
economic relations. Although he granted a degree of 
'autonomy' to groups and ideologies that could not be reduced 
10. This absence has had repercussions for the post-War 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) which has had to adapt to 
the reconstruction of the bourgeois state. Whereas for 
Gramsci the absence of strong political institutions 
permitted the coincidence-of proletarian revolutionary 
interests with the 'national-popular', for the PCI the 
balance between the economic-corporate interests of the 
working class and the 'national interest' has been more 
problematic. See Clark and Hine (1980), Vacca (1991) and 
Forgacs (1984,1990). 
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to class interests (especially given Italy's late 
industrialisation), his overriding assumption was that 
'historical blocs' were composed of allied classes and that a 
hegemonic 'ideology derived from a single class or class 
fraction. -Ideas and beliefs not directly related to classes 
were thought to influence, indeed considerably constrain, the 
formation of classes as political agents. However, the 
constitutive role of class position in the formation of social 
consciousness was never greatly problematic for Gramsci. That 
emphasis an class as both the defining feature of the 
'Private' interests of civil society and the core of the 
'public' sphere of hegemony makes Gramscils analysis 
unresponsive to contemporary controversy concerning race and 
gender. Modern cultural theorists and feminists have argued 
that the private/public dichotomy is intrinsically constructed 
through discourses of race and gender. Feminists, fo .r 
instance, argue that the relegation of the domestic sphere to 
the purely 'private', or non-political, reinforces patriarchy 
by depoliticising domestic sexual oppression and denying the 
gendered character of the public sphere (see Okin, 1991: 67- 
78). While Gramsci did not work strictly within the terms of 
liberal political theory, his preoccupation with class makes 
it difficult, for him to see such issues as anything other than 
of secondary importance. While Gramsci made some remarks 
concerning what he called the 'sexual question' in relation to 
incorporating women into the labour force (Q: 2147-50,2160-61 
2165-8), he clearly assumed that material production, as 
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opposed to reproduction, had primacy both ontologically and 
politically. " 
Finally, even Gramscils preoccupation with the working 
class as the basis of 'intellectual and moral reform' 
presupposed conditions in economic and social life that no 
longer exist today. For Gramsci, the decline of the market 
economy and the increased reliance by the state on functional 
specialisations in controlling production and disciplining the 
workforce created conditions for the moral unification of the 
proletariat and consequently for the reconstruction of a 
nation-wide political authority. Gramscils analysis was based 
on the assumption that Fordist methods of production provided 
conditions for a new political order, despite the fact that 
those conditions had not yet fully developed into an 
alternative state. 
Many contemporary theorists, however, have argued that 
the decline of Fordism, and its replacement by a 'post- 
Fordist' economy, have effectively destroyed the working class 
as a political, force (see Murray, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1987). 
Non-labour intensive electronic industries and the growth of 
specialist markets, as opposed to Fordist mass production, 
have fragmented the working class (Murray, 1990). In 
addition, the growth of a 'post-modernist' culture, 
characterised by weak political allegiances and a massively 
increased degree of symbolic communication, has resulted in 
the generation of subjects predominantly around consumption 
11. See Sassoon (1987b) for an argument in favour of 
Gramscils relevance to the relation between women, 
production and the shifting boundaries between private 
and public. 
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rather than production (Lash and Urry, 1987: ch. 9). In such 
conditions, Gramsci Is assertion that hegemony 'starts in the 
factory' appears hopelessly out of date. 
In short, though suggestive, Gramscils notion of hegemony 
is limited as a framework for analyzing legitimacy. This is 
because the crisis, to which his analysis was a response, led 
him to view civil society as a dynamic sphere of class forces, 
old and barely developed ideologies, and intellectuals. In a 
particular conjuncture, those components were ununified, or 
were beginning to break apart from the bloc to which they had 
previously adhered. For Gramsci, their recomposition into an 
'organic unity' would be acheived by the proletariat 
presenting itself as a 'universal class'. In a contemporary 
context, neither the class foundation nor the conditions of 
social crisis adequately characterise civil society. 
Consequently, authority over belief in civil society cannot be 
granted a similar significance. 
Part Three: Summary and Final Conclusion 
In this thesis I have provided an original account of the 
relationship between the notions of hegemony and legitimacy. 
My central argument has been that Gramscits Quadernidel 
carcere must be interpreted as a response to Italy's social 
and political crisis. on this interpretation, it is Possible 
to grasp the extent to which his account of hegemony provides 
a framework for the discussion of legitimacy. I shall 
summarise the arguments below. 
It was shown that the issue of legitimacy concerns the 
validation of political relationships, and that a major part 
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of that process involves the generation of authority through 
common beliefs and values that serve to unify a political 
community. The notion of hegemony is directly concerned with 
the sustenance of political relations through a common set of 
beliefs. Throughout the thesis I have attempted to illuminate 
the manner in which Gramsci constructed ýegemony as a general 
mode of analysis. Unlike other commentators, I have argued 
that the problem of crisis is fundamental in interpreting his 
thought. 
In Chapter One, I outlined the trajectory of Gramscirs 
analysis throughout the turbulent years before his*arrest in 
1926. His response to Italy's crisis was examined in terms of 
his arguments promoting, first of all, a new form of state 
organised around factory production, and subsequently, his 
initial arguments in favour of a mass Party. Gramscils 
Crocean influence, like that of many other Italian' 
intellectuals, inclined him to see political unity in cultural 
terms. Yet unlike Croce, Gramsci sought the foundation for 
this unity in the objective conditions of the collapse of the 
Italian state. This formed the second strand of his response 
to the crisis. Gramsci analysed the collapse of the state, 
firstly, in terms of the loss of bourgeois control over 
production, and then later, as the disintegration of the 
Ibloct of class supportýthat sustained its rule. This shift 
represented a move from a concern with the state (its 
collapse, and the form of moral unity that could replace it) 
to society (as a bloc of class forces unified by 
intellectuals). That transition in his analysis of the crisis 
was fundamental to the arguments in the Quaderni. 
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-In Chapter Two, I examined Gramscils presentation of 
hegemony as a relation between state and society. I argued 
that it would be wrong to see that relation as a static one in 
his thought. For Gramscils view that consent was a central 
factor in class domination was more an argument for 
revolutionary politics than a formal account of the structure 
of capitalist society. This was visible in his reconstructed 
class analysis where he urged the recognition of the specific 
conjuncture and its attendant 'relations of forces'. Against 
two particular Marxist interpretations, I argued that 
Gramscils remarks on state, civil society and consent aimed to 
grasp the nature of political action in the period of crisis. 
In Chapter Three, I showed how Gramscils analysis of the 
role of intellectuals in political struggle substantiates the 
argument in the previous chapter. The intellectuals were the 
central agents in his class analysis of Italian history, and 
in theorising the role of the Party and the strategy of 
hegemony. Indeed, the crisis of the state was presented by 
Gramsci as a disintegration of the bloc in which the 
relationship of representation between intellectuals and 
masses became unfixed. The relationship between intellectuals 
and people, I argued, was one of authority over belief. 
Intellectuals were crucially situated to interpret, unite, and 
'lead' the subjects of their social bases. The struggle for 
hegemony, therefore, was a contest to unite the numerous 
intellectuals in civil society. 
In Chapter Four, I examined the problematic relationship 
between class and ideology. Gramscits novelty lay in posing 
class as the central agent in political struggle while 
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simultaneously rejecting an economistic account of ideology. 
I looked at a number of the interpretations of hegemony and 
ideology that different Marxist traditions have drawn from 
Gramsci, and argued that these remained only partial 
interpretations of his thought. Gramsci understood his 
current situation as a period of 'organic crisis'. This 
allowed him to postulate the class character of social 
antagonisms whilst at the same time allowing for the autonomy 
of ideology, forms of discourse and of politics itself from 
immediate economic interests. 
In this final Chapter Five, I returned to the question of 
legitimacy and its relation to Gramscils concept of hegemony. 
I argued that hegemony refers to forms of authority over 
belief established in civil society. While some neo-Gramscian 
analyses have used hegemony to provide an account of the 
specific forms of the ideological legitimation of the 
capitalist state, I suggest that Gramscits notion of civil 
society is best seen from a more society-centred perspective. 
This is because Gramscils starting point was one in which 
state and society were not harmoniously related; in his work 
political struggle refered to the attempt to reconstruct that 
relation. As a consequence, Gramscils analysis of hegemony is 
not able to provide a full account of legitimacy in the modern 
state. This is because legitimacy consists of a framework of 
rules, beliefs and practices that define a given set of power 
relations. Hegemony, the way Gramsci constructed it, 
theorised a form of politics in a period during which the 
framework of legitimacy did not, in his view, exist. 
Gramsci's writings, therefore, remain suggestive for the 
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analysis of the cultural basis of authority and the dynamic 
nature of the private/public relation, but his theory provides 
a limited account of the legitimation of power because it was 
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